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INTRODUCTION
American law has little patience for immigrants who arrive unable
to understand English.2 These immigrants face, at best, spotty
accommodation of their language barrier: translation in the criminal
courtroom,' the voting booth,4 and the classroom5 is usually assured,
but availability elsewhere varies. As consumers, immigrants unable to
understand English are left largely to the morals of the marketplace.
Existing consumer protection regulation too often assumes that
consumers are proficient in English or, if not, are accompanied in
2. Generally, applicants for naturalization as U.S. citizens must demonstrate that they can
read, write, and speak simple English. 8 U.S.C. § 1423 (1994).
3. Cf. United States ex rel Negron v. New York, 434 F.2d 386, 391 (2d Cir. 1970) (finding
that both Sixth Amendment and "simple humaneness" require that state provide translator for
non-English speaking criminal defendant); see also Tejeda-Mata v. Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service, 626 F.2d 721, 726 (9th Cir. 1980) (finding that trial judge abused discretion by not
allowing simultaneous translation into Spanish of testimony offered against defendant in
deportation hearing); United States v. Mosquera, 816 F. Supp. 168, 175 (E.D.N.Y 1993)
(requiring translation of court documents fornon-English speaking criminal defendants in order
to allow "meaningful access to relevant documents"). For a discussion of the effect of language
barriers on the need for knowing and intelligent waiver of Miranda rights, see Linda Friedman
Ramirez et al., Men Language Is a Barrier toJustice CRIM. JUST., Summer 1994, at 2. In contrast,
the California Supreme Court found no constitutional basis for a state supplied translator in civil
proceedings. Jam v. Municipal Court, 578 P.2d 94, 96 (Cal. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1067
(1979).
4. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-la(b) (2) (1994); see also infra note 201.
5. See Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 566-69 (1974) (holding that failure of San Francisco
school system to provide English language instruction to students of Chinese ancestry who do
not speak English violates Civil Rights Act of 1964). For a discussion of bilingual education, see
generally Rachel F. Moran, Bilingual Education as a Status Conflic 75 CAL. L. REv. 321 (1987);
Rachel F. Moran, The Politics of Discretion: Federal Intervention in Bilingual Education, 76 CAL. L.
REV. 1249 (1988).
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their transactions by an interpreter. Sadly, this gap in protection has
made some Latinos/as and other language minorities the victims of
choice for unscrupulous merchants who prey on their inability to
understand the terms of the bargain.
7
Non-English-speaking consumers deserve the same protection as
other consumers, and thus, this Article advocates guarantees for their
ability to strike informed bargains. To safeguard consumers most
vulnerable to unfair and deceptive trade practices, this Article
contemplates a comprehensive strategy of reform that involves the
legislatures, administrative agencies, and courts, as well as nonprofit
organizations that advocate for language minorities and merchants
themselves. Part I examines the growth in numbers of monolingual
Latino/a consumers and documents their experience in the American
marketplace. Part I also explores the shortcomings of existing reme-
dies under the common law and consumer protection regulation
when applied to non-English-speaking consumers. Part II details
potential obstacles to establishing effective consumer protection for
Latinos/as and other language minorities. Most significant are the
English language movement's repeated calls for a "sink or swim"
standard for language minorities in settings ranging from the
classroom to the voting booth. The anti-immigrant climate that
spawned California's Proposition 187 may also impede reform efforts.
Part III proposes reforms to common law remedies and to statutory
consumer protection to place more responsibility on businesses when
they deal with language minority consumers. Part III also provides a
model of self-regulation for merchants who desire to accommodate
these consumers. Finally, the Article revisits President Kennedy's
consumer "bill of rights" from the point of view of Latino/a
consumers.
Due to the large number of monolingual Spanish-speaking
Latinos/as in the American marketplace, this Article focuses on these
6. The term Latino/a is meant to refer to all persons with ancestry in Spanish-speaking
countries. Unless used in source material, this Article does not employ the "Hispanic"
designation because of its controversial implications. See generally RODOLFO ACURA, OCCUPIED
AMERICA: A HISTORY OF CHICANOS ix-xii (3d ed. 1988) (describing Hispanic label as return to
philosophy of Mexican positivists at turn of this century who wanted to purge indigenous
Mexicans and convert Mexico into European Spanish nation). Latino/a is intended to include
those persons with ancestry in countries that are commonly thought of as Spanish-speaking, but
whose native languages are indigenous. See infra notes 231-34 and accompanying text (discussing
diversity of languages among Latinos/as). The differences among the various statutory
definitions of the Latino/a people reflect this diversity of languages and of cultures. See Lisette
E. Simon, Comment, Hispanics: Not a Cognizable Ethnic Group, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 497, 508-10
(1994) (describing range of state and federal definitions of "Hispanic").
7. For examples of such practices, see infra Part I.B.
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consumers. Much of the analysis and proposed reforms, however,
extend to other language minority groups.'
I. MONOLINGUAL LATINO/A CONSUMERS: GROWTH IN NUMBERS
AND ABUSES
A. Latinola Demographics and Language Abilities
America's immigrant population constitutes the largest "of any
society in world history."9 Immigrants from Mexico represent the
largest single group, comprising over twenty-seven percent of all
immigrants." Immigration from Mexico has itself been described
as constituting "the greatest migration of people in the history of
humanity."1 When coupled with Latino/a immigrants from coun-
tries other than Mexico and with Latinos/as born here, the total
Latino/a population in America as reported by 1994 census data is
twenty-seven million. 2 The actual number today is even larger; not
only has the Latino/a population grown since 1994, but census figures
do not accurately reflect the substantial undocumented Latino/a
immigrant population or the Latino/a population generally. 3
8. Although the federal Voting Rights Act protects only language minorities who are also
members of certain specified racial and ethnic minority groups, see infra note 201, the proposals
in this Article can extend beyond members of minority groups. See infra note 197 and
accompanying text (discussing census statistics that report French, German, and Italian as most
common languages spoken in American homes after English and Spanish).
9. Paul Raeburn, Americanization Found to Reduce Immigrant Student'sPerformance, L.A. DAILY
NEWS, Feb. 23, 1994, at N12 (commenting on 1990 census figure of 19.8 million immigrants).
Census figures released in 1995 reported the number of immigrants had reached 22.6 million
in 1994, the highest proportion of America's population since World War H1. SeeSpencer Rich,
U.S. Immigrant Population at Postwar High, WASH. POST, Aug. 29, 1995, at Al (noting that current
proportion of foreign-born population is nearly double that in 1970).
10. Rich, supra note 9, at Al (noting that immigrants from Mexico comprise more than 6.2
of 22.6 million immigrants).
11. MARILYN P. DAVIS, MEXICAN VOICES/AMERICAN DREAMS 4 (1990).
12. BuREAu OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, THE NATION'S HISPANIC POPULA-
TION-1994 (1995) (stating that in 1994, there were 27 million Hispanics in United States, and
projecting Hispanic population of 31 million by 2000 and 88 million by 2050).
13. The Census Bureau itself estimates its 1990 census undercounted Latinos/as by 5.2%.
56 Fed. Reg. 33,582 (1991). An official from the Mexican American Legal Defense and
Educational Fund suggested that fear of immigration officials and the lack of bilingual census
takers led to the undercount of Latinos/as. See Frank M. Lowrey, IV, Comment, Through the
Looking Glass: Linguistic Separatism and National Unity, 41 EMORY LJ. 223, 266 n.229 (1992)
(stating that efforts of Immigration and Naturalization Service to discover and deport
undocumented immigrants deter Latinos from responding to census inquiries); see also
Memorandum from Laurence Hamblen, Executive Director, Lane County Legal Aid Services,
Inc., to Timothy Wood, Financial Fraud Division, Oregon Attorney General's Office 5 (Oct. 24,
1992) (on file with The American University Law Review) ("Hispanics often do not respond to
census-takers. They may fear that the information will be reported to the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS). And there is a culturally rooted mistrust of government shared
10311996]
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A substantial number of Latinos/as in America cannot speak
English well or at all. Although Latinos/as learn English as fast or
faster than other past immigrant groups, 4 the traditional pattern of
English language acquisition extends to three generations: the first
generation acquires some English ability but is mostly monolingual,
the second generation is bilingual, and the third generation prefers
English.1" Several studies demonstrate that Latino/a English lan-
guage acquisition is consistent with this model.1 6 One study deter-
mined that of those Latino/a immigrants born and raised in Mexico,
eighty-four percent speak mostly Spanish in their American homes.
Eighty-four percent of their grandchildren born in America, however,
speak mostly English at home, while only four percent speak mostly
Spanish.17
Despite the normal English acquisition pattern, continued Latino/a
immigration assures the presence in America's marketplace of
millions of monolingual Spanish-speaking consumers (the Spanish-
Only Consumer). As counted by the 1990 census, over seventeen
million Americans speak Spanish at home. s If these Spanish-
speaking Americans were gathered in a single state, it would be the
by Hispanics ... ").
14. Some observers have speculated that Latino/a immigrants fail to assimilate as quickly
as other immigrant groups. See, e.g., Walter P.Jacob, Note, Diversity Vsas: Muddled Thinking and
PorkBarrelPolitics, 6 GEO. IMMIGR. LJ. 297,303 (1992) (quoting SenatorAlan Simpson's remarks
that "[t]he assimilation of the English language and other aspects of American culture by
Spanish-speaking immigrants appears to be less rapid and complete than for other groups").
Several studies, however, have debunked this racist stereotype of the obstinate or ignorant
Latino/a immigrant. See generaly Bill Ong Hing, Beyond the Rhetoric of Assimilation and Cultural
Pluralism: Addresing the Tension of Separatism and Conflict in an Immigration-Driven Multiracial
Society, 81 CAL. L. REV. 863 (1993) (providing comprehensive response to Senator Simpson and
other assimilationists who urge immigration reform to exclude immigrants of color).
15. See Antonio J. Califa, Declaring English the OFficial Language: Preudice Spoken Here, 24
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 293, 312-17 (1989) (stating classic three-generation model of language
acquisition and demonstrating its applicability to Latinos/as).
16. See, eg., id. (discussing influential 1986 McCarthy/Valdez study of Mexican Americans
in California confirming this model); Carol Schmid, Comment, Language Rights and the Legal
Status of English-Only Laws in the Public and Private Sector, 20 N.C. CENT. LJ. 65, 71 (1992)
(reporting results of 1988 Veltman study that points to shift toward two-generation pattern of
English language acquisition for Latino/a immigrants).
17. Donald L Horowitz, Conflict and Accommodation: Mexican-Americans in the Cosmopolis, in
MEXiCAN-AMERI CANS IN COMPARATIE PERSPECrivE 78 (Walker Connor ed., 1985) (reporting
results of 1978 Lopez study of. 1129 couples in Los Angeles). My own family experience
conforms to this normal shift in language ability and preference. My grandfather (Fernando
Troncoso) immigrated to East Los Angeles from Chiapas around 1918 and my grandmother
(Ramona Montes de Oca) left Guadalajara for California's Coachella Valley around 1921. Both
learned English, but spoke mostly Spanish at home. My mother (Irene Troncoso), one of their
five children, spoke both English and Spanish at home. Although I was born and raised in the
East Los Angeles barrio, I spoke English at school and at home and know only some Spanish.
18. 1990 Census of Population and Housing, Apr. 30, 1993, available in WESTLAW, Cendata
file [hereinafter 1990 Census] (reporting 17,339,172 Spanish-speakers).
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third most populous, after California and New York. 9 Although
slightly over half of these seventeen million Spanish-speakers reported
that they can speak English very well,2" 1,460,145 reported that they
were completely unable to speak English, and 3,040,828 reported that
they do speak English, but "not well."21 These figures surely over-
state the actual proficiency because those unable to speak English are
often uncounted and those participating in the census are likely to
exaggerate their language skills.2
Although not measured by the census, the number of Latinos/as in
America unable to read English probably exceeds that of Latinos/as
unable to speak it.23 One estimate is that half of the Latino/a adults
in America are functionally illiterate in English.24 Moreover, many
monolingual Spanish-speaking Latinos/as in America cannot read
Spanish.25  This circumstance is explained by illiteracy estimates in
Mexico that range from seven 26 to twelve 27 to over twenty-five
19. Thomas H. Lee, Note, A PurposefulApproach to ProductsLiability Warnings and Non-English-
Speaking Consumers, 47 VAND. L. REv. 1107, 1109 (1994).
20. 1990 Census, supra note 18.
21. 1990 Census, supra note 18.
22. See Rachel F. Moran, Irritation and Intrigue: The Intricacies of Language Rights and
Language Policy, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 790, 801 n.66 (1991) (noting that census respondents
exaggerate their linguistic ability to please census surveyors) (reviewing BILL PiAr, ONLY
ENGLISH: LAW AND LANGUAGE POLICYIN THE UNITED STATES (1990)); seealsoNATIONAL COUNCIL
OF LA RAZA, THE EDUCATION OF HISPANICS: STATUS AND IMPLICATIONS 12 (1986) [hereinafter
LA RAZA REPORT] (illustrating unreliability of subjective language assessments using 1978 study
that 72% of children identified by others as able to speak English very well or well were limited-
English proficient as tested). Inability to speak English is particularly acute in the low-income
Latino/a community. In a recent United Way study of low-income Latino/a households in Lane
County, Oregon, 85% of respondents (many of them recent immigrants) reported difficulty in
speaking English. UNITED WAY OF LANE COUNTY, REACHING OUT-LANE COUNTY HUMAN NEEDS
ASSESSMENT 22 (1994) (on file with The American University Law Review).
23. There is at least one example from the reported cases of Latino/a consumers able to
understand English when spoken to them but unable to read it- See United States v. Castillo,
120 F. Supp. 522, 524-25 (D.N.M. 1954) (holding that person who cannot read is not negligent
for failing to verify that instrument was note rather than contract).
24. LA RAZA REPORT, supra note 22, at 36.
25. See LA RAzA REPORT, supra note 22, at 36 (estimating that one-half of Latino/a adults
cannot read and write English at functional level, and that almost 9 out of 10 of these persons
are also illiterate in Spanish).
26. More than Half MEXICO BUS. MONTHLY, Jan. 1, 1993, available on 1993 WL 2508438
(reporting results of Mexican government report that seven percent of Mexico's population
cannot read or write).
27. Education & Literacy Statistics, SourceMex Econ. News and Analysis on Mexico, July 22,
1992, available on 1992 WL 2397791 (stating that adult illiteracy rate is currently 12.4% (6.1
million people) compared to 25.8% in 1970). The 1994 World Factbook reports an illiteracy
rate in Mexico of 13% of those age 15 and over. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD
FACrBOOK 260 (1994). E.g., Salinas Sends Educational Reform Proposal to Congress, LATIN AM. BUS.
NEvS WIRE, Dec. 19, 1992 (stating that Mexican daily LaJornada estimated number of illiterates
as high as 12%).
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percent of the population.2  These illiteracy statistics in turn reflect
studies that estimate the average number of years of formal education
in Mexico as anywhere from four2 9 to less than seven. 0
B. Language Fraud and English-Only in the Marketplace
The Spanish-Only Consumer has become a victim of choice for
unscrupulous merchants in America. Current frauds cover the full
spectrum of the consumer marketplace: from telemarketing to home
solicitation sales to the car lot. For example, in 1994, a spokesperson
for the National Council of La Raza explained at a press conference
that Latinos/as are targeted for telemarketing fraud because they may
lack English language ability."1 In California, a satellite dish vendor
marketing door-to-door was accused of targeting Spanish-speaking
homeowners to take advantage of the language barrier.3 2 Other
California operators targeted residents of East Los Angeles for home
equity loan scams under which Latino/a homeowners unknowingly
conveyed full title to their homes to the loan brokers.3 3 In 1993, an
Oregon car dealer was accused of using Spanish-speaking employees
to entice immigrant customers to sign contracts written in English
that sold them unwanted extras such as extended warranties and
credit insurance.3 4 Another Oregon car dealer misrepresented to a
28. Report on 1990 Census Results, SourceMex Econ. News and Analysis on Mexico, Mar. 18,
1992, available on 1992 WL 2396872 [hereinafter Report on 1990 Census Results] (reporting results
of government census that reported 23 million Mexicans are illiterate out of total population
of 81.3 million). The disparity in numbers among the different studies likely results from
different methodologies employed to measure literacy and different definitions of literacy. For
example, it is unclear whether children were included or excluded in the foregoing study. High
illiteracy rates are also reported in countries such as Honduras (41%), El Salvador (28%),
Bolivia (26%), the Dominican Republic (23%), and Brazil (22%). 21 Latin American &Caribbean
Nations: 1990 Population, Life Expectancy, 1980-1990 Average Annual Birth Rate, Notisur-South
American & Caribbean Political Affairs, Mar. 11, 1992, available on 1992 WL 2410845.
29. New Revelations, MExiCo BUS. MONTHLY, May 1, 1992, available on 1992 WL 2397851
(reporting that National Parents' Union disputes Mexican government's estimate of 6.5 years
of formal education and instead estimates time spent as four years); see also LINDA KING, ROOTS
OF IDENTriy: LANGUAGE AND LrrERACy IN MExICO 105 (1994) (reporting national education
average in Mexico as only four years of primary schooling).
30. New Revelations, supra note 29 (reporting that Education Minister (now President),
Ernesto Zedillo, found that average Mexican receives 6.5 years of formal education).
31. Tanika White, Sweepstakes Fraud Targets Elderly, BEACON J., Oct. 27, 1994, at A4.
32. Jennifer Warren, Suit Links Satellite-Dish Seller, Lender to Fraud, LA. TIMES, Apr. 1, 1989,
at 1.
33. Tracy Wilkinson, Elderly, Poor Are Easy Prey for Home-Equity Schemers, LA. TIMES, Oct. 15,
1989, at 1 (describing immigrant victims unable to read English that signed documents in
English that conveyed their homes); see also How to Tell a Real Deal from a Well-Planned Scam,
SACRAMENTO BEE,Jan. 14, 1990, at B10 (describing plight of immigrant Latino/a homeowners
who unknowingly put their homes up as collateral to finance satellite dish and other consumer
purchases).
34. Maya Blackmun, State Sues Auto Dealer, Alleging Illegal Sales Tactics, OREGONIAN, Feb. 25,
1993, at Al (noting that unwanted extras frequently cost over $1000 and were included in
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Spanish-speaking customer that an "as-is" warranty gave the customer
a fifty-day period to rescind the purchase." Other reported market
frauds include an Arizona scam directed at Latinos/as who did not
understand the process of car insurance and registration, 36 a New
Jersey real estate scam that targeted recent immigrants with limited
English skills,37 and exploitation by certain notary publics of Spanish
speakers' belief that they are lawyers. 8
Besides exploiting the language barrier, unscrupulous merchants
exploit Latino/a culture and the current anti-immigrant political
climate. Take the example of a Mexican immigrant family targeted
by a water purification company selling door-to-door. 9 Preying on
what one observer described as the Mexican people's "national,
almost religious quest" for pure water,4" the company sold the family
an overpriced, defective purification system for $5000. A mortgage
secured the purchase price that accrues interest at thirty-six percent
per annum.4 1 After paying $6000 of monthly installments toward the
purchase price, the family discovered that they still had to pay several
thousand dollars or face losing their home. When they complained
to the seller that they were unaware of the mortgage and the high
interest rate, the seller responded that if they complained to any
government agency or appeared in court to contest a foreclosure their
immigration status would be investigated.42 The climate created by
California's Proposition 187'3 may cause any Latino/a, whether
financing packages carrying 39% interest).
35. Letter from Matthew Berlin, Law Clerk, Lane County LegalAid Service, Inc., to Timothy
Wood, Financial Fraud Division, Oregon Attorney General's Office 2 (Feb. 9, 1993) (on file with
The American University Law Review).
36. Frederick Bermudez, Insurance Card Scam Probed, Hundreds of Drivers May Carry FakeData,
ARIz. REP., Dec. 2, 1992, at BI.
37. See Rolo v. City Investing Co. Liquidating Trust, 845 F. Supp. 182, 197 (D.N.J.), afj'd,
43 F.3d 1462 (3d Cir. 1994).
38. SeeRosalind Resnick, NewLawAims to Rein in State's NotariosPublicos, MIAMI HERALD,July
8, 1991, at 15BM (discussing Florida disclosure law enacted to combat this abuse).
39. The example that follows roughly parallels a scam in East Los Angeles that targeted
Latino/a immigrants. See Wolf at the Door, LA. TIMES, Mar. 14, 1993, at 16.
40. DAVIS, supra note 11, at 183.
41. This modern example resonates with history. See TOMAs ALMAGUER, RACIAL FAULT
LINES: THE HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF WHITE SUPREMACrY IN CALIFORNIA 65-87 (1994) (describing
displacement of Mexican ranchero land holdings to Anglo immigrants in mid- to late 19th
century California precipitated in part by exorbitant mortgage interest rates of 36% charged by
Anglo creditors).
42. See Memorandum from Raul Ramirez, Hispanic Outreach Program Director, Oregon
Attorney General's Office, to Timothy Wood, Financial Fraud Division, Oregon Attorney
General's Office (May 24, 1995) (on file with The American University Law Review) (reporting
practice in Oregon community of debt collectors threatening to turn undocumented Latinos/as
in to federal immigration authorities unless they pay).
43. Passed by initiative in 1994, Proposition 187 requires educators, public health providers,
and others to deny public services to those persons they suspect are not legal residents. Judges
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documented or not, to avoid dealing with the government for fear of
harassment or abuse. Abusive market practices thrive in this anti-
immigrant climate.
While examples mount of affirmative frauds practiced on Spanish-
Only Consumers, these consumers also fall victim to less publicized
but more frequent abuse. Although most merchants will not affirma-
tively misrepresent their deals to the Spanish-Only Consumer, many
merchants will transact business with them partially or entirely in
English. These English language bargains can cause havoc because
here, too, the consumer does not understand the true nature of the
obligation incurred. In the analogous area of products liability,
commentators have begun to debate how to protect the Spanish-Only
Consumer and other language minorities who purchase products
ignorant of their risks.' One purpose of this Article is to extend
this debate to consumer transactions generally. Before proposing
specific protections for language minority consumers, however, this
Article reviews the shortcomings of existing consumer protection as
applied to the non-English speaker.
C. Existing Consumer Protection Against Language Fraud and English-
Only in the Marketplace
1. The duty to read doctrine
Applying existing law to the following bargain models illustrates the
limited protection it provides to language minority consumers. Each
model below involves a home improvement sale/loan transaction
between a Spanish-Only Consumer and a home siding merchant.
a. The fraud bargain
In this model, the Spanish-Only Consumer signs a secured
promissory note written in English that calls for interest at thirty-six
in California have enjoined the enforcement of most of its provisions pending resolution of
constitutional challenges against this mean-spirited measure that are expected to reach the
Supreme Court. SeeLeague of United Latin American Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755, 765-
68 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (severing Proposition 187 and holding that federal law preempts initiative's
classification and reporting provisions and its denial of primary and secondary education to
undocumented immigrants); see also infra notes 176 and 208 and accompanying text (discussing
potential impact of Proposition 187 on consumer protection).
44. See infra notes 218-19 (discussing strategies to protect Spanish-Only Consumer from
dangerous products).
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percent per annum. The merchant/lender represents orally in
Spanish that the interest rate is only ten percent.'
b. The unfair bargain
The Spanish-Only Consumer signs a secured promissory note
written in English that provides for interest at a rate that substantially
exceeds a fair rate of return.46 The merchant, however, does not
make any oral statements about the interest rate.
c. The unintended bargain
Again, the merchant does not orally misrepresent the interest rate.
Here, the secured promissory note written in English provides a rate
of interest that, although facially high, is justified in relation to the
risks of the transaction (e.g., absence of equity in the collateral, poor
credit record). Upon her later discovery of the rate agreed to,
however, the Spanish-Only Consumer objects that she would not have
agreed to purchase the home improvements on such terms.47
Relevant to each of these bargain models, the common law "duty
to read" doctrine determines the obligations of a party who signs a
written contract without reading its terms. That party is "conclusively
presumed to know its contents and to assent to them, and there can
be no evidence for the jury as to... [her subjective] understanding
of its terms." 48 The duty to read extends to those persons unable to
read the language of the contract:
45. Cf United States v. Castillo, 120 F. Supp. 522,523 (D.N.M. 1954) (involving consumers
who relied on false representation that they were signing repair contract that required
satisfactory completion as condition to payment and were unaware they had signed uncondition-
al note).
46. See Steven W. Bender, Rate Regulation at the Crossroads of Usuy and Unconscionability: The
Case for Regulating Abusive Commercial and Consumer Interest Rates Under the Unonscionability
Standard, 31 HOUS. L. REv. 721, 774-79 (1994) (discussing factors that determine fair rate of
interest).
47. Cf Teran v. Citicorp Person-to-Person Fin. Ctr., 706 P.2d 382, 387-88 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1985) (refusing to hold lender accountable for failure of translator procured by borrowers to
reveal that home improvement financing was secured by lien on their residence). In the Teran
case, presumably, the existence of the lien was reasonable and not unusual for home
improvement loan transactions with the terms offered by the lender.
48. Gaskin v. Stumm Handel GmbH, 390 F. Supp. 361, 366 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). The so-called
duty to read is not a true duty owed to the other party to the contract. Rather, it refers to the
consequence that a party must read the contract or be bound to what she fails to read. John
D. Calamari, Duty to Read-A Changing ConcepG 43 FORDHAM L. REV. 341, 341 n.4 (1974); see also
Stewart Macaulay, Private Legislation and the Duty to Read-Business Run by IBM Machine, the Law
of Contracts and Credit Card% 19 VAND. L. REv. 1051, 1055-69 (1966) (explaining policies behind
duty to read requirement).
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It is well settled that where a person cannot read the language
in which a contract is written, it is ordinarily as much his duty to
procure someone to read it to him as it would be to read the
agreement before signing, were he able to do so. Failure of a party
to obtain a reading and explanation is ordinarily negligence which
will estop the party from avoiding the contract on the ground that
the party was ignorant of the contract's provisions.49
Thus, as applied to the Spanish-Only Consumer, the duty to read
functions as a duty to obtain a translation. What appears to be an
unbending rule against language minorities, however, is tempered
somewhat by three exceptions, one fairly well established, one
developing, and one that results from legislative intervention.
2. The duty to read-the fraud exception
Many courts recognize an exception to the duty to read when the
other party has misrepresented the terms of the written contract.
5
In these circumstances, the victim may avoid the unread contract or,
as recognized by the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, may claim a
contract on the terms as represented.5' Some courts, however, deny
relief on the grounds that the defrauded party had no right to rely on
an oral statement that the explicit language of the written contract
contradicts.52 Commentators criticize this result for allowing mere
negligence to excuse deceit.53  In any event, it is not clear if this
49. Aluia v. Harrison Community Hosp., 362 N.W.2d 783,787 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984); see also
Merrill, Lynch, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Benton, 467 So. 2d 311, 313 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985);
2 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 4:16 (4th
ed. 1990). In contrast, a few decisions place responsibility on the contract drafter to interpret
the English language contract for the other illiterate or non-English speaking party. E.g., Trinh
v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 894 F. Supp. 1368, 1373-74 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (following dated California
authority under which illiterate insurance applicant cannot be prejudiced by her failure to read
insurance contract); Miller v. Spokane Int'l Ry. Co., 143 P. 981, 984 (Wash. 1914) (refusing to
adopt majority rule when injured Austrian laborer sought to avoid English language release
paying him "trifling" amount for his damages). This decision is a precursor to the modern,
developing unconscionability exception discussed infra Part I.C.3.
50. E.g., United States v. Castillo, 120 F. Supp. 522 (D.N.M. 1954) (finding that homeowners
signing unconditional promissory note relied on false representation of agent for home
insulation company that they were signing conditional contract to repair their home); Chrysler
Credit Corp. v. Henry, 221 So. 2d 529, 533 (La. Ct. App. 1969) (finding that consumer was
fraudulently induced into signing contract).
51. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 21A (1981). See generally Dwight Preston,
Comment, "No Hablo Ingles,"11 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 415,428 (1974) (explaining remedies under
California law when Spanish-speaking consumer is defrauded in marketplace).
52. Cohen v. Wedbush, Noble, Cooke, Inc., 841 F.2d 282, 287 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding
investors bound by arbitration clause in margin credit agreement despite claim they were told
that margin agreement did not compromise any of their rights).
53. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 108, at 750 (5th
ed. 1984); see Calamari, supra note 48, at 345 n.32 ("'Is it better to encourage negligence in the
foolish, or fraud in the deceitful? Either course has most obvious dangers. But judicial
experience exemplifies that the former is the least objectionable, and least hampers the
1038
CONSUMER PROTECTION FOR LATINOS
controversial outcome extends to parties unable to understand the
language of the written contract.
As applied to the Spanish-Only Consumer, the fraud exception falls
short of addressing the range of potential marketplace abuses. In the
case of the Fraud Bargain where a written term is orally misrepresent-
ed, courts that recognize the fraud exception will either rescind the
contract or enforce the term as it was represented.54 Some courts
might conclude, however, that the Spanish-Only Consumer's negli-
gence in failing to obtain a translation of the written contract
precludes any remedy for the merchant's deceit.5
The Unfair Bargain model assumes that the merchant has not
misrepresented the unfair term in the written contract. As such, even
when otherwise recognized, the fraud exception is not available unless
the court imposes an affirmative duty on the merchant to disclose the
unfair term. Merchants have no general duty to disclose Unfair
Bargains, although exceptions have emerged that may ultimately
overcome the merchant's right to remain silent.5 6 Thus far, courts
have not established an exception specifically to protect a consumer
who agrees to an unfair bargain because she was unable to under-
stand the language of the written contract. The doctrine of uncon-
scionability, however, may provide an analogous duty to disclose
unfair terms to those consumers the merchant knows (or perhaps has
reason to know) are unable to protect themselves. Its usual remedies
are inadequate to deter unscrupulous merchants, 7 and thus,
unconscionability is no substitute for the development in the law of
deceit of a comprehensive duty to disclose that protects Spanish-Only
victims of Unfair Bargains.5"
Finally, the fraud exception may not protect the victim of the
Unintended Bargain who has agreed to a bargain that, although
objectively fair, is one that the consumer would not have agreed to
had she understood the contract. Here, there has been no affirmative
misrepresentation. Moreover, imposing a duty to disclose (translate)
actionable as deceit is inappropriate, at least when a merchant has no
administration of pure justice.'" (quotingWestern Mfg. Co. v. Cotton & Long, 104 S.W. 758, 760
(Ky. 1907))).
54. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNRAcrs § 21A (1981).
55. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
56. JOHN D. CALAMARI &JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CONTRACTS § 9-20, at 367 (3d ed. 1987).
57. See infra Part I.C.3 (explaining reach and shortcomings of unconscionability doctrine
as applied to language fraud and English-Only in marketplace).
58. See infra Part III.D.3 (discussing potential grounds on which court could impose duty
on merchants to disclose unfair terms to language minority consumers).
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reason to know that the objectively desirable deal is undesirable to the
Spanish-Only Consumer.
3. The duty to read-the developing unconscionability exception
For centuries, equity courts have denied specific performance of
land conveyances and certain other contracts when the bargain sought
to be enforced is unconscionable. 9 Since section 2-302 of the
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) codified the unconscionability
doctrine for credit sales of goods," that doctrine has become part
of the general common law of contracts.6 Although courts have not
yet articulated a predictable formula for defining unconscionability,
the developing standard holds promise for the Spanish-Only Consum-
er. Many courts have adopted the distinction the late Professor
Arthur Leff coined between procedural unfairness or "bargaining
naughtiness" in contract formation and substantive unfairness in a
contract's terms.62 In holding a contract or contractual term
unconscionable, these courts usually require some showing of both
procedural and substantive unfairness.' For example, in its classic
common law articulation, unconscionability has involved "an absence
of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties [procedural
unfairness] together with contract terms which are unreasonably
favorable to the other party [substantive unfairness]."64
So articulated, the unconscionability doctrine should encompass the
Spanish-Only victim of an Unfair Bargain and create another
exception to the duty to read doctrine.65 In this bargain model, the
consumer can point to both the bargain's substantive unfairness and
to the "bargaining naughtiness" that occurred when the merchant
59. See generally Bender, supra note 46, at 735 (explaining judicial use and adoption of
unconscionability standard to monitor bargain fairness).
60. U.C.C. § 2-302, at 68-69 (1962).
61. Bender, supra note 46, at 735-36.
62. SeeArthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-TheEmperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA.
L. REV. 485, 550 (1967) (criticizing unconscionability standard as one causing courts to decide
cases through guesswork); see alsoAlan Schwartz, A Reexamination ofNonsubstantive Unconscionabili-
ty, 63 VA. L. REv. 1053, 1053 (1977) (labeling unconscionability classifications as "non-
substantive" and "substantive").
63. See Bender, supra note 46, at 747 (describing judicial application of U.C.C. § 2-302 to
support finding of unconscionability).
64. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965); see also
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69,94-97 (N.J. 1960) (holding that automobile
dealer's disclaimer of implied warranty of merchantability and its exclusion of other
responsibilities violated public policy in light of parties' grossly unequal bargaining positions).
65. See Calamari, supra note 48, at 355 (observing unconscionability doctrine creates an
exception to, but does not expunge, duty to read). The unconscionability doctrine should
encompass Spanish-Only victims of an Unfhir Bargain because one with little bargaining power
who signs a contract without full knowledge of its terms can hardly be said to have consented
to its provisions. See id. (describing application of unconscionability doctrine).
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took advantage of the consumer's inability to understand the English
language contract, at least when the merchant knew or had reason to
know of that inability. The few cases that have applied the unconscio-
nability doctrine to the Spanish-Only Consumer support this analysis.
For example, after negotiations in Spanish, a Latino consumer in
Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynoso6" signed a contract written in English to
purchase an overpriced refrigerator. 7  Although commentators
sometimes cite this New York case as authorizing courts to declare a
contract unconscionable on substantive unfairness alone,68 it appears
that the case's outcome was influenced by the Spanish-Only
Consumer's inability to understand the price of the written bar-
gain.69  In Albert Merrill School v. Godoy,7° another New York court
agreed that a consumer's inability to understand English is relevant
in determining whether the consumer exercised a meaningful
choice.7' Earlier, the same New York court applied the unconsciona-
bility provision in section 2-302 of the UCC to strike down a contract
written in English in which a Spanish-Only Consumer agreed to waive
warranties in the purchase of an automobile.
72
Although most of the reported decisions applying unconscionability
to protect Spanish-Only Consumers were issued by lower courts
during the 1960s and 1970s, a 1988 decision by the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals supports application of the doctrine to the victim of
an Unfair Bargain. In Besta v. Beneficial Loan Co., 73 the court
concluded that it was unconscionable for a lender to extend credit
under a six-year loan plan without informing the borrower that the
monthly payments and total payment amount under an alternative
three-year plan were lower.74 Rather than deciding the case on the
substantive unfairness of the six-year plan alone, the court looked to
66. 274 N.Y.S.2d 757 (Dist. Ct. 1966), rev'd on other grounds, 281 N.Y.S.2d 964 (Sup. Ct.App.
Term 1967).
67. Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynoso, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757, 758 (Dist. Ct. 1966), rev'd on other
grounds, 281 N.Y.S.2d 964, 964 (Sup. Ct. App. Term 1967).
68. See Bender, supra note 46, at 749 (citing Frostifresh and other "classic" consumer price
unconscionability cases); Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle and Its Limits, 95 HARV. L.
REV. 741, 753 n.41 (1982) (citing Frostfresh and other cases that may suggest but do not rely on
circumstances of high-pressure selling).
69. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts employs the Frostifresh facts to illustrate that a party's
inability to understand the language of a contract is a relevant factor in determining whether
the bargaining process is unconscionable. SeeRESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt.
d, illus. 3 (1979) (explaining that relevant factors in determining existence of unconscionability
in bargaining process include one's inability to understand language of agreement).
70. 357 N.Y.S.2d 378 (Civ. Ct. 1974).
71. Albert Merrill Sch. v. Godoy, 357 N.Y.S.2d 378, 381-82 (Civ. Ct. 1974).
72. Jefferson Credit Corp. v. Marcano, 302 N.Y.S.2d 390, 392-94 (Civ. Ct. 1969).
73. 855 F.2d 532 (8th Cir. 1988).
74. Besta v. Beneficial Loan Co., 855 F.2d 532, 535 (8th Cir. 1988).
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the unfair surprise that resulted from the lender's failure to disclose
the more advantageous plan to a consumer the lender knew was
unaware of the better deal.75 Although commentators have predict-
ed that the Besta line of cases, holding lenders liable to borrowers, will
be a "short-lived aberration in lender liability law," 76 Besta, in fact,
falls squarely within the mainstream of unconscionability cases that
insist on a showing of both procedural and substantive unfairness.
The Spanish-Only victim of an Unfair Bargain might rely on Besta to
argue that a lender must disclose (translate) any disadvantageous
terms that the lender knows the consumer does not understand
because of the language barrier.
77
Although the unconscionability doctrine should extend to victims
of an Unfair Bargain, its shortcomings limit its effectiveness as a
consumer protection tool for Latinos/as and other language
minorities. For example, remedies for unconscionable conduct often
inadequately deter such conduct. Courts have not only declined to
award tort remedies, such as punitive damages, to victims of uncon-
scionable contracts, but have also refused to award restitution and
other affirmative damages.78 For example, when a merchant's price
is unconscionably excessive, at most, courts limit the merchant's
bargain to the fair price it should have charged and will not require
the merchant to return any overpayment.79 This sanction inade-
quately deters merchants from imposing substantively unfair terms on
Spanish-Only Consumers.
Another concern is that the unconscionability doctrine might
require substantive unfairness and, therefore, may not reach the
victim of an Unintended Bargain. As the Official Comments to
section 2-302 of the UCC articulate, the basic test for unconscionabili-
ty is whether "the clauses involved are so one-sided as to be uncon-
75. I&
76. Warren L. Dennis & Mark Mosling, Death Knell for Fidudary Duties of Lenders to Cosumer
Borrowers, 46 Bus. LAw. 1323, 1323 (1991).
77. I have argued elsewhere that courts, in the consumer setting, should strike down
bargains on substantive unfhirness alone. See Bender, supra note 46, at 747-51 (describing
scholarly and judicial indecision whether to require proof of both substantive and procedural
unfairness to support finding of unconscionability). One advantage that accrues when courts
treat the failure to disclose as procedural unfairness is that courts might find a bargain
unconscionable on a lesser degree of substantive unfairness. Moreover, this approach avoids the
controversy over striking down bargains on substantive unfairness alone. I&. at 748.
78. See Bender, supra note 46, at 757-60 (explaining variety of judicial remedies for
unconscionable contracts).
79. See Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynoso, 281 N.Y.S.2d 964, 965 (Sup. Ct. App. Term 1967)
(explaining that lower court erred in failing to award reasonable profit plus net costs to seller
of unconscionably priced product); cf. Carboni v. Arrospide, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 845, 850 (Ct. App.
1991) (affirming trial court's reduction of unconscionable 200% interest rate to reasonable 24%
rate).
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scionable."8 ° Some commentators read decisions under section 2-
302 to mean that when grossly unfair, contract terms can be uncon-
scionable without proof of any procedural unfairness.81 Unconscio-
nability under the common law and section 2-302, however, does not
yet grant relief for procedural unfairness standing alone that lacks a
separate and established basis for relief,82 as when there is duress or
fraud.
4. The duty to read-the legislative exception
Federal or state law that requires the delivery of a translated
consumer contract serves as a legislative exception to the duty to read
doctrine. The potential of this legislative exception remains unreal-
ized. Neither federal nor state law imposes a comprehensive duty on
merchants to translate consumer contracts for the benefit of language
minorities. Instead, most existing statutory and administrative
requirements only target consumer transactions with the most
notorious records of abuse. For example, federal law singles out only
door-to-door and used car sales. As required by a Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) rule, door-to-door sellers must provide buyers with
a contract written in the same language as that used principally in the
oral sales presentation.83 Under another FTC rule, sellers of used
motor vehicles who "conduct a sale in Spanish" must deliver pre-
scribed warranty information, according to a specific format, in
Spanish.84 State law has singled out such problematic transactions
80. U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1, at 69 (1962).
81. See Bender, supra note 46, at 749 (citing "classic" consumer price unconscionability cases
that support this conclusion).
82. SeeinfraPart ll.E (discussingtheories bywhich unconscionability doctrine mightextend
to Unintended Bargains). Although the Eighth Circuit's decision in Besta might be read to have
relied solely on the procedural unfairness of the lender's failure to disclose a more advantageous
bargain, the existence of that better bargain made the bargain actually struck substantively
unfair. Moreover, the lender's failure to disciose in these circumstances is a close cousin to
fraud. See Besta v. Beneficial Loan Co., 855 F.2d 532, 535-36 (8th Cir. 1988). A lower New York
court invalidated a sales contract as unconscionable because the Spanish-Only Consumer was
unable to understand the English contract and because the seller invoked high pressure sales
tactics without providing a Spanish-speaking interpreter, but the reporting of the facts and the
court's reasoning is sketchy. Brooklyn Union Gas Co. v.Jimeniz, 371 N.Y.S.2d 289,290 (Civ. Ct.
1975).
83. See 16 C.F.R. § 429.1(a) (1995) (providing for delivery of three-day cancellation notice
in same language as contract).
84. See 16 C.F.R. § 455.5 (1995) (establishing disclosure requirements and format for sales
conducted in Spanish language). The FTC, however, has approved exemptions from its used
car rule in favor of state law in Maine and Wisconsin that fails to require Spanish language
translation. In both cases, the FTC relied on evidence that the Latino/a populations in those
states were small. See 53 Fed. Reg. 16,390, 16,393 (1988) (exempting Maine); 51 Fed. Reg.
20,936, 20,941-42 (1986) (exempting Wisconsin).
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as "rent-to-own" or lease-purchase agreements85 and social referral
(dating) service contracts by imposing translation requirements.8 6
This selective approach provides only limited protection. Federal
consumer disclosure statutes of general application usually fail to
require translations for language minorities. For example, the Truth
in Lending Act, 7 the Truth in Savings Act,' the Real Estate Settle-
ment Procedures Act,89 the Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade
Commission Improvement Act,9 ° and the Interstate Land Sales Full
Disclosure Act,9 require disclosure of certain information to aid
consumers in making an informed choice, but none of the statutes
compels translation of the required disclosures for language minori-
ties.92 For example, under the Truth in Lending Act, a lender has
no obligation to supply interest rate disclosures to a Spanish-Only
85. See OR. REV. STAT. § 646.249 (1993) (stating that statutory disclosures in lease-purchase
agreements must be provided in non-English language in which any portion of the transaction
is conducted). This section does not apply if the consumer supplies an interpreter to conduct
any part of the transaction. Id.
86. SeeN.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 394-c7(b) (McKinney Supp. 1995) (stating that seller of social
referral services must furnish buyer with contract in same language as that used principally in
oral sales presentation).
87. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1677 (1994) (advancing disclosure of consumer credit terms to
promote informed credit use, to protect consumers, and to encourage competition among
fimancial institutions to enhance economic stability).
88. 12 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4313 (1994) (specifying federal standards for clear and uniform
disclosure of financial institutions' interest rates and fees).
89. Id. §§ 2601-2617 (stating federal requirements forvariety of steps involved in real estate
settlement process in order to better protect consumers).
90. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (1994) (specifying content of consumer product warranties).
91. Id. §§ 1701-1720 (setting forth federal registration and disclosure requirements
pertaining to land sales).
92. Cf. County Trust Co. v. Mora, 383 N.Y.S.2d 468, 470 (Rockland County Ct. 1975)
(explaining that Truth in Lending Act does not require disclosures in Spanish even when
consumers cannot understand English). On the other hand, a defective English disclosure
statement that a Spanish-Only Consumer could not understand was no defense to liability. See
Zamalippa v. Cy's Car Sales, Inc., 674 F.2d 877, 879 (11th Cir. 1982) (rejecting subjective
standard measuring consumer's deception or misunderstanding to determine whether relief
should be granted when seller's disclosure statements failed to comply with federal regulations).
At best, sometimes these federal disclosure laws expressly allow translations at the option of
the business. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 230.3(b) (1995) (permitting depository institutions to give
Truth in Savings disclosures in other languages if English disclosures are available upon
request); 24 C.F.R. § 3500.6(d) (3) (1995) (explaining that lender may translate special
information booklet required by Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act into languages other
than English); id. § 3500.9(a) (8) (stating that settlement statement of Department of Housing
and Urban Development may also be translated into languages other than English). Because
creditors in Puerto Rico are expressly given the option to provide Truth in Lending disclosures
in Spanish, this might imply that rate disclosure translations are improper in other locations.
See 12 C.F.R. § 226.27 (1995) (authorizing disclosure in English and/or Spanish in Puerto Rican
transactions). The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System has concluded, however,
that Arizona's state disclosure law under the Small Loans Act, requiring disclosures of Truth in
Lending information in English and Spanish, is consistent with, and not preempted by, federal
law if every borrower receives English disclosures and the Spanish disclosures are provided as
additional information. See50 Fed. Reg. 25,068-69 (1985) (examining state language disclosure
requirements vis-A-vis federal regulations).
1996] CONSUMER PROTECTION FOR LATINOS 1045
Consumer in Spanish.93 Moreover, even when federal law requires
translated disclosures, it fails to provide a private right of action to
enforce these requirements.94
State law overcomes some of the inadequacies of federal law. First,
at least one state requires certain lenders to translate their Truth in
Lending disclosures into Spanish.95 Also, many states have enacted
counterparts to the federal door-to-door rule that allow for private
enforcement to ensure that merchants write home solicitation sales
contracts in the same language they used in the oral sales presenta-
tion." Alternatively, state "baby" or "little" FTC acts may authorize
a private action for violations of FTC regulations, such as those for
door-to-door and used car sales.97 Finally, a few state statutes impose
a translation requirement that covers more than isolated consumer
transactions. For example, California law requires written translations
of certain loan contracts, residential leases, and other consumer
contracts that are -negotiated primarily in Spanish. S Under an
Illinois statute, it is an unlawful practice to fail to provide a translated
written contract, if the retail transaction is negotiated in a language
other than English.99 Finally, a Florida regulation declares it an
93. If the financing transaction results from a door-to-door sale but involves the creation
of a non-purchase money loan secured by a principal dwelling, the Federal Trade Commission's
door-to-door rule that would require certain Spanish-language disclosures gives way to the Truth
in Lending Act. See 16 C.F.R § 429.1 note 1(a) (2) (1994) (stating requirements for door-to-
door sales shall not apply where consumer has rescission under Consumer Credit Protection
Act); see also BILL PIATT, ONLY ENGLISH? LAW AND LANGUAGE POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 147-
48 (1990) (pointing out inconsistency of federal laws that require Spanish language disclosures
of warranty information in used car sales, but do not require Spanish language disclosure of
interest rate and total payments due when automobile purchase is financed).
94. Rather, noncompliance with the door-to-door or the used car rule constitutes a violation
of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA) that is actionable only by the FTC. See Steven W.
Bender, Oregon Consumer Protection: Outfitting Pivate Attorneys Generalfor the Lean Years Ahead, 73
OR. L REV. 639, 640 n.7 (1994) (detailing federal court's rejection of consumer litigants'
attempts to pursue private actions under FTCA).
95. See Am. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6-651 (A) (2) (Supp. 1995) (requiring consumer loan
providers to provide Spanish-language disclosures on request); cf. CAL. Civ. CODE § 1632(b)-
1632(b) (1) (West Supp. 1995) (noting that financial organization complies with California's
Spanish-language contract translation requirement by providing Spanish translation of
disclosures required under Truth in Lending Act).
96. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1689.7 (West Supp. 1995) (providing that buyer's agreement,
resulting from home solicitation contract, may be canceled by buyer within specified time); N.Y.
PERS. PROP. LAW § 428 (McKinney 1992) (providing for buyer's right to cancel door-to-door
sales).
97. See JONATHAN SHELDON & CAROLYN L CARTER, NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER,
UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE ACTS AND PRACTICES § 3.2.4.6, at 90 (3d ed. 1991) (explaining that state
statutes may create private right of action by making per se violation for failure to follow federal
provisions, even though private right of action may not be available at federal level).
98. CAL. CiV. CODE § 1632 (West Supp. 1995) (requiring any person in trade or business
to furnish Spanish translation contract when oral negotiations are conducted in same language).
99. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 815, para. 505/2N (Smith-Hurd 1993).
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unfair or deceptive trade practice to fail to provide a translation of a
contract negotiated principally in a language other than English.0
Despite these provisions, state law does not fully overcome the
inadequacies of federal law. Several states, other than California,
Florida, and Illinois, with large and growing language minority
populations do not have comprehensive consumer translation
requirements. As the next section discusses, the English language
movement threatens both to hinder the enactment of translation laws
in these states and to undermine the few existing translation laws.
Moreover, design flaws in existing state translation laws limit their
effectiveness. These flaws are also discussed below.10'
II. OBSTACLES AND CONSIDERATIONS IN ENSURING CONSUMER
PROTECTION FOR LANGUAGE MINORITIES
A. Impact of English Language Movement on Consumer Protection
Regulation
Roots of the Official English and English-Only movements' are
apparent in xenophobic hostility during the early 1900s toward
immigrants from southern and eastern Europe.'0 3 For example,
Nebraska's 1920 constitutional amendment declaring English the
official state language" grew out of anti-German sentiment.0 5  By
1923, thirty-four states had laws that declared English the language of
100. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 2-9.005 (1995).
101. See infra Part II.D (examining whether legislative protection of language minorities
should be language neutral); infra Part IIIA.2 (discussing legislative reform for protection of
language minorities).
102. "Official English" refers to those laws that provide that English is the "official language"
of the state. In contrast, "English-Only" refers to those laws that further purport to prohibit the
government from acting in languages other than English. Some state laws are not easily
categorized as one or the other. See Lowrey, supra note 13, at 283 n.311 (explaining differences
between Official English and English-Only legislation).
103. SeegeneraUy DENNIS BARON, THE ENGUSH-ONLY QUESTION 1-13 (1990) (describing early
beginnings of state Official-Language laws); Lowrey, supra note 13, at 282-83 (describing
perception of and negative sentiment against waves of immigrants and resulting changes in state
legislation).
104. NEB. CONST. art. 1, § 27; see alsoJamie B. Draper & MarthaJim~nez, A Chronology of the
Official English Movement, in LANGUAGE LOYALTIES: A SOURCE BOOK ON THE OFFICIAL ENG1ISH
CONTROvERSY 89 (James Crawford ed., 1992) [hereinafter LANGUAGE LOYALTIES]. An Illinois
statute, adopted in 1923, declared "American" as its official language, but was amended in 1969
to substitute English for American. ILL ANN. STAT. ch. v., para. 460/20 (Smith-Hurd 1991); see
Dennis Baron, Federal English in LANGUAGE LOYALTIES, supra, at 36, 39 (describing passage of
Illinois state bill promoting American over English as official state language due to American
hostility toward British).
105. Lowrey, supra note 13, at 282 & n.307.
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school instruction.' ° Since then, most states have enacted laws that
require the use of English in specific situations, such as in testing for
occupational licenses.'
0 7
During the 1980s, resurgent xenophobia, directed this time toward
Latino/a and Asian immigrants, revived interest in and support for
comprehensive English language laws.' Organizations, such as
U.S. English, formed to urge states and Congress to enact Official
English and English-Only laws'0 9 that encompass all aspects of
government Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida,
Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky, Mississippi, North Carolina, North
Dakota, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia adopted English
language laws by legislation or initiative during the 1980s.11 In
1990, Alabama joined these states.
11
By the end of the 1980s, the language movement had begun to lose
momentum. In 1989, legislatures in New Mexico, Oregon, and
106. Joseph Leibowicz, Official English: Another Americanization Campaign?, in LANGUAGE
LOYALTIES, supra note 104, at 101, 105.
107. Many states require that examinations for business or professional licenses be conducted
in English. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 34-29-73 (1975) (veterinary license); CAL. Bus. & PROF. § 1630
(West 1996) (dentistry license); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 340.240 (Vernon 1995) (veterinary license);
MONT. CODE. ANN. § 37-3-311 (1993) (license to practice medicine).
108. A 1978 amendment to Hawaii's Constitution declared English and Hawaiian as official
state languages-a move intended to be inclusive of the state's primary language minority. HAW.
CONST. art. XV, § 4.
109. For more detailed history of U.S. English and the modern English language movement,
see generally JAMES CRAWFORD, HOLD YOUR TONGUE: BILINGUALISM AND THE POLITICS OF
"ENGLISH ONLY" (1992) (arguing that promotion of English-Only mentality or unilinguaism is
short-sighted and choice to speak other native languages is question of individual rights and self-
determination);Juan F. Perea, Demography and Distrust: An Essay on American Languages, Cultural
Pluralism, and Official English, 77 MINN. L. REv. 269 (1992) (reporting that historical oversight
of current Official English language movement is its failure to recognize that other languages,
besides English, were also accepted by several states as "official" languages). For example,
California's first constitution provided for laws to be published in English and Spanish. Perea,
supra, at 317; see also Andre Sole, Official English: A Socratic Dialogue/Law and Economics Analysis,
45 FLA. L. REV. 803, 820-32 (1993) (describing 1983 formation of U.S. English, an activist group
that advocates state and federal English-Only statutes, constitutional English-Only amendment,
eradication of bilingual voting ballots and education, claiming to promote national unity and
to encourage immigrants to learn English).
110. ARiz. CONST. art. 28; ARK. CODE ANN. § 14117 (Michie Supp. 1993); CAL. CONST. art.
3, § 6; COLO. CONST. art. 2, § 30; FLA. CONST. art. 2, § 9; 1986 Ga. Laws 529; IND. CODE ANN.
§ 1-2-10-1 (Burns 1993); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 2.013 (Baldwin 1995); MIss. CODE ANN. § 3-3-31
(1991); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 145-12 (1994); N.D. CENT. CODE § 54-02-13 (1989); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 1-1-696 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994); TENN. CODE ANN § 4-1-404 (1991); VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-
212.1 (Michie 1993). Georgia's adoption was by a nonbinding resolution. 1986 Ga. Laws 70.
In 1995, however, Georgia's governor vetoed Official English legislation. See 1995 Ga. S.B. 49,
143rd Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (1995) available in WESTLAW, Bill Tracking Database. See
generally English Only Translates to Hostility, ATLANTA CONST., Apr. 26, 1995, at A14 (editorial)
(stating Georgia governor's two reasons for vetoing Official English bill: (1) bill invites lawsuits
from non-English speakers that would be expensive for state to defend; and (2) bill sends signal
of hostility and disapproval to immigrants).
111. ALA. CONST. amend. 509.
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Washington adopted resolutions that embraced multilingualism" 2
Rhode Island's legislature did so in 1992.13 The success of
California's Proposition 187, however, has revived the English
language campaign. Although none of the many Official English or
English-Only bills introduced in Congress since 1981114 progressed
beyond a committee hearing, the Language of Government Act of
1995 stands a real chance of passage."' In 1995, Connecticut,
Georgia, Iowa, Maryland, Massachusetts, Montana, New Hampshire,
New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Washington, West
Virginia, and Wisconsin considered Official English or English-Only
bills. l' Montana, New Hampshire, and South Dakota enacted
language legislation in 1995, and Wyoming joined them in 1996,
becoming the first states to do so since 1990.117 In the first two
months of 1996, English language laws were introduced in Kansas,
Missouri, NewJersey, Oklahoma, and Rhode Island, as well as in many
112. H.R.J. Mem. Res. 16, 39th Leg., 1st Sess., 1989 N.M.; SJ. Res. 16, 65th Leg., 1989 Or.
Sess.; H.R. Res. 2129, 51st Leg., 1989 Wash. Legis. Serv. 236 (West).
113. RI. Ga. LAws § 42-5.1-1 (1993) (articulating state's policy that multilingualism and
diverse backgrounds of its citizens contribute to state's economy and that it is every resident's
right to nurture their native language, although English remains primary language of United
States). Despite frequent reference to Louisiana as an "Official English" state, Louisiana law
does not so provide and its legislature rejected such legislation in 1994 and in prior year efforts.
See Gail D. Cox, 'Engllsh-Only':. A Legal Polyglot, NAT. LJ., Oct. 26, 1987, at 1, 10 (noting that
English language effort that failed because of concern it would imperil efforts to promote
Cajun); cf. R. Geoffrey Dillard, Note, Multilingual Warning Labels: Product Liability, 'Official
English," and Consumer Safety, 29 GA. L. REV. 197, 244 n.88 (1994) (listing Louisiana as an
"Official-English" state since 1812, presumably referencing a since repealed provision of
Louisiana's Constitution); U.S. ENGLISH, TOWARDS A UNITED AMERICA (containing promotional
materials from U.S. English that reflect Louisiana as "Official English" state) (on file with The
American University Law Review).
114. Former Senator Samuel I. Hayakawa of Califprnia introduced the first proposal as a
constitutional amendment. S.J. Res. 72, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). That law sought to
preclude Congress and every state government from making or enforcing any law that required
the use of a language other than English. See generally Elliot L. Judd, The English Language
Amendment: A Case Study on Language and Politics, 51 REviSTA DEL COLEGIO DE ABOGADOS DE
PUERTO RICO 115 (1990) (discussing history of various federal English language proposals from
1981 to 1986).
115. H.R. 123, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); S. 356, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). Unlike
some prior efforts, however, these bills are not proposed as precursors to a constitutional
amendment.
116. See 1995 Conn. H.B. 5262; 1995 Ga. H.B. 378; 1995 Iowa H.B. 47; 1995 Md. H.B. 657;
1995 Md. S.B. 200; 1995 Mass. H.B. 477; 1995 Mont. H.B. 376; 1995 N.H. Laws 157; 1995 N.Y.
A.B. 2432; 1995 N.Y. A.B. 6153; 1995 N.Y. S.B. 938; 1995 Ohio H.B. 273; 1995 Pa. H.B. 793; 1995
Pa. S.B. 1216; S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 1-27-20 (1995); 1995 Wash. SJ.R. 8209; 1995 W. Va.
H.B. 2378; 1995 Wis. A.J. Res. 291.
117. MONT. CODE ANN. Laws § 3-1-314 (1995); 1995 N.H. LAws 157 (to be codified at N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 3-C:1); S.D. CODIFIED Laws ANN. § 1-27-20 (1995); 1996 Wyo. Sess. Laws 154
(to be codified at WYO. STAT. § 8-6-101). The governors of Georgia and Maryland vetoed
English-language legislation. See 1993 Md. H.B. 982, 408th Legis. Sess., Reg. Sess. (1994)
available in WESTIAW, Bill Tracking Database (noting that governor vetoed this legislation in
May 1994); supra note 110 (discussing Georgia governor's veto). Delaware's governor did so in
1994. See Del. H.B. 460, 137th Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (1993-94).
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of the states that considered but failed to adopt these laws in
1995.118
The legality of these language laws and their impact on consumer
protection remain unresolved. Resolution of these issues may depend
on the precise wording of the particular language law. At one
extreme, Arizona's "English-Only" constitutional provision states that
all political subdivisions in Arizona must "act in English and in no
other language" except in certain narrow circumstances such as to
protect health and safety.119 Shortly after the provision's adoption
by initiative in 1988, Arizona's Attorney General construed this
provision narrowly to conclude that it does not "interfere with the fair
and effective delivery of governmental services in languages other
than English, or otherwise affect governmental operations so as to
unreasonably disadvantage non-English speakers. 12 A subsequent
Attorney General opinion concluded that Arizona's new constitutional
provision did not prohibit the production of Spanish public service
announcements by the Commission on the Arizona Environment."'
In 1995, however, the Ninth Circuit rejected this construction as
incompatible with the provision's plain language, which prohibited
state employees from using languages other than English.'22 The
Ninth Circuit held that the law, as written, is overbroad and violates
the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. 23
Of lesser effect are laws that simply declare English the "official"
state language. 24 As one commentator observed, these "Official
118. 1995 Kan. H.B. 2929, 76th Legis., Reg. Sess. (1996); 1996 Mo. H.B. 985, 88th Gen.
Assembly, 2d Sess. (1996); 1996 N.J. S.B. 276, 207th Legis., 1st Sess. (1996); 1995 Okla. H.B.
2054, 45th Legis., 2d Reg. Sess. (1996); 1995 R.I. S.B. 2241, Legis. Sess. (1996).
119. ARmz. CONsT. art. 28, § 3(1) (a). For a list of exceptions, including the exception for
health and safety, see ARIZ. CONST. art. 28, §§ 3(2) (a)-3(2) (e).
120. Ariz. Op. Att'y Gen. 189-009 (1989).
121. Ariz. Op. Att'y Gen. 189-013 (1989); see also Califa, supra note 15, at 300-01 (describing
interpretation of Florida county's English-Only ordinance). Before its repeal in 1993, the
Antibilingual Ordinance of Dade County, Florida, had been construed by the county attorney's
office as even forbidding Spanish-language recordings on the government's "Tel-Consumer
hotline" aimed at Spanish-speaking consumers. See CRAWFORD, supra note 109, at 108.
122. Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d 920, 930 (9th Cir. 1995) (en banc)
(describing Attorney General's interpretation as attempt "to resurrect a facially unconstitutional
measure"), cert. granted, 64 U.S.L.W. 3635, 3639 (U.S. Mar. 25, 1996) (No. 95-974).
123. Id. at 940-42. As a result of the Yniguez decision, Tennessee's English-Only law is also
of dubious constitutional validity because its plain language encompasses the speech of
government employees. SeeTENN. CODE ANN. § 4-1-404 (1991) (stating that "[a] II communica-
tions and publications, including ballots, produced by governmental entities in Tennessee shall
be in English").
124. See, e.g., COLO. CONST. art. II, § 30a; FLA. CONST. art. II, § 9; HAW. CONST. art. XV, § 4;
NEB. CONST. art. I, § 27; ARK. CODE ANN. § 1-4-117 (Michie Supp. 1993); 5 ILCS 460/20 (1993);
IND. CODE § 1-2-10-1 (1993); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 2.013 (Baldwin 1995); Miss. CODEANN. § 3-3-
31 (1991); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 145-12 (1990); N.D. CENT. CODE § 54-02-13 (1989); VA. CODEANN.
§ 22.1-212.1 (Michie 1993).
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English" laws "appear on their face to have little more [legal]
significance than a state's choice of an official motto or the official
state bird."1" Courts will likely adopt this narrow interpreta-
tion.1 26  For example, in concluding that no Illinois law prohibited
city election officials from giving voter assistance information in
Spanish, the Seventh Circuit observed that the Illinois Official English
statute appears with those naming the state bird and the state song
and has "never been used to prevent publication of official materials
in other languages." 27  So construed, laws that merely declare
English as the state's "official" language should create no legal rights
in favor of the English-speaking majority.
Substantial legal questions surround the validity of a third form of
comprehensive language law that does more than declare English the
official language of government but does not expressly restrict the
speech of government employees. Following an initiative in 1986, a
provision incorporated into California's constitution established
English as the official state language and declared further that the
legislature "shall make no law which diminishes or ignores the role of
English as the common language of the State of California."128
Moreover, California residents and businesses have standing to
enforce these declarations. 29 Unofficially, California's Attorney
General interpreted the state's constitution narrowly to permit other
languages to accompany English in official publications." °  In a
125. Michele Arington, Note, English-only Laws and Direct Legislation: The Battle in the States
over Language Minority Rights, 7J.L & POL 325,339 (1991) (arguing that courts should construe
Official English laws as mere symbolic statements because of threat they pose to language
minorities and because of concerns about fairness of initiative process employed to adopt some
of these laws). But see Perea, supra note 109, at 367-68 (criticizing commentators who conclude
that, as mere symbolic statements, Official English laws are constitutional and harmless, and
arguing instead that racist cultural meaning of laws causes harm that offends Equal Protection
Clause).
126. See Arington, supra note 125, at 339 (predicting that courts will apply overbreadth
doctrine and interpret these laws narrowly).
127. Puerto Rican Org. for Political Action v. Kusper, 490 F.2d 575, 577 (7th Cir. 1973)
(noting that despite provision, numerous agencies published some materials and provided some
services in Spanish). After the passage of Colorado's Official English initiative, Colorado's
governor and Denver's mayor ordered that government policies on bilingual assistance would
remain in effect. See BARON, supra note 103, at 20-21; see also Moran, supra note 22, at 792
(stating that "[t]he limited impact of official English amendments is derived, in part, from their
vagueness: confronted with doubtful language, state and local administrators have tended to
preserve existing bilingual services").
128. CAL CONST. art. 3, § 6(c) (stating that § 6(a) is also "intended to preserve, protect and
strengthen the English language").
129. I& § 6(d). In 1990,Alabamavoters approved an English language initiative substantially
identical to the Californla provision. See ALA. CONST. amend. 509 (1990).
130. See Ballot Translations Legal, Attorney General Says, SANJOSE MERCURY NEWS, May 23, 1987,
at 7B (describing letter from California's Attorney General John Van de Kamp to sponsors of
California's initiative explaining new law does not prohibit translations on voting ballots).
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decision later vacated as moot, the Ninth Circuit interpreted
California's law as "primarily a symbolic statement" that did not
require Spanish-speaking government employees to speak English at
work.'3 ' The court recognized, however, that should the legislature
take action to implement the language law as the initiative directs,
32
then the Constitution "may conceivably have some concrete applica-
tion to official government communications."133 Since the adop-
tion of the initiative in 1986, implementing legislation has been intro-
duced regularly in the California legislature, but has not yet been
enacted.1M
In summary, authorities to date support the following tentative
conclusions on the legal effect and validity of English language laws.
In considering laws that merely declare English as the official
language of government, courts will construe those laws as having no
substantive legal effect on the provision of bilingual services. In
contrast, laws that prohibit public employees, acting in their official
capacity, from using a language other than English to serve constitu-
ents unable to speak English'35 contravene the First Amendment.
A declaration that prohibits the government from requiring the use
of a language other than English, however, might survive scrutiny if
it does not conflict with federal law"36 or the constitutional rights
guaranteed to criminal defendants. 3 7 The courts have not yet
considered directly the urgings of many commentators that these and
131. Gutierrez v. Municipal Court, 838 F.2d 1031, 1044 (9th Cir. 1988), vacated as moot, 490
U.S. 1016 (1989) (vacated when complainant employee quit); see alsoYniguez v. Arizonans for
Official English, 69 F.3d 920, 928 n.11 (9th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (observing that language laws
of California and certain other states "appear to be primarily symbolic").
132. CAL CONsr. art. 3, § 6(c) (stating that "[t]he Legislature shall enforce this section by
appropriate legislation," and noting further that legislature should also do whatever acts are
needed to preserve and enhance English in California).
133. Guterr 838 F.2d at 1044 (noting that lack of legislative action shows symbolic nature
ofprovision). It is possible, however, that California's law may have more than a symbolic effect
even without legislative action to implement it. For example, consider the improbable case of
a motor vehicle department that refuses to offer its driver's test in English. Presumably, a
California resident could sue to take the test in English whether or not implementing legislation
has been enacted.
134. The most recent proposal to "enforce" California's language provision was introduced
to the California legislature in February, 1996. See 1995 Cal. A.B. 2183, Reg. Sess. (1995-96).
135. In Yniguez, the defendant, Arizonans for Official English, argued that the plaintiff
employee sought the right to speak Spanish at will regardless of the primary language of the
recipient of services. 69 F.3d at 943. The court rejected this assertion because it viewed the
plaintiff's free speech daim as based on her more narrow desire to speak Spanish to only those
Spanish-speaking claimants. Id.
136. To avoid conflict with the federal Voting Rights Act and other federal laws that protect
language minorities, Arizona's Constitution permits the use of languages other than English
when necessary to comply with federal law. AIZ. CoNsT. art. 28, § 3(2) (b).
137. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (discussing constitutional rights of criminal
defendants).
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the Official English laws contravene the Equal Protection guaran-
tee.
138
Should English language laws survive constitutional scrutiny, they
could frustrate efforts to extend consumer protection to language
minorities.3 9 English-Only provisions in state constitutions that
prohibit the state's legislature from requiring the use of languages
other than English would preclude laws that require translation of
consumer contracts and disclosures of essential terms. Even if
enacted as statutes, rather than as amendments to a state constitution,
English-Only laws can wreak havoc on consumer protection for
language minorities."4 Courts might construe these laws as repeal-
ing existing statutes that require bilingual consumer disclosures and
contracts.14 Moreover, these laws would prevent an administrative
agency, such as the state's Attorney General Office, from exercising
138. The Ninth Circuit did note that the equal protection ramifications of the Arizona
language law lent "strong[] support' to its holding. Ynigue, 69 F.3d at 948 (noting that burden
under provision does not fall evenly over population). Professor Perea extensively develops the
equal protection case against these laws. SeePerea, supra note 109, at 367-71; see also Califa, supra
note 15, at 330-46 (arguing that federal English-Only law would not survive Equal Protection
Clause challenge); Daniel J. Garfield, Comment, Don't Box Me In: The Unconstitutionality of
Amendment 2 and English-Only Amendments, 89 Nw. U. L. REv. 690, 694-95 (1995) (arguing that
English language laws adopted by initiative are unconstitutional because they affect fundamental
right to participate equally in political process).
139. Although in Yniguez the Ninth Circuit struck down the entire Arizona law on First
Amendment grounds, that law had no severability clause. 69 F.3d at 930-32 (stating text of
provision). Moreover, the parties treated the legislation as a unit that would stand or fall as a
whole. Id. As such, the decision does not necessarily reach language laws that do not prohibit
government employees from dealing with non-English speaking constituents in a language other
than English. Moreover, the Supreme Court may ultimately disagree with the Ninth Circuit's
position.
140. Some reviewers of this Article have expressed doubts that these English language laws
were intended to have the impacts on the consumer marketplace that this Article suggests. In
rejecting the Arizona Attorney General's narrow interpretation of Arizona's English-Only law as
"completely at odds" with its plain language, the Yniguez case is instructive in predicting the
potential reach of these laws to all aspects of government. See supra notes 120-23. Certainly,
these laws are not intended nor do they purport to govern private transactions such as those in
the consumer marketplace. Nevertheless, their potential pervasive public reach holds
implications for these private dealings as the discussion that follows suggests. In no way,
however, does this Article intend to suggest that courts must or should construe the laws to the
detriment of language minority consumers. Rather, these comprehensive English language laws
are unconstitutional, either because they contravene the First Amendment if they restrict
government speech or, as Professor Perea has urged, because they offend the Equal Protection
Clause. See Perea, supra note 109, at 356-71.
141. The proposed federal Language of Government Act of 1995 provides that "[e]xcept
where an existing law of the United States directly contravenes the amendments made by section
3 [declaring English the official U.S. language] (such as requiring the use of a language other
than English for official business of the government of the United States), [the provisions of the
proposed law] are not intended to repeal existing laws of the United States." S. 356, 104th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1995). The impact of this provision on the FTC door-to-door and used car
rules discussed in Part I.C.4 is uncertain.
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its rulemaking authority to require translations in consumer transac-
tions.' 42
These English-Only laws may also limit the authority of courts to
dispense consumer justice to language minorities. For example,
South Carolina's language statute prohibits any "order" or "decree"
that "require[s]" the use of any language other than English. 4
Consider how a South Carolina court should resolve a claim that a
merchant engaged in an unfair trade practice by falling to provide a
translated contract following oral negotiations in Spanish.1"
Another interesting question is whether a court could conclude that
a merchant has committed fraud by falling to translate an unfair
contract term for a Spanish-Only Consumer.45 In either case, a
decision that favors the consumer arguably "requires" the use of a
language other than English, creating a result presumably contrary to
the English-Only law.
As shown, English-Only laws may impede the development of
legislative, administrative, and judicial reforms to protect language
minorities. Even the "symbolic" Official English laws may hinder
reform. For example, one of the primary policy arguments made in
favor of Official English (and English-Only) laws is that a multilingual
govemment encourages immigrants to forego acquisition of Eng-
lish.'46 When urging legislation to require translated contracts and
disclosures, consumer advocates will be met with the same claim that
such reform runs counter to assimilation goals. Despite compelling
arguments that the accommodation of other languages does not
142. See Mapco Int'l, Inc. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 993 F.2d 235, 240 (Temp.
Emer. Ct. App. 1993) (stating that administrative agency can only interpret statutes through
regulations and decisions, not supersede them). In the absence of contradictory legislation,
state agencies that are authorized to construe their state deceptive trade practice statutes could
establish protections for language minorities. See Bender, supra note 94, at 650 (noting that
more than half of states authorize rulemaking under these statutes).
143. S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-1-697 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994); see also ARiz. CoNsT. art. 28,
§ 3(1) (b) ("No entity to which this Article applies [the legislative, executive, and judicial
branches] shall make or enforce a law, order, decree or policy which requires the use of a
language other than English.").
144. See infra Part 1I.G (discussing this potential claim under state unfair or deceptive trade
practice acts).
145. See infra Part III.D.3 (discussing argument that merchant should have duty to make
such disclosure). That discussion assumes an English-Only law does not constrain the court.
146. Elliot L.Judd, The Federal English Language Amendment: Prospects and Perils, in NOT ONLY
ENGLISH 37, 39 (Harvey A. Daniels ed., 1990). But seeJeffrey L. Harrison, Class, Personality,
Contract, and Unconscionability, 35 WM. & MARY L. REv. 445, 497 (1994) (noting, and later
rejecting as permitting "undue advantage-taking," potential law and economics argument in
favor of enforcing unconscionable bargains to motivate disadvantaged to read their contracts,
become better educated, search for better terms in marketplace, and other similar goals).
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discourage or delay the acquisition of English, 4 7 the adoption of
Official English laws reflects the rhetorical power and political
popularity of these assimilationist claims. The Official English
argument that multilingual government frustrates assimilative goals
may also impede judicial activism. For example, defendants might
rely on an Official English law to urge that a court should not
obligate a business to translate unfair contract terms in favor of
language minorities."
Given these potential impacts on consumer protection, consumer
advocates should add their voices to those opposing the English
language movement. Even when urged as a merely symbolic
expression of patriotism,149 English language laws are unsound
because of their tangible impact on the development of consumer
protection for language minorities. Once enacted, a "symbolic"
Official English law may remain unchallenged on constitutional
grounds due to its apparent lack of impact, yet still cause pernicious
injury to language minorities.
147. E.g., Note, "Offziial English":" Federal Limits on Efforts to Curtail Bilingual Services in the
States, 100 HAlv. L. REv. 1345, 1360 (1987) ("Given the overwhelming social and economic
incentives that already exist to learn English, the deprivation of bilingual services seems at most
a small added incentive." (citations omitted)). Even if multilingualism policies could lessen the
immigrant's incentive to learn English, it is not fair for government to encourage assimilation
by declaring open season on immigrants while they learn English. See Alfonso v. Board of
Review, 444 A.2d 1075, 1085 (NJ.) (Wilentz, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 806 (1982).
Judge Wilentz stated:
Some might think that the rule of the majority [by finding no constitutional basis
to receive notice of unemployment appeal rights in Spanish] provides an incentive to
learn English. No such incentive is needed, for every day of their lives provides
Hispanic-Americans with innumerable, often devastating reminders of their
disadvantaged position resulting from the language barrier they face. There is no
carrot in this decision, only a stick.
Id Affirmative policies designed to promote the acquisition of English, such as English
education programs, would better address this concern of the official language law proponents.
See generally Califa, supra note 121, at 347 (arguing that real motivation of those promoting
English-Only laws is "cultural insecurity" and prejudice, not assimilation).
148. See Ramirez v. Plough, Inc., 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 423, 428-29 (Ct. App. 1992) (concluding
that official language policy does not override consumer protection policies), rev'd on other
grounds, 863 P.2d 167 (Cal. 1993). In Ramirez, defendant drug manufacturer argued that
California's English language law abolished, for public policy reasons, a manufacturer's liability
for failing to warn of product dangers in languages other than English. See generally Dillard,
supra note 113, at 223 (discussing Ramire and noting possibility of courts interpreting Official
English amendment to constitution as support for assertion that legislature should not require
use of languages other than English).
Looking back to the "harshly decided" cases of German-speaking immigrants by the Wisconsin
Supreme Court in the 1870s to the early 1900s, Professor Macaulay has commented that the
court's refusal to allow these immigrants to testify that their oral bargains differed from the
written contracts served the social policy of integration by encouraging them to learn English.
See Macaulay, supra note 48, at 1065-66 n.31 (citing cases from 1875-1901).
149. But see Perea, supra note 109, at 367-71 (arguing that Official English laws should not
be treated as unobjectionable symbols of "national unity" because in fact they symbolize
rejection of the Latino/a heritage and culture).
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B. Proposition 187 and Other Considerations in Choosing the Apprupriate
Legal Institution for Reform
Legislation is the best vehicle to protect language minorities against
the market's failure to translate their bargains. Professor Alan
Schwartz and the late Professor Arthur Leff have led the attack on
judicial efforts to remedy imperfection in consumer markets generally.
Professor Leff viewed the case-by-case application of the judicial
doctrine of unconscionability to regulate the quality of consumer
transactions as an expensive and frustrating proposition."' 0 Profes-
sor Schwartz has argued that courts are "relatively poor social
institutions" to resolve problems of imperfect information in
consumer markets.'' He argues that legislatures are the institution
best situated to promote the delivery of information to consumers
through such policies as plain-language laws or statutes requiring the
disclosure of relevant information.
5 2
Considerations specific to language minorities also favor legislative
solutions to the current market abuses. In a discussion of the
appropriate forum for the articulation of language rights, Professor
Moran has distinguished between positive and negative rights.'53
Moran argues that courts are well equipped to enunciate negative
rights, which are guarantees that a person will not suffer discrimina-
150. Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Crowd-Consumers and the Common Law
Tradition, 31 U. Prrr. L. REv. 349,356 (1970) (describing wasteful cycle that occurs when quality
of goods is regulated on case-by-case basis). Addressing high pressure and deceptive door-to-
door transactions, Professor Epstein has commented that the unconscionability doctrine may
function "at best as a blunt instrument... and that it is better to adopt some legislative solution
to control the problem." Richard A. Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisa 18 J.L. &
ECON. 293, 305 (1975). I have argued elsewhere for a statutory standard of unconscionability
that defers to the courts to judge the fairness of interest rates. Cognizant of these concerns, my
proposal was offered as an alternative to the offensive effects of usury laws on freedom of
contract. See Bender, supra note 46, at 743-44. Translation laws, in contrast, have little impact
on the parties' freedom to self-determine their substantive bargain.
151. Alan Schwartz, Unconscionability and Imperfect Information: A Research Agenda, 19 CAN. BUS.
LJ. 437,453(1991) (arguing that because courts are not well suited to resolve market perfection
problems, unconscionability doctrine should not be used often).
152. Id. at 441 (describing function of courts as one of interpreting contracts and function
of legislature as responding to situations that create unfair consumer contracts). Schwartz
argued elsewhere that administrative agencies can address information problems in consumer
markets more effectively than courts. SeeAlan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets
on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630, 681
(1979) (listing three advantages as factfinding resources, potential power to order effective
remedies to make markets more competitive, and more effective policing of disclosure schemes).
Initiating a federal administrative solution to aid language minorities is problematic because of
the plethora of federal agencies with jurisdiction over consumer transactions. For example, the
FTC oversees finance companies, while the National Credit Union Administration oversees credit
unions. Rather, federal legislation should be pursued with compliance enforced by the various
federal agencies.
153. Moran, supra note 22, at 807.
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tion based on an exercise of choice, such as the decision to speak
Spanish in a restaurant or tavern."54 The legislature is an "inapt
forum" to articulate such negative rights because its "orientation to
the give-and-take of special-interest politics"1 5 is likely to favor
"assimilative approaches [over] those that preserve linguistic differ-
ence."'156 In contrast, positive rights, such as bilingual education
programs, are better established by legislation followed by
administrative enforcement.- 7  Among other institutional con-
straints, "[c]ourts have limited resources to undertake enforcement
of their decrees, and judges may not be able to oversee the broad-
ranging structural reforms that implementation of a positive right re-
quires. ""' Because reform to require translations in consumer
transactions establishes a positive right, Professor Moran's analysis
favors legislative intervention on behalf of language minorities.
15 9
Moreover, judicial reluctance to protect language minorities from
unsafe products supports legislative intervention. In establishing, as
a matter of law, that an aspirin manufacturer had no duty to warn of
product dangers in Spanish, the California Supreme Court inferred
from legislative silence that the California legislature had deliberately
chosen not to protect language minorities."6 The court reasoned
that deciding when product warnings in a language other than
English are required is a task for which "legislative and administrative
bodies are particularly well suited."' The court assumed that this
policymaking would require collection of empirical data and
consideration of questions such as the cost of multilingual warnings
154. Moran, supra note 22, at 807, 813.
155. Moran, supra note 22, at 808.
156. Moran, supra note 22, at 813.
157. Moran, supra note 22, at 808-09; see also Leff, supra note 150, at 357 (raising possibility
that more would be changed by specific statutes, backed up by administrative regulations, as
opposed to establishing consumer protection through expensive process of case law).
158. Moran, supra note 22, at 808.
159. In Ynigu= the Ninth Circuit relied on the distinction between positive and negative
rights to reject the language law proponent's reliance on cases refusing to require government
to provide bilingual services. Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d 920, 936-37 (9th
Cir. 1995) (en banc). In contrast to those cases seeking judicial establishment of a positive
right, the employee in Yniguez sought relief from the gag that Arizona's language law placed on
the free speech of government employees. Id.
160. Ramirez v. Plough, Inc., 863 P.2d 167, 175 (Cal. 1993) (determining that legislature is
"able and willing" to specify in what instances it requires non-English language communica-
tions); seeLee, supra note 19, at 1121-22 (describing measures by various states requiring foreign
language communications, such as Arizona's requirement that process servers provide notice of
legal action in Spanish).
161. Ramir, 863 P.2d at 174 (noting that California's legislature already required
multilingual warning in other areas). But see Linda M. Baldwin, Note, Ramirez v. Plough, Inc.:
Should Manufacturers of Nonprescription Drugs Have a Duty to Warn in Spanish?, 29 U.S.F. L REV.
837, 867 (1995) (arguing that legislatures do not necessarily have superior technical and
procedural resources to enact laws to protect language minorities from dangerous products).
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and the number of persons likely to benefit from warnings given in
a particular language. 62 The court cited many instances in which
the California legislature had presumably engaged in such study to
establish rights to bilingual information in public and private
transactions, including consumer transactions. 63 The court also
looked to a federal judge's comment that "'[t]he extent to which
special consideration should be given to persons who have difficulty
with the English language is a matter of public policy for consider-
ation by the appropriate legislative bodies and not by the
Courts."' 1  The potential that courts will defer to a legislature's
failure to establish positive rights for language minorities compels
legislative initiative.
As to whether Congress or a state legislature is better suited to
establish positive rights for language minority consumers, consumer
protection experience supports federal intervention. One commenta-
tor has debunked the view that state legislatures are best able to
engineer consumer protection policy because they are familiar with
the unique local concerns of businesses and consumers." Arguing
for a "completely preemptive federal takeover" of consumer credit
regulation, Professor Jeffrey Davis maintains that creditors and
consumers do not have unique local needs." Similarly, in arguing
for establishment of federal payment systems law, Professor Mark
Budnitz contends that "[clonsumer concerns are national in scope
and require national solutions."67  Moreover, in the state legisla-
162. Ramirei, 863 P.2d at 176.
163. Id. at 174-75.
164. Id. at 178 (quoting Carmona v. Sheffield, 325 F. Supp. 1341, 1342 (N.D. Cal. 1971)
(concluding that unemployment claimants have no constitutional right to Spanish language
services from government)), aff'd, 475 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1973)); see also State v. Olivo, 337
N.E.2d 904,910 n.6 (Mass. 1975) (stating that if translating notices to vacate public housing into
other languages is "desirable," then "it should be done by legislative action and with carefully
delineated rules and guidelines. It is not appropriate for this court to enter so difficult and
obscure an area without legislative mandate"); Alfonso v. Board of Review, 444 A.2d 1075, 1077
(NJ.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 806 (1982). In Alfonso, the court stated:
The decision to provide translation [of unemployment appeal rights], encompassing
as it does the determination of when a translation should be provided, and to whom,
and in what language, is one that is best left to those branches of government that can
better assess the changing needs and demands of both the non-English speaking
population and the government agencies that provide the translation.
Id.
165. Jeffrey Davis, Revamping Consumer Credit Contract Law, 68 VA. L. REV. 1333, 1349 (1982)
(stating that assumption that unique concerns exist locally for creditors and consumers is basis
of theory that states are better suited to regulate in this area).
166. Id. at 1349.
167. Mark E. Budnitz, The Revision of UC. C. Articles Three and Four A Process Which Excluded
Consumer Protection Requires Federal Action, 43 MERCER L. REv. 827, 851 (1992) (arguing that
regulatory power in consumer protection area belongs at federal level).
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tures, consumer groups are often less influential than the special
interest groups that represent businesses." s  In contrast, national
consumer organizations are most effective before Congress.' 69
The English language movement poses additional obstacles, both
legal and political, that make federal intervention crucial. In those
states with comprehensive English language laws adopted as constitu-
tional amendments, notably California, state legislatures may be
unable to establish positive consumer protection rights for language
minorities. 7 Under the Supremacy Clause,"' Congress could
override these state provisions. 72
Another obstacle to reform in the state legislatures is the anti-
immigrant political climate that exists in many states with large
immigrant populations. In California, for example, this attitude
prompted both the 1986 Official English constitutional amend-
ment7" and 1994's Proposition 187. Although both these laws were
adopted by initiative174 rather than through legislation, it is unlikely
that California's legislature will enact any positive rights to protect its
immigrant population."5 Although the concentration of language
minorities in certain states may argue for localized solutions, local
solutions are now politically unfeasible in most of those states.
Therefore, in order to protect Spanish-Only Consumers and other
language minorities, Congress must act.
1 76
168. See Kathleen Patchel, Interest Group Politics, Federalism, and the Uniform Laws Process: Some
Lessonsfrom the Unifom Commercial Code, 78 MINN. L. REv. 83, 148 (1993) (commenting that state
legislative forum often favors special interest groups' concerns as opposed to interests of
consumers).
169. Budnitz, supra note 167, at 850 (citing Edward Rubin, Efficiency, Equity and the Proposed
Revision of Articdes 3 and 4, 42 ALA. L. REV. 551, 588-89 (1991)).
170. See supra Part IIA (discussing potential for English language laws to impede consumer
protection).
171. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2, cd. 2.
172. For examples of existing federal preemption of state language laws in the areas of
voting and bilingual education, see Laura A. Cordero, ConstitutionalLimitations on OfficialEnglish
Declarations, 20 N.M. L. REV. 17,45-49 (1990) (discussing challenge to federal bilingual programs
by state English-Only legislation).
173. CAL. CoNST. art. III, § 6.
174. See generally Kevin R. Johnson, An Essay on Immigration Politics, Popular Democracy, and
California's Proposition 187: The Political Relevance and Legal Irrelevance of Race, 70 WASH. L. REV.
629 (1995) (commenting on California's initiative process that produced Proposition 187).
175. In 1995, California's legislature did require the state Insurance Commissioner to
develop and distribute explanations ofautomobile insurance policies in Spanish andVietnamese.
See C.A AB. 1150, Reg. Sess. (1995-96) (specifying that these requirements impose no duty on
insurers to provide insurance policies in non-English language).
176. Some commentators might express concern that a national language policy is unfair to
businesses in states with small language minority populations. Language policies, however, could
account for such variations. For example, legislation could be based on the federal Voting
Rights Act that requires non-English voting materials in just those political subdivisions that meet
a prescribed numerical threshold. See infra note 201 (noting minority population threshold of
10,000 or 5%). For a discussion of various approaches to decide the question of which language
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Although Congress is the appropriate institution to establish
positive rights for language minorities in their consumer transactions,
other considerations compel reforms in every institution, legal and
nonlegal. Congress too could fall victim to the anti-immigrant
agenda.' Should it pass the proposed Language of Government
Act of 1995 or similar legislation, 8 subsequent federal enactments
of consumer protection for language minorities would contradict that
legislation and be politically unfeasible. In fact, because the Act as
introduced would not preempt state law,7 9 the same factors necessi-
tating congressional leadership in consumer language law reform
support the need for simultaneous state reform.
Positive rights that Congress or the states establish may ultimately
fall to protect every language minority."t° Moreover, as the arche-
typical design of consumer protection regulation, disclosure laws may
not address the needs of language minority consumers who are not
literate in their native language.' Finally, the current political
climate may frustrate any source of legislative reform.'82 Therefore,
this Article considers and proposes reforms in other institutions, as
well as designs for legislative reforms, that are facially applicable to
consumers generally and therefore removed from any anti-immigrant
backlash.
minorities should be protected by consumer protection reform, see infra Part I.D (outlining
various state and federal statutory standards referred to as language of Consumer Standard,
Language of Bargain, Language of Solicitation, Variable Language Threshold, Fixed Language,
and combination approaches). Moreover, a federal agency could be authorized to grant
exemptions in those states with small language minority populations. See supra note 84
(discussing exemptions granted by FTC from its used car rule in these circumstances).
177. In addition to English language legislation, the 104th Congress is considering legislation
to tighten immigration laws and limits. See S. 1394, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (amending
Immigration and Nationality Act). See generallyJennifer Gordon, We Make the Road by Walking
Immigrant Workers, the Workplace Project, and the Struggle for Social Change, 30 HARV. C.L-C.L. L.
REv. 407, 409 n.3 (1995) (describing various punitive federal and state measures directed
towards immigrants).
178. See supra note 115 and accompanying text (discussing various federal English-Only
legislative proposals).
179. S. 356, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4 (1995).
180. See infra Part II.D (noting approaches to language reform that may fail to protect every
language minority).
181. See infra Part II.E (commenting on deficiencies in market perfection paradigm).
182. Cf Neil G. Williams, Offer, Acceptance, and Improper Considerations: A Common-Law Model
for the Prohibition of RacialDiscrimination in the ContractingProcess, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 183, 225-
28 (1993) (arguing that because current restrictive political trend makes congressional
protection against racial discrimination unlikely, courts should expand common law of contracts
to embrace broad antidiscrimination principle). Establishing positive rights of language
minorities to receive translated consumer contracts might also be attacked as unduly
burdensome to small business and generally as antithetical to the movement to curb government
regulation of business.
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C. Racial Discrimination in Consumer Markets: Are Language-Based
Solutions Too Narrow?
Reformers must consider whether solutions addressing marketplace
language barriers miss the mark. Perhaps reform should aim to
eradicate all forms of racial discrimination in consumer markets.
Examples such as the water purification sales scheme 8" lend sup-
port to broader reform. In this instance, a scam targeting Spanish-
speaking Latinos/as exploited not just the language barrier, but also
Latinos/as' "almost religious quest" for pure water and their hesitancy
to complain to government authorities."s'
Because continued immigration and an active anti-immigrant
climate present increased opportunities for racial discrimination
against Latinos/as in consumer markets, consumer and Latino/a
advocates may hope for comprehensive reform. While not opposing
comprehensive solutions, this Article aims to isolate and address the
narrower issue of how to level the language playing field. Experience
under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA)185 demonstrates
that broad-brush efforts targeting racial discrimination through the
creation of negative rights often fail to influence consumer markets.
Among other problems, racial discrimination is difficult to prove
under the ECOA and similar acts. 86 As a result, most ECOA claims
rely on technical provisions that create bright line standards for
compliance.8 7 Because violations of more narrowly drawn positive
rights are easier to establish, they are likely to have more deterrent
influence on merchants than are vague, admonitory laws. Professor
Whitford has argued persuasively that "increasing the specificity" of
consumer legislation yields greater voluntary compliance by mer-
183. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text (describing inducement of Mexican family
to purchase overpriced water purification system).
184. DAvis, supra note 11, at 183. In this scenario, the discrimination may stem from
economic opportunism but it could also be driven by animus toward Latinos/as, particularly
given the current political climate in which Spanish speakers are often viewed as undocumented
immigrants. This Article generally does not attempt to discern the motive of the discrimination.
Cf. Ian Ayres, Fair Driving. Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail Car Negotiations, 104 HARV. L
REv. 817, 845-47 (1991) (concluding that discrimination encountered by blacks and women in
empirical study of car market appears to be revenue-based, but also indicates animus).
185. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691(a)-(f) (1994).
186. See infra Part III.B.2 (noting application of ECOA to language-based practices).
187. SeeAnthony D. Taibi, Banking, Finance, and Community Economic Empowerment: Structural
Economic Theory, Procedural CivilRights, and SubstantiveRacialjustice, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1463, 1479-
84 (1994) (urging reform of banking law to adopt community-empowerment paradigm instead
of failed equality model in ECOA). An example of a positive right under the ECOA is the right
to receive notification of the reasons for an adverse credit decision. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(d).
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chants."~ Targeting language barriers with translation laws is the
type of specific regulation that is likely to produce acceptable levels
of compliance.
The apparent strength of the English language movement might
argue for solutions that avoid direct focus on language issues.
However, any broader attack on racial discrimination in consumer
markets is likely to encounter allied prejudices: the anti-immigrant
sentiment behind California's Proposition 187 and the anti-minority
backlash apparent in current efforts to dismantle affirmative ac-
tion.
18 9
Although it offers language-based solutions, this Article proposes
strategies that may have broader impact on racial and ethnic
discrimination in consumer markets. For example, aggressive public
enforcement against language fraud practiced on Spanish-Only
Consumers' should send merchants the more general message that
there is no open season on Latinos/as-any scam that victimizes them
will prompt enforcement action.
D. Should Protection of Language Minorities Be Language-Neutral or
Language-Specific?
Reforms that protect the Spanish-Only Consumer may be met with
the English language movement's policy argument that accommodat-
ing a single language minority group itself discriminates against other
language minorities. 1 ' Pointing to the existence of over 4000 world
languages 192 and to the approximately 298 languages other than
English spoken in American homes,' 93 this argument assumes that
fairness compels all-or-nothing solutions. Not surprisingly, in the
188. William C. Whitford, Structuring Consumer Protection Legislation to Maximize Effectiveness,
1981 Wis. L. REV. 1018, 1042.
189. SeeJohn Boudreau, Effort to Outlaw Affirmative Action Promoted in California; Civil Rights
Groups See Initiative as Political-Cultural Grenade; WASH. POST, Dec. 27, 1994, at AS (discussing
upcoming initiative in California to outlaw state government affirmative action programs).
190. See infra Part III.F.2.
191. See FERNANDO DE LA PERA, DEMOCRACY OR BABEL: THE CASE FOR OFFICIAL ENGLISH 62
(1991) (suggesting that government could not provide services for one language group without
providing them for all language minorities); Facts & Issues (U.S. English, Washington, D.C.)
(urging that to add some languages other than English for government business discriminates
against remaining languages) (on file with The American University Law Review).
192. BARON, supra note 103, at 31 (citing RONALD WARDBAUGH, LANGUAGE IN COMPETITON:
DOMINANCE, DIVERsITY AND DECLINE 22 (1987)).
193. SeeLee, supra note 19, at 1109 n.7 (noting numbers ofAmerican non-English language
speakers based on 1990 census); cf. Ramirez v. Plough, Inc., 863 P.2d 167, 170 (Cal. 1993)
(noting that litigants agreed, in product liability case, that more than 148 languages are spoken
in the United States).
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realm of government services, this rhetoric usually favors the
latter.194
As a policy argument, however, this claim is nonsense. It overlooks
the plain fact that any choice to conduct government business only in
English discriminates against all other languages. Moreover,
indigenous languages and Spanish were in use in America before the
introduction of English. 95 The dominant status that the English
language now enjoys is not an American birthright. Instead, the
language movement urges English as the sole language of government
because of its now overwhelming use by Americans. 96 This ap-
proach apparently assumes that at some point a numerical threshold
was crossed that requires government to operate in English. There
is no good reason why the threshold must admit only English,
however, when there is an enormous gap between Spanish, the
second most spoken language in American homes, and other
languages. As reported by the 1990 census, there are 17.3 million
Spanish-speakers in America, trailed by speakers of French at 1.7
million, German at 1.5 million, Italian at 1.3 million, and Chinese at
1.2 million.19 7 These circumstances establish a strong case for the
recognition of English and, at least, the Spanish language in the
provision of government services and also in consumer settings.
Of the current approaches the law uses to extend positive rights to
language minorities as consumers, some are language neutral because
under the circumstances any language minority might qualify. Others
protect a single language minority group (usually Spanish-speakers),
while others strike a middle ground. These approaches include:
194. See Frontera v. Sindell, 522 F.2d 1215, 1219 (6th Cir. 1975). In Frontera, the court
stated:
If Civil Service exams are required to be conducted in Spanish ... what about the
numerous other nationality groupswhich inhabit metropolitan Cleveland? These other
nationality groups would have just as much right as Frontem [plaintif to have their
examinations conducted in their own languages.
... This would, of course, be at the expense of the city ... and would ultimately be
saddled upon the harried taxpayers of Cleveland.
Id.; see also Guerrero v. Carleson, 512 P.2d 833, 837-38 (Cal. 1973) (rejecting constitutional
challenge to English notices of welfare termination in part because of concern that to require
notice in Spanish would entitle other language minorities to same accommodation), cert. denied
sub nom. Guerrero v. Swoap, 414 U.S. 1137 (1974).
195. See generally MATt S. MEIER & FELICIANO RiBERA, MEXICAN AMERICANS/AMERICAN
MEXICANS 21 (1993) (noting establishment of Spanish settlement in Nuevo Mexico (now part
of New Mexico and other American states) nine years before English established Jamestown).
196. See Califa, supra note 15, at 293-95 (noting general perception among Americans that
English is dominant language).
197. See Americans Speaking Languages Other Than English, available in WL, Cendata file, RN
05 99 02 120, Sept. 21, 1993.
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(1) protecting any consumer whom the merchant knows or has
reason to know is unable to understand English (the Language of the
Consumer Standard);198
(2) protecting any consumer with whom the merchant negotiates
in a language other than English (the Language of the Bargain
Standard) ;199
(3) protecting any language minority group that the merchant has
targeted in non-English advertising (the Language of the Solicitation
Standard) ;2o1
(4) protecting any language minority group that represents more
than a specified percentage of the population or of the merchant's
past customers (the Variable Language Threshold Standard) ;201
198. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 16, § 3840 (1985) (requiring immigration consultants to
provide disclosures in English and language of client); MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 940, § 8.05 (1987)
(requiring mortgage brokers and lenders to take "reasonable steps,' such as using interpreters
or supplying translations, to communicate material facts of loan transaction in language
borrower understands); cf ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 20 para. 1015/8.2 (Smith-Hurd 1993) (instructing
that non-resident farmworkers must be given summary of Illinois labor laws in English and
language in which worker is fluent). A Massachusetts regulation prohibits a door-to-door seller
from inducing a purchaser to sign documents that the seller knows or has reason to know the
purchaser "is unable to read" or does not understand. MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 940, § 3.09(6)
(1987). In order to comply with this regulation, sellers dealing with a language minority would
have to translate any purchase documents.
199. The FrC door-to-door rule and state law counterparts to that rule use this approach.
See 16 C.F.R. § 429.1 (1995) (noting that sales contracts must be furnished in same language in
which oral negotiations transpire); see also supra note 96 (citing state counterparts).
200. See, ag., CAL. GOV. CODE § 8219.5 (West 1992 & Supp. 1995) (requiring inclusion of
translated disclosure in advertisements by non-attorney notary publics in languages other than
English); CONN. AGENcIES REGS. § 42-110b-21 (1975) (mandating non-English advertisements
must make any required disclosures in that language); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 61B-8.003
(1992) (stating subdivision public offering statements in land, condominium, and mobile home
sales must be translated into any language of advertisements); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 765, para.
85/6 (Smith-Hurd 1993 & Supp. 1995) (requiring that land and mobile home sales transactions
must be translated into advertised language); NEB. REV. STAT. § 69-1604 (1990) (stating that
merchant must give cancellation notice form in door-to-door sales in language other than
English if seller regularly uses that other language in any advertising); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 17:16C-
100(d) (West 1984) (requiring home repair contractors who advertise in language other than
English to provide one receipt in other language); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 423.203 (West Supp. 1994)
(specifying same provision for cancellation notice in "consumer approval transactions").
201. The federal Voting Rights Act employs a variation of this approach. As reauthorized
in 1992, that Act requires non-English voting materials if at least 10,000 or five percent of a state
or political subdivision's voting age citizens are (1) members of a single language minority
defined as American Indians, Asian Americans, Alaskan Natives, or those of Spanish "heritage,"
(2) unable to speak or understand English adequately for purposes of the electoral process, and
(3) have a rate of failure to complete the fifth primary grade that exceeds the national rate. 42
U.S.C. § 1973aa-la (1994). The Act is also triggered if the political subdivision contains an
Indian reservation on which more than five percent of the American Indian or Alaskan Native
voting age citizens are members of a single language minority meeting the latter two
requirements. Id. at (b) (2) (A) (i) (III).
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(5) protecting only those members of a designated language
minority group(s) (usually Spanish-speakers) (the Fixed Language
Standard) ;202 and
(6) some combination of these approaches. °3
Language-neutral approaches include the Language of the
Consumer, Bargain, and Solicitation Standards. They stand in
contrast to those approaches that, by design, fail to protect at least
some language minority groups-the Variable Language Threshold
and the Fixed Language Standards. Each of these approaches has its
own unique advantages and shortcomings.
Rarely employed, the Language of the Consumer Standard would
require businesses to determine whether each consumer can
understand English and, if not, to translate any required disclosures
and the written contract. Merchants likely would oppose this standard
with horror stories of the cost and inconvenience of translating their
contracts into every language that their customers might conceivably
speak. Moreover, merchants might object to the burden placed on
them to determine when their customers are unable to understand
English. In practice, however, these concerns are overstated. In most
locations, it is unlikely that merchants will encounter more than a few
predictable language minority groups. Because the legislature should
limit any translation requirement to significant consumer transactions
above a floor dollar amount,2" in the rare event that a business
bargains with an unanticipated language minority there will likely be
sufficient opportunity to obtain a translation before the transaction
is concluded. Public or private intermediaries could provide speedy
202. SeeARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 6-651(A) (Supp. 1995) (requiring consumer loan licensees
to provide Truth in Lending disclosures in Spanish on request); id. § 6-1411 (Supp. 1995)
(mandating premium finance company licensees to provide Truth in Lending disclosures in
Spanish on request); CAL. CV. CODE § 1799.91 (West 1992 & Supp. 1995) (requiring lenders
to provide Federal Credit Practices Rule disclosure to consumer cosigners in English and
Spanish).
203. For example, the FTC Used Motor Vehicle Trade Regulation Rule employs both the
Fixed Language and Language of the Bargain approaches in requiring the delivery of warranty
disclosures in Spanish whenever the merchant conducts a sale in Spanish. 16 C.F.R. § 455.5
(1995).
204. See infra note 290 and accompanying text (noting cost-benefit considerations in
translating consumer documents). When using the Language of the Consumer Standard,
legislatures should also exclude those disclosures that are mass-mailed to prospective customers,
such as the Truth in Lending disclosures that must accompany credit card solicitations. 15
U.S.C. § 1637 (1994); cf. Charles F. Adams, Comment, "Citado a Comparecer " Language Bariers
and Due Process-Is Mailed Notice in English Constitutionally Suffidenti, 61 CAL. L. REV. 1395, 1414
n.95 (1973) (urging that complainants send notice of legal proceedings in language of recipient
when they know of language barrier, but that Spanish surname alone should not compel
investigation of recipient's language ability).
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translations to address this concern, as might on-line services or
software programs. 0 5
A more valid drawback of the Language of the Consumer Standard
results from its emphasis on whether the merchant knows (or,
perhaps, has reason to know) of the consumer's inability to under-
stand the English contract. This standard will prompt the cautious
merchant to probe affirmatively its customer's English ability.0 6
Unfortunately, the current anti-immigrant climate is likely to
undermine this process. First, the Spanish-Only Consumer may be
inclined to overstate her English language ability because of the
stigma attached by the English language movement to the failure to
understand English.2 7  The current anti-immigrant climate may
cause the same exaggeration because Spanish-speakers are assumed
to be undocumented immigrants. Moreover, laws such as California's
Proposition 187 may require Latinos/as (and others) to verify their
immigration status on demand. Latinos/as might perceive questions
about their English language ability as attempts to verify their
immigration status or as a precursor to discrimination targeted at
Latinos/as. °s Perhaps posting prominent signs in Spanish that
address the right to translations would alleviate some of the concerns
that are particularly acute for the Spanish-Only Consumer.0 9 Still,
205. See infra note 450 and accompanying text (discussing technological advances in
translating). Admittedly, it might cost more to obtain these rare bargain-specific translations
that merchants cannot use in multiple transactions.
206. Merchants probably would add some disclaimer to their contracts that the customer is
able to understand English. It is uncertain what deference the law would give these disclaimers.
If a state law employs the Language of the Consumer Standard, lenders might be concerned
whether probing the loan applicant's ability to understand English violates the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act (ECOA). Regulations under the ECOA prohibit the creditor from inquiring
about the applicant's race or national origin. 12 C.F.R. § 202.5(d) (5) (1995). Lenders who
probe the applicant's language abilities in order to help discern the applicant's race or national
origin may violate the ECOA, but lenders under a Language of the Consumer Standard probably
have a sufficient justification to probe for purposes of providing a translation. See infra Part
III.B.2 (discussing standards for ECOA liability).
207. Cf. Sam Howe Verhovek, Mother Scolded byjudgeforSpeakingin Spanish, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
30, 1995, at A9 (reporting remarks of Texas judge in child-custody case who likened Latina
mother's conversations with her five year-old daughter in Spanish to child abuse, sparking fear
that speaking Spanish could have legal consequences).
208. Another problem with the Language of the Consumer Standard is the uncertain point
at which a language minority is sufficiently able to understand English to relieve the merchant
of the duty to translate. If the consumer appears only partially able to bargain in English, but
has some ability, the merchant may be concerned that he will offend the consumer if he
questions her English ability.
209. Cf. ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 6-651(A) (2) (Supp. 1995) (requiring consumer loan
licensees to display conspicuous sign stating lender will provide federal Truth in Lending
disclosures in Spanish on request); CAL. Civ. CODE § 1632(c) (West 1985 & Supp. 1995)
(requiring posting of Spanish-language notice of translation rights by persons regularly
conducting business in Spanish). Because displaying signs in every language might undercut
their effectiveness, any sign requirement should be limited to Spanish or to a few languages.
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the cautious merchant would want to assure himself of the consumer's
English ability unless legislation relied on such signs to shift responsi-
bility to the consumer to protect her own interest.
Legislatures that create positive rights for consumer language
minorities usually employ the Language of the Bargain Standard.
Because this standard looks to the language of the oral bargain,
merchants can predict and control when and in which language (s)
they must provide translations. This greater certainty, however, leads
to several shortcomings. First, despite its facial neutrality, the
standard is not language neutral in practice: a merchant can
determine which language minority groups it will accommodate and
refuse to bargain in any other languages. Second, by negotiating a
bargain in English when a consumer is able to struggle through price
and other simple deal terms, a merchant can escape the duty to
translate the more complex provisions of the written documents and
consumer disclosures even when it knows the consumer cannot
comprehend them.
Most statutes that employ the Language of the Bargain Standard
aggravate these problems by limiting the merchant's translation duty
to just those transactions negotiated "primarily"21 or "principal-
ly"2 n in a language other than English. Therefore, merchants
might elude the duty to translate even when they conduct some part
of the negotiation in a language other than English. Statutes that
look to the "primary" or "principal" language of the negotiation also
engage the court in an undisciplined weighing of the English and
non-English components of the negotiation process.2 12 Statutes that
require translations when the business "conducts" a bargain in a
language other than English are equally vague.213  To avoid these
difficulties, legislatures employing the Language of the Bargain
Although this approach may seem contrary to the language neutrality of the Language of the
Consumer Standard, it is a wise compromise to make that standard work better for the common
language minority groups.
210. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1632 (West 1985 & Supp. 1995).
211. Most of the state door-to-door sale statutes use this standard. See supra note 96 and
accompanying text.
212. Cf. Yates Ford, Inc. v. Benavides, 684 S.W.2d 736, 739-40 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984) (finding
sufficient evidence to support trial court finding that Spanish was primary language of oral sales
presentation after reconstructing entire oral bargain for purchase of car). Unlike the Language
of the Consumer Standard, it appears irrelevant under the Language of the Bargain Standard
whether the consumer that bargains in another language is in fact fluent in English, although
the merchant may point to the consumer's fluency in English to cast doubt on the consumer's
claim that she struck the entire oral bargain in a language other than English. Of course, a
statute might expressly call for a finding that the consumer was not fluent in English.
213. SeeILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 815, para. 505/2N (Smith-Hurd 1993) (holdingfailure to provide
copy of unexecuted contract in language of negotiation unlawful); 16 C.F.R. § 455.5 (1995)
(specifying when used car warranty disclosures must be provided in Spanish).
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Standard should require translations if "any portion" of the transac-
tion is negotiated in a language other than English.214
The Language of the Bargain Standard works best when conjoined
with the Language of the Solicitation Standard." 5 This combination
prevents manipulation of the Language of the Bargain Standard by
merchants who lure language minorities with non-English advertising
and then negotiate deals in simple English to avoid any translation
requirement.216 In the related area of dangerous product warnings,
commentators have urged courts to adopt the Solicitation Stan-
dard."' Presumably manufacturers will object to any standard that
looks to the language of the ultimate purchaser because it would
overwhelm them with the duty to label in every potential language.
By limiting the duty to warn to just those language minorities whose
markets they entered with advertising, the Solicitation Standard, when
operating alone, overcomes this objection.1 For significant con-
sumer transactions that involve oral bargaining, however, it is
reasonable to extend the duty to translate to those transactions
negotiated in languages other than English or, perhaps, to transac-
214. SeeOR. REV. STAT. § 646.249(5) (1993) (requiring translation of rent-to-own disclosures
if"any portion of the transaction is conducted in a language other than English").
215. In 1973, California's Governor Ronald Reagan vetoed a consumer translation bill
requiring translations when the merchant advertised in Spanish. See 1973 Cal. A.B. 212, Reg.
Sess. (1973-74). Apparently, Reagan did so because Spanish-language broadcasters feared they
would lose Spanish advertising from merchants who did not wish to undertake the duty to
translate. See Carl P. Blaine, Breaking the Language Barrier New Rights for California's Linguistic
Minorities, 5 PAC. LJ. 648, 671 (1974) (suggesting that legislature address broadcasters' concern
by shifting focus from advertising to that of language used in conducting transaction, which
legislature did in 1974 legislation).
216. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 69-1604(3) (1990) ("A seller who in the ordinary course of
business regularly uses a language other than English in any advertising or other solicitation of
customers ... or in any face-to-face negotiations ... shall give the [home solicitation sale
cancellation] notice ... to a buyer whose principal language is such other language, both in
English and in the other language."). The FTC's Used Motor Vehicle Trade Regulation Rule
provides that merchants who "conduct" a sale in Spanish must translate the warranty disclosure.
16 C.F.R. § 455.5 (1995). The FTC Staff Compliance Guidelines state that this requirement is
triggered if the dealer expects to conduct sales in Spanish. 52 Fed. Reg. 18,552-02 (1987). To
evidence this intent, the FTC will look to advertisements in Spanish language newspapers and
telephone books, and to "Se Habla Espafiol" signs. IL
217. Cf Michael S.Jacobs, Toward a Process-Based Approach to Failure to Warn Law, 71 N.C. L.
REv. 121, 153-54 (1992) (noting need to warn non-English speakers of product risks); Lee, supra
note 19, at 1139.
218. See Lee, supra note 19, at 1139 ("An appropriate balance, therefore, is to subject
manufacturers to liability, as a matter of law, when they purposefully avail themselves of non-
English speaking markets and then fail to warn in those markets in the language consumers
speak."). A Florida federal district court opinion suggested this approach in 1992. It concluded
that the jury should decide whether English warnings were adequate when the injured Nicara-
guan product users could not read English and the manufacturer had employed the Latino/a
media to advertise the product. Stanley Indus., Inc. v. W.M. Barr & Co., 784 F. Supp. 1570,
1575-76 (S.D. Fla. 1992).
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tions where the business knows or has reason to know that the
consumer cannot understand English. 19
Two alternate approaches are the Variable Language Threshold and
the Fixed Language Standards. Unlike transaction-linked standards,
these alternatives offer no protection to language minorities that do
not meet their thresholds. 22 ' Language minority groups that are
protected, however, are spared the problems of proof under the other
standards; for either approach it is immaterial whether the merchant
knows the consumer is unable to understand English (the Language
of the Consumer Standard),221 negotiates some portion of the
bargain in a language other than English (the Language of the
Bargain Standard), or advertises to the particular language market
(the Language of the Solicitation Standard).
When employed in consumer settings, however, the Variable
Language Threshold and Fixed Language Standards are usually
combined with the Language of the Bargain Standard. For example,
the FTC used car rule requires that merchants translate warranty
disclosures in transactions "conducted" in Spanish, but not those
conducted in other languages.22 A Florida regulation requires
translation of documents in deals negotiated principally in a language
other than English, but only if the language minority group accounts
for five percent or more of the merchant's transactions at the
particular business location. 2 1 Under Florida's merchant-specific
threshold, language minorities are never certain whether a merchant
who does not deliver translations has nonetheless triggered the
219. In the area of product warnings, one commentator suggested that labels with too many
languages can intimidate or confuse consumers, causing them to ignore the disclosures. See
Jacobs, supra note 217, at 153-54 (noting that purpose of failure to warn doctrine is to articulate
risks intelligibly to consumers). By contrast, significant consumer transactions that involve
individualized bargaining allow for transaction-specific translations that avoid this scenario.
220. In the case of the Fixed Language Standard, the threshold is implicit in the designation
of one or more (but less than all) languages for protection.
221. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that a landlord's failure to deliver both
English and Spanish notices to quit as required by a Fixed Language Standard was excused when
the commercial tenant understood English. Ontell v. Capitol Hill E.W. Ltd. Partnership, 527
A.2d 1292, 1295 (D.C. 1987). Courts that construe this standard (or the Variable Language
Threshold Standard), however, should refuse to consider whether the consumer in fact could
understand English. If the legislature intends to add this decision point, it will do so explicitly.
For a case that illustrates the court's often difficult task in assessing the consumer's language
ability, see Chesire Mortgage Serv., Inc. v. Montes, 612 A.2d 1130, 1136 (Conn. 1992) (holding
that trial court did not err in concluding that Puerto Rican borrowers understood English loan
documents though one testified she could not read or write in any language and other testified
he could speak English only a "little bit").
222. 16 C.F.R. § 455.5 (1995); see also Tax. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, § 1.15 (1976) (requiring
regulated loan licensees to provide Spanish loan contract disclosures when "all or a majority of
the negotiations" are in Spanish).
223. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 2-9.005 (1995).
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translation threshold.24  To avoid proof problems, thresholds
should be unrelated to particular merchants, such as a standard based
on state or county population.22 These population-based thresh-
olds help to create a consumer expectation of translations in covered
regions based on the conduct of other merchants in the area. Once
established, this expectation helps consumers to identify and seek
redress from merchants who fail to comply with the translation
law.
226
Instead of using the Variable Language Threshold or the Fixed
Language Standard to limit the reach of the Language of the Bargain
Standard, legislatures should consider using one of these language-
specific standards to augment protection under a transaction-specific
standard. For example, the legislature could require translations into
Spanish in every transaction (Fixed Language Standard) together with
any other language in which the merchant negotiates a particular
transaction (Language of the Bargain).
In selecting the appropriate standard to protect language minori-
ties, the following general considerations are relevant: (1) the type
224. Presumably, the cautious merchant will need to determine the language of each of its
customers to ascertain those languages that exceed the threshold. This inquiry raises the same
problems as those under the Language of the Consumer Standard. See supra notes 206-09 and
accompanying text (discussing how current anti-immigrant climate would undermine this inquiry
process).
225. In addition, legislatures should avoid articulating the threshold in such vague terms as
the language "prevalent" in the county. Cf. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 18915 (West 1991)
(requiring food stamp materials be made available in English, Spanish, and any other "non-
English language prevalent in each county"); see also 7 C.F.R. § 1944.555 (1995) (stating FHA
tenant grievance procedure providing translated notice to tenants when there is "concentration"
of non-English speaking persons); 24 C.F.R. § 50.25 (requiring notice of NEPA hearing will be
bilingual if affected public is "largely" non-English speaking); 47 C.F.R. § 76.75(a) (1) (stating
that notice of cable television employee equal employment opportunity rights should be posted
in Spanish when "significant percentage" of employees are Hispanic); OR. REV. STAT. § 471.551
(1993) (requiring that tavern alcohol warning signs include language other than English if
"significant number of patrons" use that language).
Another problem inherent in this Variable Language Threshold Standard is choosing the
appropriate percentage or numerical threshold for protection. California's use of this standard
suggests that the appropriate threshold may vary depending on the context. See CAL. EDUC.
CODE § 48985 (West 1993) (requiring 15% non-English speaking student body for bilingual
public school notices); CAL. ELEC. CODE § 1635 (West 1977) (providing that 3% non-English
speaking population triggers efforts to recruit bilingual election officials); CAL. GOV'T CODE
§ 53112 (West 1983) (requiring 5% non-English speaking population for bilingual emergency
911 operators); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1113 (West 1990) (requiring 10% non-English
speaking population for bilingual family planning pamphlets); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 1599.74 (West 1990) (invoking 1% threshold for purposes of translating nursing home patient
bill ofrights). To add to merchants' certainty, some administrative agency might provide notice
to affected merchants when a percentage or numerical threshold is satisfied for a particular
language minority group.
226. Although somewhat merchant-specific because of merchants' ability to dictate the
language of the oral bargain, the Language of the Bargain Standard at least creates the
expectation that the consumer will receive written translations whenever oral negotiations occur
in a language other than English.
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of forum selecting the standard and the need to distinguish between
positive and negative rights; (2) the nature of the consumer transac-
tion for which protection is sought; and (3) in targeting Latinos/as
for protection, the diversity of their native languages and the
differences in dialect of Spanish-speaking persons.
The standard employed may turn on whether the consumer seeks
negative rights from the courts or positive rights from the legislatures.
For example, a legislature may decide to require translations of
bargains with any language minority group that exceeds a numerical
threshold. A court is unlikely, however, to adopt such a bright-line
standard.22 Moreover, the appropriate standard may be different
for Congress than for the state legislatures. For example, if choosing
between the Fixed Language and the Variable Language Threshold
Standards, Congress is more likely to employ the latter standard to
address national diversity,228 whereas the individual states might
employ the Fixed Language Standard to designate the dominant
language minority group (s) in the state.229
The appropriate standard may be different for various consumer
transactions. For example, because Latinos/as may mistake their
notary public for a lawyer and fall victim to inflated prices exploiting
this potential confusion, 230 a legislature might require that notaries
clarify that they are not lawyers in Spanish only. In contrast, when
addressing abuses common to language minority groups such as
merchants' falling to translate consumer contracts, universal,
language-neutral reform may be necessary.
Finally, in considering whether the large Latino/a population
demands special attention, such as through the Fixed Language
Standard, reformers must confront the diversity of languages and
dialects among Latinos/as. For example, Brazilians and some other
Latinos/as speak Portuguese rather than Spanish, while in Mexico
and Guatemala alone approximately 260 different indigenous
227. SeeRamirezv. Plough, Inc., 863 P.2d 167, 176-77 (Cal. 1993) (refusing to require aspirin
danger warnings in languages in which product is advertised because court believes legislature
is appropriate forum to adopt this standard). But see Torres v. Sachs, 381 F. Supp. 309, 313
(S.D.N.Y. 1974) (ordering elections board to provide bilingual election officials at polls in
election districts with 5% or more Puerto Rican population in order to assure this population's
constitutional and statutory right to vote). This decision influenced the adoption of the federal
Voting Rights Act standard. See supra note 201 (noting percentage thresholds requiring non-
English voting materials).
228. See supra note 201 (discussing federal Voting Rights Act).
229. See supra note 202 (noting state statutes that require contract disclosure in Spanish).
230. See supra note 38 and accompanying text (discussing Florida law enacted to combat
fraud on non-English speakers).
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languages are spoken." In Mexico, over five million people speak
an indigenous language.232 Moreover, diversity in dialects among
Spanish-speakers raises concerns for reforms that require translations
into the Spanish language. Differences in dialect, though in practice
not too substantial,23 may render translations at least partially
inaccurate. Because speakers of the four primary varieties of Spanish
spoken in America-Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, and Peninsu-
lar2l--tend to concentrate in different locations, merchants may be
able to accommodate these differences.
E. Inadequacies of the Market Perfection Paradigm as Applied to
Language Minorities
Consumer protection regulation usually employs either a market
perfection or a market control design.23 Market perfection solu-
tions aim to improve the performance of market participants.3 '
The classic example is disclosure legislation intended to correct the
market's failure to provide information necessary to ensure competi-
tion.23 7 The market perfection paradigm views markets as healthy
institutions and consumers as competent to protect their own interests
once given the necessary disclosures.2" In contrast, market control
231. FERNANDO PEI4ALOSA, CHICANO SOCIOLINGuIsrIcs 24 (1980) (citing 1959 study of
indigenous influences on language diversity).
232. Report on 1990 Census Results, supra note 28. In Guatemala, 32% of the population
speaks an indigenous language. Michael Ross Fowler & Julie M. Bunck, Legal Imperialism or
Disinterested Assistance? American Legal Aid in the Caribbean Basin, 55 ALB. L REV. 815, 833 n.97
(1992).
233. For example, a Mexican Spanish-speaker would refer to an orange as a "naranja," but
a Puerto Rican Spanish-speaker would use "china." Substantial differences in word meanings
are often confined to nouns. Another example is the slang "nieve" which means ice cream in
Mexico, but means snow among Spanish-speakers in other regions. See Marty Westerman, Death
of the Frito Bandito, AM. DEMOGRAPHICS, Mar. 1989, at 28, 32 (describing impact of this diversity
in dialects on Borden ice cream advertising campaign). See generally ROSAURA SANCHEZ, CHICANO
DISCOURSE: SoCio-HISTORIC PERSPECTIvES 98-138 (1983).
234. PENALOSA, supra note 231, at 25.
235. SeeRobert D. Cooter & Edward L. Rubin, Orders and Incentives as Regulatory Methods: The
Expedited Funds Availability Act of 1987,35 UCLA L. REV. 1115, 1174 (1988) (referring to market
control as "market displacing" and suggesting market stimulation as third model). One example
of market stimulation is to take bank policies toward language minorities into account in
approving the mergers of regulated lenders. Cf Bender, supra note 46, at 809-10 (describing
relevance of compliance with ECOA when national banks seek federal approval of acquisitions).
In theory, market perfection regulation also stimulates the market to respond to the agenda of
the informed consumer.
236. See Robin A. Morris, ConsumerDebt and Usury: A New Rationale for Usury, 15 PEPP. L. REV.
151, 157 n.22 (1988) (referring to market perfection solutions as "those which perfect the ideal
dialogue between sellers and buyers by helping buyers to negotiate more effectively or to
comparison shop more easily").
237. Cooter & Rubin, supra note 235, at 1175 (acknowledging that disclosure was part of
Expedited Funds Availability Act, designed to inform consumers when market fails to do so).
238. Cooter & Rubin, supra note 235, at 1178-79 (arguing that disclosure allows regulators
to make efficient decisions and consumers to protect their own interests).
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solutions assume that efficient operation of the market cannot be
restored and must therefore be displaced by government control of
the substantive terms of the bargain.3 9
Described as the "cornerstone of consumer credit legislation,"240
the federal Truth in Lending Act (TILA)241 employs both models
of consumer regulation. Among its provisions, TILA requires that
lenders disclose the annual percentage rate and other basic terms of
the loan transaction.242 In addition to market perfecting disclosure,
TILA employs market controls, such as prohibiting creditor termina-
tion of home equity credit plans except in certain specified circum-
stances.2' Employed by TILA for certain home loans, cooling-off
periods share attributes of both the market control and market
perfection models.2  Market control strategies in TILA, however,
usually target isolated loan transactions and are overshadowed by
TILA's typical reliance on disclosures. TILA's declaration of purpose
emphasizes this market perfection model:
The Congress finds that economic stabilization would be
enhanced and the competition... would be strengthened by the
informed use of credit. The informed use of credit results from an
awareness of the cost thereof by consumers. It is the purpose of
this title to assure a meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that
the consumer will be able to compare more readily the various
239. Cooter & Rubin, supra note 235, at 1174. For example, the FTC's Credit Practices Rule
employs market control in outlawing various terms in consumer credit transactions such as
confessions ofjudgment, wage assignments, and certain blanket security interests in household
goods. 16 C.F.R. § 444.2 (1995).
240. James P. Nehf, Effective Regulation of Rent-ToOawn Contracts, 52 OHIO ST. LJ. 751, 758
(1991).
241. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1677 (1994).
242. Id. §§ 1632, 1637, 1637a, 1638.
243. Id § 1647. The Truth in Lending Act (TILA) also employs what Professors Cooter and
Rubin refer to as market stimulating strategies. See Cooter & Rubin, supra note 235, at 1174 ("A
market stimulating statute is based on the premise that the market's operation can be restored,
but only by imposing governmental rules. For such rules to restore, rather than displace, the
market they must mimic some aspect of the market's operation that has been eliminated by the
market failure."). For example, by excluding voluntary credit insurance premiums from its
definition of the finance charge and therefore from the calculation of the annual percentage
rate, TILA encourages lenders to offer optional rather than required credit insurance. See 15
U.S.C. § 1605(b).
244. See 15 U.S.C. § 1635 (allowing for right to rescind transaction during specified window
of time). Cooling-off legislation reflects the market perfection model by allowing the consumer
time to consider the bargain and to comparison shop. See Peter M. Juzwiak, Mr. Micawber
Revisited: A Critique of the Credit Practices Rule 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 417, 454 (1991) (describing
cooling-off legislation and its benefit to market efficiency and consumers). This legislation also
controls the substantive terms of the bargain by delaying the final bargain until the specified
cooling-off period has passed. Id
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credit terms available... and avoid the uninformed use of credit
245
TILA's predilection toward the market perfection paradigm reflects
the usual tendency of legislatures and of many commentators to reject
market control solutions as antithetical to freedom of contract.
46
One commentator urges that legislatures resist market control
solutions because such substantive regulation is easily eluded and
limits consumer choices in a non-optimal manner.21 Usury regula-
tion is a familiar market control strategy that illustrates these
concerns. In order to elude restrictions on the legal rate of interest,
lenders often charge unregulated fees and costs that fall outside the
statutory definition of interest24 Moreover, usury laws may exclude
high risk borrowers from the legal lending market.
2 49
Because of these free market concerns, many commentators
promote market perfection by disclosure laws as the preferred
legislative response to imperfect markets.25 ° Other commentators,
however, point to the many weaknesses of disclosure regulation,
aiming their criticism at TIIA's disclosure scheme.
2 11 Critics of
TILA charge that disclosure of the true cost of credit has had little
effect on consumers, particularly those with low incomes. 2 Among
the evaluative disabilities consumers face in reading consumer
245. 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a). See generallyJonathan M. Landers, Some Reflections on Truth in
Lending 1977 U. ILL. L.F. 669 (observing that TILA relies on consumer's own efforts to police
marketplace).
246. See William C. Whitford, The Functions of Disclosure Regulation in Consumer Transactions,
1973 Wis. L. REV. 400, 470 (describing benefit of disclosure laws over regulation of substantive
terms as "less complete interference with freedom of contract"); see also E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH,
CoNTRACTS § 4.29, at 519 (2d ed. 1990) (remarking that legislatures have favored disclosure
rather than control of terms "as more consistent with a market economy").
247. See Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 152, at 667 (criticizing regulations for forcing
consumers to accept harsh terms or higher price in place of them); see also Howard Beales et
al., The Efficient Regulation of Consumer Information, 24 J.L. & ECON. 491, 513 (1981)
("[flnformation remedies allow consumers to protect themselves according to personal
preferences rather than place on regulators the difficult task of compromising diverse
preferences with a common standard.").
248. Bender, supra note 46, at 740 (discussing use of inflated cash prices to take advantage
of unsuspecting consumers in order to compensate for restriction on interest rates).
249. Bender, supra note 46, at 728-32 (arguing that lowering rate ceiling merely increases
number of borrowers "unable to qualify for credit at or below legal limit"); see also Nehf, supra
note 240, at 781 n.133 ("To the extent that rate limits exclude high-risk individuals from
obtaining credit, usury laws can actually hurt the poorer segments of the population.").
250. Beales et al., supra note 247, at 513; Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 152, at 668-71, 673;
Whitford, supra note 246, at 470.
251. See Edward L. Rubin, Legislative Methodology: Some Lessons From the Truth-in-Lending Act,
80 GEO. LJ. 233, 239 (1991) (questioning effectiveness of Truth in Lending Simplification and
Reform Act in informing consumers or encouraging effective credit shopping).
252. See Rubin, supra note 251, at 236 (stating that studies indicate that benefits from
disclosure are "limited to the same upscale consumers who would manage perfectly well" absent
legislation).
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contracts and disclosures are a lack of education,23 so-called infor-
mation overload,' physical settings for consumer bargaining that
are not conducive to careful deliberation and analysis,2 5 and the
lack of opportunity to read the disclosures or the contract before
becoming psychologically committed to the bargain.256
Results of a national literacy study released in 1993 (1993 Study)
further fuel criticism of disclosure regulation.2  The study revealed
that forty to forty-four million of America's 191 million adults
achieved in the lowest of five levels of proficiency in interpreting
prose, documentary, and quantitative information. 8  Another fifty
million adults performed at the next second lowest literacy level.25 9
Based on these findings, one commentator has remarked that faith in
the value of disclosure laws "to 'level the playing field' ... should be
reexamined in light of... [the evidence] that almost half of all
Americans over age sixteen lack basic reading and math skills."2 °
The legislative tendency to favor market perfecting disclosure laws
must also be reexamined to address the needs of the growing number
of Spanish-Only Consumers and other language minorities. There are
indications that disclosure may be even less effective for language
minorities than it has proven for consumers generally. First, illiteracy
rates of language minorities in their native languages might be higher
than for English-speakers. 26" The 1993 Study did not measure the
253. See Davis, supra note 166, at 1356 ("Recent studies have shown that consumers think
disclosure statements are complicated, that they do not read the statements, and that they
remain ignorant of much of their legal relationship with the creditor.") (citations omitted);
Ndiva Kofele-Kale, The Impact of Truth-in-Lending Disclosures on Consumer Market Behavior: A
Critique of the Critics of Truth-in-Lending Law, 9 OKLA. CTry U. L. REv. 117, 132 (1984) (noting
studies that report consumer awareness of such disclosed terms as annual percentage rate
correlates strongly to education and income).
254. See genera/lyJeffrey Davis, Protecting Consumers from Overdisclosure and Gobbledygook An
Empirical Look at the Simplification of Consumer-Credit Contracts, 63 VA. L. REV. 841 (1977)
(discussing overwhelming effect of disclosure on consumers and suggesting simplification of
process).
255. SeeJonathan M. Landers & Ralph J. Rohner, A Functional Analysis of Truth in Lending
26 UCLA L. REV. 711, 725 (1979) (describing usual physical setting as "extremely stressful"
because salesperson is usually close to consumer, children or noise may distract the consumer,
and there may be subtle urging of "need for speed").
256. See id. at 715 (stating that disclosures are usually made to consumers at point in time
which they are not likely to comparison shop); Whitford, supra note 246, at 426 ("Even in the
rare case in which a consumer actually reads the contract before signing, it must be
remembered that he usually views himself as already morally committed.").
257. IRWIN S. KIRSCH ET AL, NATIONAL CTR FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS, ADULT LITERACY IN
AMERICA (1993).
258. Id. at xiv.
259. Id.
260. EricJ. Gouvin, Truth in Savings and the Failure of Legislative Methodology, 62 U. GIN. L.
REv. 1281, 1300 (1994).
261. See supra notes 23-80 and accompanying text (discussing literacy rates of Latino/a
population).
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literacy of Americans in languages other than English.262 Because
they use different methodologies than the 1993 Study, literacy studies
in Mexico and in other countries do not provide an accurate
comparison to the literacy of Americans in English."
Counterpart statistics on the level of educational attainment,
however, may provide a means of comparing literacy levels. Of the
variables explored in the 1993 Study, the level of education had a
stronger relationship to the level of literacy proficiency than any other
single variable-including age and sex.26 Reports that on average
Mexicans spend as few as four years in formal education in Mexi-
co 2  portend that the degree of literacy in Spanish of immigrants
from Mexico may be much less than that in English for Americans
generally.2' Before enacting laws requiring written translations for
Spanish-Only Consumers and other language minorities, more study
is needed of their levels of literacy in their native languages.267
Another factor that may affect disclosure solutions is the cultural
familiarity of language minorities with the information to be
translated. Disclosure laws assume that consumers will read the
information disclosed, understand its meaning, and then comparison
shop for the best package of terms.25 Reformers would profit from
careful study of the level of language minorities' understanding of
concepts such as balloon payments, credit insurance, as-is warranties,
security interests, and others. Findings that language minorities are
unfamiliar with concepts American businesses employ in consumer
transactions may require market control solutions, more detailed
disclosure than straight translations, and the establishment of
consumer education programs to complement disclosure.269
Finally, the English language movement may restrict or impede the
enactment of non-English disclosure regulation. For example, a
statute that demands disclosure of essential terms in a language other
than English may contravene a state constitution that prohibits the
262. KIRSCH Er AL, supra note 257, at 13.
263. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text (noting disparity of results for studies of
literacy rates among Spanish-speaking people).
264. KMRSCH Er AL, supra note 257, at 25.
265. See supra note 29 and accompanying text (discussing length of formal education in
Mexico).
266. Cf. KiRScH Er AL, supra note 257, at 35 (detailing 1992 statistics that state average years
of schooling of white adults in America as 12.8).
267. The need for such a study of a particular language minority is especially acute when the
legislature is inclined to adopt a Fixed Language Standard to protect that group.
268. Dwight Golann, Beyond Truth in Lending: The Duty of AffirmativeDisclosure 46 BUS. LAW.
1307, 1312 (1991).
269. See infra Part lII.F.1 (discussing need for consumer education programs for language
minorities).
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legislature from enacting any law that requires the use of non-English
languages. ° In contrast, market control legislation that ensures a
fair bargain without reference to language issues will evade any state
(or national) English language law and, perhaps, the political climate
that drives the English language movement. Moreover, because it is
language neutral, market control legislation avoids the dilemma
created under disclosure laws of deciding whether some or all
language minority groups deserve protection. 71
Despite these language minority-specific considerations that raise
doubts about disclosure solutions, there are indications that disclosure
may prove more effective for language minorities than for consumers
generally. Legislatures should weigh both sets of indications carefully.
First, language minorities might be more inclined than consumers
generally to read disclosures or contracts in their native language.
Studies might reveal that translations offer a source of cultural
grounding when presented in an otherwise unfamiliar marketplace
setting.
2
Second, although consumers may only give their contract a quick
reading to confirm that it is, in fact, the "right" contract,273 a
translation may enable language minorities, who cannot compare
English contracts to the oral bargain they have struck, to perform this
important task.274  For example, a Spanish-Only Consumer who
intends to purchase but, through fraud or mistake, leases an
automobile, is protected by a translation law if she at least reads the
translated document's caption. This example also exposes an
important constraint on market control regulation in addressing
problems of language minorities. Because it would infringe too
severely on consumer choice, few consumer advocates would urge that
270. See supra Part II.A (discussing impact of English language movement on consumer
protection regulation).
271. See supra Part II.D (discussing various language-neutral and language-specific standards
for extending protection to language minority consumers).
272. Another potential area for study is whether Spanish-Only Consumers who are illiterate
in Spanish nonetheless can readily find someone literate in Spanish to accompany them in their
significant consumer transactions. It is possible that language minorities can find such literate
Spanish-speaking persons more easily than a bilingual person able to orally translate an English
writing into Spanish.
273. See Landers & Rohner, supra note 255, at 722 (stating that atmosphere in which
contracts are generally read prevents consumers from paying attention to particulars, and at
best, consumers might quickly confirm that they are signing the type of contract they intended).
274. To aid this function, translation laws should adopt Florida's requirement that the
translation also disclose in the same non-English language: "READ THIS FIRST. This is a
translation of the document that you are about to sign." FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 2-9.005
(1992).
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legislatures outlaw consumer leasing transactions.2" Here, transla-
tion laws present an attractive alternative.
In general, the choice between market control and market
perfection should turn on a balancing test. The extent of the
inability to correct the particular market failure through disclosure
should be weighed against the degree of infringement that market
control places on the consumer's freedom of contractual choice.
Therefore, the appropriate choice may vary for different consumer
transactions. For example, studies of the credit insurance industry
that report high saturation 76 and unfair pricing demonstrate that
disclosure laws do little to encourage competition and fair pricing in
that industry. 7 Here, price control may be necessary to protect not
only language minorities but consumers generally. In contrast, the
appropriate protection for language minorities who misinterpret lease
bargains as sales is to require translated disclosure of the contract
rather than to outlaw often beneficial consumer leases.
III. AN AGENDA FOR REFORM: CONSUMER PROTECTION FOR
LANGUAGE MINORITIES
A. Agenda for Legislative Reform
1. Overview
In addressing the marketplace abuse of language minorities, any
legislature or advocate of legislative reform must confront and resolve
the issues that this Article has examined: (1) whether an English
language law or the movement that encourages these laws impedes
legislative action;"T (2) whether legislation is the appropriate
vehicle to establish protection of language minorities;279 (3) whether
reform should extend to all languages other than English;280 (4)
whether reform should level the language playing field or address
broader issues of racial discrimination in consumer transactions;
28 1
275. Price control would also fall short of addressing those language minorities who might
unknowingly agree to an unintended lease bargain. So long as they make some profit,
merchants would still have an incentive to defraud language minorities into a lease bargain
through the lure of low monthly payments in relation to a purchase.
276. SeeLanders & Rohner, supra note 255, at 727 (reporting penetration rates of over 90%).
277. See Landers & Rohner, supra note 255, at 727-28 (asserting that Truth in Lending
requirements for term disclosures fail to achieve intended purpose of lowering cost to
consumers).
278. See supra Part I.A.
279. See supra Part lI.B.
280. See supra Part II.D.
281. See supra Part II.C.
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and (5) whether reform should employ a market perfection or market
control model. 82 In summary, this Article argues that legislatures
are the best vehicle to establish consumer protection for language
minorities and that reform efforts initially should target language
issues rather than discrimination generally. If Congress establishes
language policy, it can overcome state English language laws. In the
state legislatures and agencies, however, the impact of these laws must
be determined on a state-by-state basis. Although it offers guidelines,
this Article does not answer definitively whether to choose market
control over market perfection, and whether reform should extend to
all language minorities. The answers depend on factors such as the
particular consumer transaction for which protection is sought, as well
as the outcome of the additional studies proposed. In resolving these
and other open issues, legislatures should follow Professor Edward
Rubin's suggestion that instead of a precise bill, the proper starting
point to enact effective consumer legislation is an issue for develop-
ment in hearings.
28
2. Designing effective disclosure legislation for language minorities
Because market control legislation is usually reserved for particular-
ly abusive transactions and terms,2s4 comprehensive legislative
reform to protect language minorities will likely rely on market
perfection strategies, particularly disclosure through translation. In
structuring effective disclosure solutions for language minorities,
legislatures must consider, among other issues, (1) the scope of
transactions covered, (2) whether disclosure requirements should be
language neutral, (3) how to ensure accurate translation, and (4) the
adequacy of sanctions for noncompliance.
The range of consumer transactions includes loans, home and
personal property rentals and purchases, the purchase of insurance,
and the purchase of services, such as home improvements, car repairs,
and even legal services. Most existing translation laws, however, are
directed at isolated transactions such as door-to-door sales. 85 Even
California's comprehensive translation law, which governs a wide
range of transactions such as retail installment sales, leases of
dwellings for over one month, vehicle leases, and fee agreements for
legal services, excludes sales of homes and many home loan transac-
282. See supra Part II.E.
283. Rubin, supra note 251, at 285-86.
284. See, e.g., 16 C.F.R. § 444.2 (1995) (outlawing confessions of judgment, waivers of
exemptions, and certain other clauses in consumer credit contracts).
285. See supra Part I.CA (discussing limited legislative requirements for translations).
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tions.8 6 It also excludes certain documents incidental to covered
transactions, such as rules and regulations under residential leas-
es.287 Shortly after its enactment, California's statute drew criticism
for its failure to cover all transactions important to Spanish-Only
Consumers.28 In enacting a translation statute, a legislature should
include all consumer transactions unless: (1) a market control solu-
tion for a particular transaction eliminates the need for disclo-
sures;289 (2) a particular transaction is shown to have no record of
abuse of language minorities, whether because of merchant self-
regulation or otherwise; or (3) the legislature determines that the cost
of translation would exceed its benefit in a particular transaction. For
example, Florida translation law excludes both cash sales receipts and
any documents in sale transactions under $150.290
Some existing translation statutes exclude transactions in which the
language minority provides her own interpreter. For example,
Oregon's rent-to-own translation law excludes transactions conducted
through an interpreter "supplied" by the lessee. 291  Similarly,
California's translation statute is inapplicable when the consumer has
an interpreter not employed by or made available through the other
party.292 To protect against self-interested translations, these statutes
should not defer to any interpreter who stands to benefit financially
from the transaction, such as when a bilingual home improvement
contractor acts as an intermediary between the consumer and a
286. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1632 (West Supp. 1995).
287. Id. § 1632(d). But ef. 5000 Park Assoc. v. Collado, 602 A.2d 803, 805 (NJ. Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1991) (establishing common law right to receive apartment rules and regulations in
Spanish, based on large local Latino/a population).
288. See Rodolpho Sandoval, A Critical Analysis of the Cooling-Off Period for Door to Door Sales,
3 CHICANO L. REv. 110, 146 (1976) (criticizing California statute because it "fhils to cover areas
of importance to non-English speaking consumers").
289. Often, the need for disclosure regulation may survive the adoption of market control
measures. For example, usury laws might provide an outside limit on interest rates, but
consumers who deserve a rate lower than the rate ceiling would benefit from rate disclosures.
290. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 2-9.005 (1992). Another cost-benefit determination will
involve whether to require translation ofjust those disclosures mandated by other law or of the
written contract too. In loan transactions, for example, should translation extend beyond the
TILA disclosure to encompass the promissory note and any security documents? Must the
lender translate any subsequent foreclosure notice too? Because individualized foreclosure
notices might be expensive to translate, the legislature might require a standardized warning of
the need for translation. See UNIFORPI LAND SECuRrrY INTEREST ACr § 112(0 (1985) (requiring
foreclosure and other notices to contain statement in languages designated by state enforcement
agency that "[t] his is an important notice regarding your rights in real estate. Get it translated
immediately"); ef. Reyes v. Household Fin. Corp., 173 Cal. Rptr. 267, 267-68 (Ct. App. 1981)
(construing California's translation statute to extend to notice of repossession and deficiency
under automobile loan).
291. OR. REV. STAT. § 646.249 (1993).
292. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1632(e) (West Supp. 1995).
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lender that finances the contractor's improvements. 293  Even so
limited, this interpreter exception seems ill-advised. The court must
determine whether the consumer's interpreter was in fact competent
to interpret the bargain.2 4 Moreover, those bargain terms that the
interpreter deems important enough to translate may not coincide
with those terms important to the consumer.295 Finally, if the
transaction calls for a standard contract or disclosure that the
merchant has translated in advance for language minorities without
interpreters, it would be little trouble to provide that translation to
consumers with interpreters.295
In requiring translations, the legislature must select a standard to
determine when and in what languages the requirement is triggered.
This selection will depend on factors such as whether the legislation
is adopted by Congress or a state legislature, whether the legislature
desires a language neutral standard, and the particular transaction for
which translation is required. Recommendations and guidance to the
legislature for resolving these issues may be found elsewhere in this
Article.
29
Another issue the legislature should address is how to ensure
accurate translations. Concern over the accuracy of translations led
the FTC to limit its used car rule translation requirement to just those
sales conducted in Spanish.293 The FTC assured an accurate transla-
tion by specifying in Spanish the exact language of the required
293. See Teran v. Citicorp Person-to-Person Fin. Ctr., 706 P.2d 382, 384-87 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1985) (refusing to hold lender accountable for fraudulent interpretation of loan bargain given
by employee of home improvement contractor to Spanish-Only Consumers where lender did not
attempt interpretation or furnish interpreter); see also In re Hyun-Bok Chung, 43 B.R 368, 369
(1984) (finding minority boutique owners bound by security agreement written in English
because their English-speaking daughter present at signing should have interpreted agreement
for them).
294. See CAL CIV. CODE § 1632(e) (West Supp. 1995) (defining interpreter in relevant part
to mean "a person, not a minor, able to speak fluently and read with full understanding the
English and Spanish languages").
295. Cf. Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165, 1191 (1993) (noting
translator's practice consists of power to change text); Grace Leonard, Patents and Translation,
76J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'V 561,563 (1994) (noting importance of continuity in work
with translator so that translator may become familiar with client's business requirements and
style).
296. A reasonable exception to any translation statute would exclude persons not engaged
in a trade or business. Thejudicial doctrines of fraud and unconscionability would still apply
to overreaching by individuals in isolated transactions (e.g., sales of cars). See supra Part I.C
(discussing fraud and unconscionability).
297. See supra Part H.B (advocating legislation as appropriate protection for language
minorities against market's failure to translate their bargains and discussing appropriate
legislative bodies to address issue); Part II.D (articulating various language-neutral and language-
specific standards).
298. 49 Fed. Reg. 45,692, 45,711 (1984).
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disclosure.299 When the material to be translated is not standard-
ized, other approaches might ensure accuracy. For example, under
California's general translation law the state Department of Consumer
Affairs will verify translation accuracy for a fee.3°°
Finally, a legislature that requires translations must determine a
sufficient sanction for noncompliance. California's translation law
authorizes consumers to rescind untranslated contracts."' Ordinari-
ly, the availability of rescission may avoid the need for courts to
determine the extent of any unfairness in fixing an actual damages
remedy. Limiting relief to rescission, however, may be inadequate in
some circumstances. For example, a consumer who rescinds an
untranslated loan bargain used to finance a vacation presumably
would need to borrow the money at the market rate to repay the loan
proceeds. If the original loan rate is equal to or below that market
rate, 02 then the consumer gains nothing by exercising rescission
and incurs the transaction costs of obtaining a substitute loan.
Therefore, legislatures should consider authorizing minimum
damages or a doubling or trebling of actual damages to help deter
noncompliance.
0 3
Legislatures that require translations should also consider ways to
overcome the inadequacies of disclosure laws.3 Employed in door-
to-door transactions, 3°  home equity loans,30 6 and certain other
transactions, "cooling-off' laws might be extended to additional
transactions, thus giving language minorities sufficient opportunity to
299. 16 C.F.R. § 455.5 (1995). Claims by drug manufacturers of the difficulty in obtaining
accurate translations of drug package insert warnings led the Food and Drug Administration to
prepare a Spanish language insert for the industry. 46 Fed. Reg. 160, 163 (1981). The FDA
ultimately abandoned its package insert requirements. See 47 Fed. Reg. 39,147-55 (1982)
(revoking 46 Fed. Reg. 160).
300. CAL CIV. CODE § 1632(h) (West Supp. 1995). Presumably, to negate the inference that
the government passed on the substantive fairness of the contract, the statute prohibits the
merchant from advertising or representing that the government has verified the translation. Id.
§ 16320).
301. I& § 1632(g).
302. This would likely be the case for victims of an Unintended Bargain where the interest
rate, although more than the consumer would have incurred knowingly, is a fair rate given the
consumer's credit standing.
303. See Bender, supra note 94, at 667-71 (discussing need for additional damage formulas
under state unfair trade practice acts).
304. See supra Part II.E (discussing benefits and drawbacks of market perfection paradigm
and use of disclosure laws to correct market's failure to provide necessary information to
consumers).
305. E.g., 16 C.F.R. § 429.1(b) (1995). Typically, a"door-to-door" sale refers to a transaction
in which the seller personally solicits the sale at a place other than the seller's place of business.
Id. note 1(a).
306. See 15 U.S.C. § 1635 (1994) (establishing right to rescind for buyer before midnight of
third business day after parties have entered into certain credit transactions involving buyer's
principal dwelling as security interest).
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examine the terms of the translated bargain and generally aiding
comparison shopping for consumers 0 7 To overcome consumer
illiteracy, legislatures might require oral translations of important
terms in addition to written disclosures. °8 Merchants not fluent in
the particular language could provide the oral disclosure on a voice
recording cassette prepared by some translation intermediary.309 To
simplify the content of written translations, the legislature might look
to the "plain English" laws in effect in several states. 0 Making
contracts easier to read in English should also make them easier to
translate into other languages. Finally, funding consumer education
307. Seegenerally Byron D. Sher, The "Cooling-Off'Period in Door-to-Door Sales, 15 UCLAL. REV.
717 (1968) (discussing pros and cons of "cooling-off" period legislation and problems associated
with drafting such legislation). Whether the benefits of cooling-off periods outweigh their delay
of the bargain, however, has been called into question by evidence that consumers rarely
exercise their cancellation rights. SeeJohn E. Bryson & Stephen S. Dunham, Note, A Case Study
on the Impact of Consumer Legislation: The Elimination of Negotiability and the Cooling-Off Period, 78
YALE LJ. 618, 628-30 (1969) (discussing impact of Connecticut's "cooling-off' statute as limited
because provision allowing rescission by midnight of day of sale is too short). Dean Kronman
once remarked that legislatures rarely employ a cooling-off period because of its "antidemocrat-
ic" affect on the parties' freedom of contract and, therefore, that lawmakers "would never think
of imposing a cooling-off period in every contractual relationship." Anthony T. Kronman,
Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE LJ. 763, 795 (1983).
308. See Whitford, supra note 246, at 448-49 (suggesting that oral disclosure during
precontract negotiations may be particularly effective to convey information to consumers with
substandard reading abilities, but notes various drawbacks of oral disclosures such as merchant's
ability to lessen their impact by tone of voice). Some federal and state statutes require oral
disclosures with or instead of written disclosures. See, e.g., 16 C.F.R. § 429.1(e) (1995) (requiring
both written and oral notice of consumer's right to cancel transaction to comply with FTC door-
to-door rule); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 22502.1 (1995) (requiring ticket seller to inform
purchaser of disclosures in writing and orally); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 58-33-73 (1995)
(requiring insurance company to make oral and written disclosure to insured regarding
automobile glass replacement or repair services); UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-23-6 (1994)
(establishing that seller of real estate cooperative interest must make prescribed disclosures to
purchaser both orally and in writing).
For dangerous product warnings, symbols might effectively convey information to consumers
regardless of their language and literacy in that language. See Campos v. Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co., 485 A.2d 305,310 (NJ. 1984) (holding that symbols may be more appropriate than
written warnings when many product users are illiterate). In other consumer settings, however,
pictorial warnings appear to be of little practical value. For example, how would one illustrate
a high interest rate loan?
309. Professor Nehf has expressed reservations about oral disclosures in consumer
transactions because businesses might not easily refute false claims that they failed to provide
the required oral disclosure. See Nehf, supra note 240, at 844 n.361 (explaining difficulty in
enforcing oral disclosure requirements and offering alternative solutions). Retention in the
lender's file of a copy of the tape (or a written transcript of the disclosure), however, would
serve as the equivalent of a copy of a written disclosure form. Moreover, testimony of a practice
of oral disclosure might overcome such claims. See Tashof v. FTC, 437 F.2d 707, 714-15 (D.C.
Cir. 1970) (upholding FTC order requiring merchant guilty of deceptive practices to disclose
its credit terms both orally and in writing despite merchant's fear of false claims).
310. See generally Michael S. Friman, Plain English Statutes: Long Overdue or Underdone?, 7 LOY.
CONSUMER L REP. 103, 106 (1995) (citing 10 states with this legislation-Connecticut, Hawaii,
Maine, Minnesota, Montana, NewJersey, NewYork, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia).
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programs can help to overcome evaluative disabilities that the
translation laws cannot address.31'
Because legislative attention to the needs of language minorities
may not be forthcoming,3 1 2 or may leave gaps in coverage, reform-
ers must look to other means to establish protection. One strategy
that holds promise is to seek the judicial and administrative interpre-
tation and expansion of existing civil rights laws, consumer protection
laws, and common law doctrines to encompass abuses of language
minorities."' The next sections of this Article examine the potential
reach of these existing laws into the new realm of language minority
consumer protection.
B. Employing Civil Rights Laws Against Language Fraud and the
English-Only Marketplace
1. The Civil Rights Acts
The federal Civil Rights Acts, §§ 1981 and 1982, give all persons the
same right to make and enforce contracts,314 and all citizens the
same right to purchase and sell real and personal property."
These requirements extend beyond state action to encompass private
discrimination, 16 including discrimination in consumer transac-
311. See infra Part III.F.1 (discussing consumer education programs as possible solution to
some of language minority problems ifprograms are adequately funded and specifically targeted
to meet needs of language minorities).
312. See supra note 182 and accompanying text (discussing how current political dimate may
not support legislation favorable to language minorities, but how courts may adopt broad
antidiscrimination principle).
313. See infra Part III.B-F (discussing alternative approaches to reform aside from legislative
initiatives, including using civil rights laws, unfair trade practice laws, doctrine of fraud, doctrine
of unconscionability, or other institutional strategies).
314. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994).
315. Id. § 1982. For a discussion of the statutory precursors to §§ 1981 and 1982, see Mary
J. Woodhead, Comment, Ethnic Origin Discrimination as RaceDiscrimination Under Section 1981 and
Section 1982, 1989 UTAH L. REv. 741, 742-43. Courts typically construe §§ 1981 and 1982 the
same on such general issues as the need for intentional discrimination and the recoverable
damages. Under their plain terms, however, § 1981 protects noncitizens as "persons," but § 1982
protects only "citizens." Compare42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (using language "[a]l persons") with id.
§ 1982 (using language "[a]ll citizens").
316. Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 410 U.S. 431, 43940 (1973) (noting
historical interrelationship between §§ 1981 and 1982);Jones v. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 413
(1968) (holding that § 1982 bars public and private discrimination in sale or rental of property).
As part of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress added an express reference in § 1981 to
nongovernmental discrimination. Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 101, 105 Stat. 1071, 1071-72 (1991)'
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994)).
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tions.3 17  Successful claimants may recover compensatory and
punitive damages.318
Two significant obstacles that could impede the use of §§ 1981 and
1982 by the Spanish-Only Consumer and other language minorities
injured by language fraud or other English-Only practices in the
marketplace are the requirements that the claimant: (1) prove racial
discrimination;319 and (2) prove that the discrimination was pur-
poseful.3 20 Until a 1987 Supreme Court decision involving an
Arabian professor denied tenure,2 it was uncertain whether
§§ 1981 and 1982 protected Latinos/as. 22  In an effort to under-
stand race, the Supreme Court explored Congress' intent behind the
predecessors to §§ 1981 and 1982.3' The Court concluded that
Congress "intended to protect from discrimination identifiable classes
of persons who are subjected to intentional discrimination solely
because of their ancestry or ethnic characteristics." 324 Among those
317. See Clark v. Universal Builders, Inc., 501 F.2d 324, 334 (7th Cir.) (allowing claim under
§ 1982 alleging discriminatory housing market), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1070 (1974). In the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, Congress overrode the Supreme Court's refusal to extend § 1981 to post-
contract formation discrimination. See Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 101, 105 Stat. 1071, 1071-72
(1991) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994)) (defining "make and enforce
contracts" to include the performance of contracts, thereby overruling Patterson v. McLean
Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1989) (holding that racial harassment occurring in course
of employment is not actionable under § 1981))).
318. SeeJohnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 460 (1975) (noting that § 1981
entitles successful claimants to equitable and legal relief and, under certain circumstances,
compensatory and punitive damages). Despite the prospect of similar remedies in a successful
action for deceit, discussed infra Part III.D, an action under the Civil Rights Acts would enable
the plaintiff to sue in federal court and to avoid certain elements of proof required in fraud
actions, such as the reasonableness of reliance on the false representation.
319. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 ("All persons.., shall have the same right... to make and enforce
contracts... as is enjoyed by white citizens .... "); id. § 1982 ("All citizens ... shall have the
same right ... as is enjoyed by white citizens ... to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and
convey real and personal property.").
320. See General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 390 (1982) (finding
that discriminatory purpose is required for § 1981 claim); see also Vasquez v. McAllen Bag &
Supply Co., 660 F.2d 686, 687-89 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that successful § 1981 claimant must
show discriminatory intent).
321. Saint Francis College v. A-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 609-13 (1987).
322. The lower courts had failed to reach a consensus. Compare Vera v. Bethlehem Steel
Corp., 448 F. Supp. 610, 612-13 (M.D. Pa. 1978) (dismissing plaintiffs' § 1981 claim against
employer alleging discrimination based on their Puerto Rican background) with Ortiz v. Bank
of Am., 547 F. Supp. 550, 559-68 (E.D. Cal. 1982) (allowing claim by Puerto Rican plaintiff and
refusing to follow those courts that rejected national origin claims under § 1981, instead
adopting a "dynamic" definition of racial discrimination without identifying bright line between
racial and national origin discrimination). See generally Gary A. Greenfield & Don B. Kates,Jr.,
Mexican Americans, Racial Discrimination, and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 63 CAL. L. REV. 662
(1975) (arguing that Mexican Americans are protected under §§ 1981 and 1982 as nonwhite
racial group).
323. Saint Francis, 481 U.S. at 609-13.
324. Id. at 613; see also Shaare Telfila Congregation v. Cobb, 481 U.S. 615, 617-18 (1987)
(applying court's holding in Saint Francis in finding that "Jews and Arabs were among the
peoples then considered to be distinct races and hence within protection of [§ 1982]").
CONSUMER PROTECTION FOR LATINOS
groups referred to as a race in debates that preceded the enactment
of §§ 1981 and 1982 were Mexicans and Spaniards.32 Since the
Supreme Court's decision, district courts have refused to grant
summary judgment against § 1981 claims brought by Cuban 32 6 and
Puerto Rican plaintiffs. 27
Although it now appears that all or most Latinos/as constitute a
nonwhite race (or races) for purposes of §§ 1981 and 1982, it is not
clear whether exploiting a language barrier is racial discrimination.
In 1973, one of the few cases to consider the application of §§ 1981
and 1982 to language-based discrimination held that a tavern's
English-Only policy constituted "patent racial discrimination" against
its Mexican customers.328 The tavern's language rule deprived
Spanish-speaking persons of their right to contract for the purchase
of beer and the right to drink it at the bar on an equal footing with
white, English-speaking, customers. 29
Although it arose in a consumer setting, this decision has dubious
persuasive value for language minority consumers because it estab-
lished a negative right in outlawing the tavern's ban on the speaking
of Spanish. This is distinguishable from the positive right to obtain
a Spanish-language translation from a business. Moreover, citing
Gritgs v. Duke Power Co.,33° the court looked to the language rule's
impact on Mexican customers, not to the tavern owner's intent, in
deciding that the policy violated §§ 1981 and 1982.331 Later,
however, the Supreme Court refused to apply the Griggs disparate
impact standard of proof in § 1981 litigation. 32 Instead, it held that
§ 1981, like the Equal Protection Clause, "can be violated only by
purposeful discrimination."333 Subsequently, the proof requirement
325. Saint Francis, 481 U.S. at 612. See generally Juan F. Perea, Ethnicity and the Constitution:
Beyond the Black and Wite Binary Constitution, 36 WM. & MARY L. REv. 571, 604-07 (1995)
(postulating that broad 19th century conception of"race" adopted for §§ 1981 and 1982 claims
could be more inclusive than treatment of ethnicity-based claims under Equal Protection
Clause).
326. See Quintana v. Byrd, 669 F. Supp. 849, 850 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (refusing to dismiss § 1981
claim brought by Cuban who alleged discrimination based on Hispanic ethnic characteristics).
327. See Franceschi v. Hyatt Corp., 782 F. Supp. 712, 720-21 (D.P.R. 1992) (holding that
regardless of color or appearance, plaintiff may bring § 1981 claim as Puerto Rican who,
identified as such, was discriminated against because of his race).
328. See Hernandez v. Erlenbusch, 368 F. Supp. 752, 755 (D. Or. 1973) ("There is no
question but that 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982 have been interpreted to ban the discrimination
alleged [here].").
329. Id.
330. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
331. Hernandez 368 F. Supp. at 755 (citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432
(1971)).
332. General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 391 (1982) (holding that
successful § 1981 claim must demonstrate intentional discrimination).
333. Id.
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frustrated an analogous § 1981 language claim brought against an
employer that refused to hire truck drivers who spoke only
Spanish."M
Whether the need for purposeful racial discrimination will hamper
the claims of language minority consumers under §§ 1981 and 1982
probably depends on the nature of their claim. The victim of the
Fraud Bargain335 has the best chance to state a claim. In his much
acclaimed study concluding that blacks pay more than white men in
retail car transactions, Professor Ayres explained that to establish
intentional discrimination under §§ 1981 and 1982 the black car
purchaser "would need to show that the specific car dealer with whom
he or she had bargained considered the plaintiff's race in deciding
how to bargain." ' 6  Therefore, the Fraud Bargain victim must
establish that the business took her race into account in deciding to
misrepresent to her the terms of the written bargain.
Among its rejoinders, the business might argue: (1) its motive was
to make money, not to discriminate against the consumer; (2)
discrimination claims contemplate the refusal to deal with a certain
race, not bargains struck on disparate terms; and (3) exploiting the
consumer's language barrier is not discrimination based on race.
Courts should reject them all. As to the first rejoinder, Professor
Ayres reached the analogous conclusion that car dealers cannot
attribute the higher prices obtained from black purchasers to a
nondiscriminatory motive of maximizing profit because
"' [d]iscrimination may be instrumental to a goal not itself discrimina-
tory [such as profit]."'337 As to the second rejoinder, courts have
established that §§ 1981 and 1982 extend beyond the refusal to deal
with a certain race to guard against bargains struck on discriminatory
terms. For example, one court concluded that "there is no reason to
distinguish a refusal to sell on the ground of race and a sale on
334. See Vasquez v. McAllen Bag & Supply Co., 660 F.2d 686, 688 (5th Cir. 1981) (citing
precedent illustrating that § 1981 standard may be equated with purposeful discrimination
standards of Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1122 (1982). Because
claimants under the Equal Employment Opportunity Act need only prove disparate impact,
employer language policies are best challenged under that Act. See generally BILL PiATr,
LANGUAGE ON THEJOB 49 (1993). In Vasquez, the lower court dismissed the employee's claim
under the Act because he failed to satisfy its jurisdictional prerequisites. Vasque,4 660 F.2d at
687.
335. See supra Part I.C.1 (providing example of Fraud Bargain as when non-English speaking
consumer signs promissory note in English and merchant/lender orally represents rate of
interest lower than rate in promissory note).
336. Ayres, supra note 184, at 859.
337. Ayres, supra note 184, at 862 (quoting Village of Bellwood v. Dwivedi, 895 F.2d 1521,
1531 (7th Cir. 1990)).
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discriminatory prices and terms." Ss Finally, exploiting a consumer's
language barrier should constitute racial discrimination because the
native language of a nonwhite consumer is one of her "ancestry and
ethnic characteristics." 339 Thus, the language minority should state
a claim when targeted for a fraudulent bargain that exploits her
language barrier.
Consumer victims of an Unfair Bargain are less likely to state claims
under §§ 1981 and 1982 than victims of fraud. In this bargain model,
language minorities have agreed to unfair terms but without any
affirmative misrepresentations. Here, in addition to its arguments
against the Fraud Bargain victim, the merchant might add that it did
not target the consumer for any unfair treatment. Instead, the
business may claim its practice to offer substantively unfair terms is
racially neutral because it entraps "suckers" of any race who fail to
read the contract or comparison shop. For the Unfair Bargain victim
to prevail under §§ 1981 and 1982, the factfinder would have to reach
the unlikely conclusion that the business included the unfair term in
its English language contract to discriminate against nonwhites. 4
Finally, language minority victims of an Unintended Bargain
probably have no claim under §§ 1981 and 1982. Although subjective-
ly undesirable, these bargains are objectively fair and have not been
misrepresented. In these circumstances, the business will claim that
it did not engage in any purposeful discrimination, 341 and, at least
when the merchant believed that the bargain was acceptable to the
consumer, the court will probably side with the merchant.
338. Contract Buyers League v. F & F Inv., 300 F. Supp. 210, 216 (N.D. IlL. 1969), aff'd sub
nom. Baker v. F & F Inv., 420 F.2d 1191 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 821 (1970); see also
JONATHAN SHELDON, CREDrr DISCRIMINATION § 4.2.10.3, at 85-86 (1993 & Supp. 1995)
(explaining that practice of targeting minority groups for predatory loans (known as "reverse
redlining") is actionable discrimination under §§ 1981 and 1982, and other laws, even though
"[o]n first blush it may appear contradictory to find a creditor to discriminate by offering
minorities credit").
339. Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604,613 (1987) (concluding that Congress
intended to protect persons discriminated against "solely because of their ancestry or ethnic
characteristics"); see Juan F. Perea, Ethnicity and Preudice: Reevaluating "National Origin"
Discrimination Under Title VII, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 805, 832-34 (1994) (defining ethnicity as
consisting of one's ethnic traits such as language).
340. The purveyor of a Fraud Bargain might argue similarly that it was seeking "suckers" who
would not compare the written contract to the oral misrepresentations. It seems unlikely,
however, that merchants will misrepresent the written bargain to all their customers. In
contrast, it is likely that a business will offer unfair terms to all its customers, looking for "sucker"
sales to victims white and nonwhite. Professor Ayres pioneered the concept of sucker pricing
in describing an auto dealer's business as a "search for suckers"--referring in that context to a
search for customers willing to pay high markups for whatever reason. Ayres, supra note 184,
at 854.
341. Cf Note, supra note 147, at 1358 (explaining that government distribution of materials
in English only is not purposeful discrimination under Equal Protection Clause because "there
is no design to disadvantage those who do not understand the language").
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2. The Equal Credit Opportunity Act
Compared to their actions under §§ 1981 and 1982, language
minority claimants who invoke the federal Equal Credit Opportunity
Act (ECOA) 1 2 face two obstacles but gain an important advantage.
Although the ECOA governs only credit transactions and its applica-
tion to language-based claims against lenders is uncertain, it does not
require proof of intentional discrimination.
In contrast to the Supreme Court's liberal interpretation of
§§ 1981 and 1982 to prohibit ethnicity-based discrimination,"3
courts have not yet construed the ECOA's prohibition of "race,"
"color," or "national origin" discrimination"4 to encompass ethnic
characteristics such as language. In pursuing language-based claims,
ECOA claimants may reference several commentators who urge that
an individual's primary language is "closely correlated and inextricably
linked with their national origin."' Claimants may also refer to
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Guidelines that create
a presumption that employer English-Only rules constitute national
origin discrimination under Title VII because "[t] he primary language
of an individual is often an essential [characteristic of] national
2"346origin.
342. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691f (1994); SHELDON, supra note 338, § 2.2.2, at 41. ECOA
remedies are somewhat less forceful than those under §§ 1981 and 1982 because of the statutory
limit on punitive damages. See 15 U.S.C. § 1691e (limiting punitive damages in individual ECOA
actions to amount not greater than $10,000);Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454,
460 (1975) (noting that under certain circumstances punitive damages may be awarded in
§§ 1981 or 1982 claim).
343. Shaare Telfila Congregation v. Cobb, 481 U.S. 615, 615 (1987); Saint Francis, 481 U.S.
at 604.
344. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)(1) (1994).
345. Juan F. Perea, English-Only Rules and the Right to Speak One's Primary Language in the
Workplae 23 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 265, 276 (1990); see also Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official
English, 69 F.3d 920, 947-48 (9th Cir. 1995) (en banc) ("Since language is a close and
meaningful proxy for national origin, restrictions on the use of languages may mask
discrimination against specific national origin groups or, more generally, conceal nativist
sentiment.") (citations omitted); Califa, supra note 130, at 332-34 (discussing strict scrutiny and
language-based classifications); Manuel del Valle, Language Rights and Due Process-Hispanics in the
United States, 17 REv. J. U. INT'L P.R. 91 (1982) (discussing language-based discrimination);
Wendy Olson, The Shame of Spanish: Cultural Bias in English First Legislation, 11 CHICAO-LATINO
L. REv. 1, 28-32 (1991) (arguing that English-Only provisions are unconstitutional); Perea, supra
note 109, at 357-60 (urging that courts recognize language discrimination as proxy for national
origin discrimination); Rey M. Rodriguez, The Misguided Application of English-Only Rules in the
Workplace, 14 CHICANO-LATNO L. REv. 67, 73-75 (1994) (asserting that language is proxy for
national origin).
346. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(a) (1995). An Office of Thrift Supervision rule articulates the same
nexus between language and national origin. See 12 C.F.R. § 571.24(c) (2) ("Requiring fluency
in the English language as a prerequisite for obtaining a loan may be a discriminatory practice
based on national origin.").
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Lenders, however, might cite cases that refuse to apply the strict
scrutiny standard of review reserved for race and national origin
classifications when claimants level equal protection challenges against
government language policies. In Soberal-Perez v. Heckler, 7 the
Second Circuit concluded that the Government's failure to provide
social security benefit forms and services in Spanish did not create an
illicit classification based on race or national origin.' Similarly, the
Sixth Circuit held that an equal protection challenge against a city
employment exam conducted in English did not implicate a suspect
nationality or race. 49 Equal protection claimants, however, must
prove intentional discrimination."' Courts consider the govern-
ment's decision to provide services only in English as a facially neutral
act and a "reflect[ion], at most, [of] a preference for English over all
other languages," 5' so necessarily, these cases usually fail. In ECOA
litigation, by contrast, claimants may challenge facially neutral rules
and policies under the disparate impact ("effects test") analysis.352
If language minorities can prove that a lender's language practices
unreasonably burden a particular race or nationality, they are able to
establish a nexus between language and national origin that has
eluded claimants in the equal protection context.353
347. 717 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1983), cert denied, 466 U.S. 929 (1984).
348. Soberal-Perez v. Heckler, 717 F.2d 36, 41 (2d Cir. 1983) ("A classification is implicitly
made, but it is on the basis of language, i.e., English-speaking versus non-English-speaking
individuals, and not on the basis of race, religion or national origin."), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 929
(1984).
349. Frontera v. Sindell, 522 F.2d 1215, 1219-20 (6th Cir. 1975). See aso V'ialez v. New York
City Housing Auth., 783 F. Supp. 109 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding that failure of housing authority
to provide termination of tenancy documents in Spanish does not implicate protected class for
purposes of an equal protection challenge); Kathryn J. Zoglin, Recognizing a Human Right to
Language in the United States, 9 B.C. THIRD WORLD LJ. 15, 18-24 (1989) (observing that courts
generally have fhiled to accord suspect or quasi-suspect class status to language minorities in
their equal protection claims); Andrew P. Averbach, Note, Language Classiflcations and the Equal
Protection Clause: Wen Is Language a Pretext for Race or Ethnicity?, 74 B.U. L. REV. 481, 484-503
(1994) (examining holdings in equal protection claims brought by language minorities).
350. Soberal-Perez, 717 F.2d at 42.
351. Id.
352. 12 C.F.R. § 202.6(a) n.2 (1995). The Federal Reserve Board has concluded that
Congress intended to borrow the effects test from Title VII for use in ECOA claims. See Cherry
v. Amoco Oil Co., 490 F. Supp. 1026, 1029 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (concluding that effects test is
available to ECOA claimants). Although after the adoption of the ECOA the Supreme Court
undercut the Title VII effects test, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 restored prior law. SHELDON,
supra note 338, § 9.5.2.2, at 154-55 (discussing ECOA commentary standards).
353. Because the ECOA disparate impact test is borrowed from cases under Titie VII, the
EEOC Title VII Guideline equating language with national origin is especially persuasive. See
supra note 346 and accompanying text (discussing presumption in EEOC guidelines that
employer English-Only rules constitute national origin discrimination). Although the Ninth
Circuit regrettably has rejected that Guideline as "wrong," it rejected only the presumption that
an employer's English-Only rule establishes the employee's prima facie case under the disparate
impact analysis. See Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480, 1489 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding that
enactment of English-Only policy does not inexorably lead to abusive environment), cert. denied,
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Although ECOA litigation has produced little case law applying the
"effects test,'' "M a 1994 Policy Statement on ECOA and Fair Housing
Act compliance issued by ten government agencies explained the
ECOA disparate impact analysis."' 5 Discrimination is established by
disparate impact "when a lender applies a practice uniformly to all
applicants but the practice has a discriminatory effect on a prohibited
basis [e.g., national origin] and is not justified by business necessi-
ty."53 6 Factors relevant to establishing business necessity include cost
and profitability.35 As the Policy Statement suggests, however, even
if business necessity justifies a practice with disparate impact, that
practice is nonetheless discriminatory "if an alternative policy or
practice could serve the same purpose with [a] less discriminatory
effect."3"
Under the standard established in the Policy Statement, victims of
a Fraud Bargain can establish discrimination. Disproportionately
successful when practiced on language minorities, there is no
legitimate business necessity for language fraud. 59 Victims of an
Unfair Bargain should also satisfy the threshold showing of discrimina-
114 S. Ct. 2726 (1994). It did not reject the linkage between language and national origin, and
remanded the case to allow monolingual Spanish-speaking employees the opportunity to
establish the language rule's discriminatory impact, but without the presumption. Id.
Professor Perea has predicted that the Supreme Court will reject the EEOC Guideline because
it may go beyond statutory language and legislative history. Perea, supra note 339, at 831. He
concluded that existing protection against national origin discrimination in Title VII (and
presumably under the ECOA too) does not adequately encompass discrimination based on a
person's ethnic traits such as language. I&. Therefore, he urges reform of Title VII to expressly
reach discrimination on the basis of "ethnic traits." Id.
354. See Sayers v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 522 F. Supp. 835, 839 (W.D. Mo. 1981)
(explaining operation of effects test in acceptance of credit applications). See generallyJeffrey
I. Langer & Andrew T. Semmelman, Creditor List Screening Practices: Certain Implications Under the
Fair Credit ReportingAct and the Equal Credit opportunity Act, 43 BUS. LAW. 1123 (1988) (observing
that paucity of ECOA litigation on effects test has left several unresolved questions such as level
of justification needed to establish legitimate business need and what constitutes less
discriminatory alternative).
355. Policy Statement on Discrimination on Lending, 59 Fed. Reg. 18,266 (1994)
[hereinafter Policy Statement].
356. Id. at 18,268. Monolingual language minorities should be able to establish the requisite
disparate impact. Cf Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 270 (5th Cir. 1980) (employer's English-
Only rule had no disparate impact on bilingual employee who could readily comply with rule
if he so desired), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1113 (1981). Courts should reject any argument that the
borrower's ease in obtaining a third party to translate dispels any adverse impact. There is
disparate impact simply because language minorities do not routinely obtain their own
translations. Cf Alfonso v. Board of Review, 444 A.2d 1075, 1080 (NJ. Sup. Ct. 1982) (Wilentz,
J., dissenting) (highlighting difficulties language minorities face in obtaining translations from
agencies, family, or friends), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 806 (1982).
357. Policy Statement, supra note 355, at 18,269.
358. Policy Statement, supra note 355, at 18,269.
359. The Policy Statement provides that the challenged practice need not adversely affect
every member of a protected group to have a disparate impact. Policy Statement, supra note
355, at 18,269. Therefore, it is not fatal to the claim that some members of a particular race or
national origin are fluent in English and therefore not susceptible to language fraud. It.
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tory effect. Here, however, the lender might convince the court that
it failed to translate the written bargain on the business ground of
cost rather than as a scheme to entrap borrowers into unfair
deals.3" Unfair Bargain claimants may still prevail by suggesting
alternate business practices which are both less discriminatory and not
unduly expensive. For example, given the large number of Spanish-
Only borrowers, a Spanish-Only Consumer could attempt to establish
that lenders could efficiently utilize the Spanish language in their
transactions."6 Alternatively, the claimant could argue that, if it is
unduly expensive to translate, the lender could simply eliminate the
unfair terms from its bargains.
Finally, even Unintended Bargain claimants might utilize the
disparate impact analysis. Presumably, a language minority can at
least establish a prima facie case if a lender's English-Only policy
results in a disproportionate number of Unintended Bargains for a
particular language group. 2
3. Other civil rights laws
The Federal Fair Housing Acte63 protects home purchasers,
lessees, and borrowers against race and national origin discrimination
by employing the same proof standards available to ECOA claim-
ants."6  Complementing federal law, many state laws proscribe
racial, and sometimes, national origin discrimination in consumer
credit and other consumer transactions.3
360. See Carmona v. Sheffield, 475 F.2d 738, 739 (9th Cir. 1973) (holding that operation of
state unemployment office business in English had rational basis because of additional burdens
Spanish translations would impose on California's finite resources).
361. See supra notes 191-97 and accompanying text (singling out substantial language
minority group for protection does not necessarily discriminate against others). Indeed, the
Federal Reserve Board has determined that California's requirement that certain lenders
translate certain loan documents into Spanish is consistent with the ECOA. See FRB Official
Board Interpretation, 42 Fed. Reg. 22,861, § 202.1102 (1977) ("Astate requirementthat contract
terms be made more easily understandable for one group is ... not inconsistent with the
[ECOA].").
362. Cf Pabon v. Levine, 70 F.R.D. 674, 675-77 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (denying motion for
summary judgment against challenge of state unemployment office language practices under
federal law that prohibits race or national origin discrimination in programs receiving federal
assistance because plaintiffalleged that state's failure to employ Spanish-speaking personnel and
to provide bilingual forms and notices had discriminatory impact on Spanish-speaking persons).
363. 45 U.S.C. § 3601 (1994).
364. Id. § 3617; see SHELDON, supra note 338, § 2.3, at 53-55 (providing overview of
antidiscrimination provisions of Fair HousingAct). Regulations adopted under that Act provide
that "the use of English language media alone or the exclusive use of media catering to the
majority population in an area, when, in such area, there are also available non-English language
or other minority media, may have discriminatory impact." 24 C.F.R. § 109.25 (1995).
365. See SHELDON, supra note 338, § 2.5, at 56, app. E (compiling state credit discrimination
laws). The ECOA requires an election of remedies between the ECOA and any counterpart
state law when the claimant seeks monetary damages. 15 U.S.C. § 1691d(e) (1994).
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C. Employing Unfair Trade Practice Laws Against Language Fraud and
the English-Only Marketplace
Federal law prohibits "unfair or deceptive acts or practices" in
interstate commerce. 67 In addition, all fifty states and the District
of Columbia address these practices with laws known as Unfair or
Deceptive Acts or Practices (UDAP) statutes." s  The UDAP laws
provide language minorities several alternative means to challenge
marketplace abuses.
UDAP statutes usually prohibit fraudulent misrepresentations in
consumer transactions. They can complement, and in some instances,
supplant a common law fraud action."9  Thus, Fraud Bargain
victims may rely on the UDAP laws. In addition, UDAP laws may
impose a duty on businesses to disclose unfair terms, either expressly
or under the "catch-all" prohibition of unfair or deceptive business
practices generally.37 ° The victim of an Unfair Bargain might,
therefore, have recourse to UDAP laws. 1 UDAP laws may also ad-
dress the Unintended Bargain. Consent agreements entered into by
the FTC in the 1970s indicate that in some circumstances it may be
unfair or deceptive for a business to fail to translate the terms of a
bargain for language minority customers even though the bargain is
not necessarily unfair and the business does not misrepresent its
terms.372 Several of these consent agreements declared the practice
of merchants who failed to translate the written contract and
disclosures following negotiations in a language other than English,
as unfair or deceptive. Most of the consent agreements only
366. E.g., CAL. CML CODE § 51 (West Supp. 1995) (stating that all persons in California are
free and equal, no matter what ancestry or national origin, in all business establishments
whatsoever); id. at § 1812.642 (extending ECOA protection to rent-to-own transactions).
367. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1994).
368. Bender, supra note 94, at 640-41. SeegenerallyDEE PRIDGEN, CONSUMER PROTEGTION AND
THE LAW §§ 3.03-.06, at 3-8 to -70 (1995) (discussing deceptive trade practices); SHELDON &
CARTER, supra note 97, § 3.2, at 85-90 (discussing state UDAP provisions).
369. See infra Part III.D.2 (contrasting interplay between common law fraud and UDAP
action).
370. See infra Part IIL.D.3 (comparing Unfair and Unintended Bargains under common law
and UDAP); see also SHELDON & CARTER, supra note 97, §§ 4.2.13 to -.14, at 118-20 (discussing
failure to disclose and other deceptive practices).
371. The UDAP may also codify the unconscionability doctrine to authorize courts to
invalidate a bargain based on the substantively unfair term. See infra notes 418-19 and
accompanying text (discussing more potent remedies available under UDAPs than under UCO
and common law).
372. For discussion of the precedential value of FTC consent agreements, see SHELDON &
CARTER, supra note 97, § 3.4.4.3, at 101-02 (observing that courts use these agreements as guide
to interpreting state UDAP laws).
373. SHELDON & CARTER, supra note 97, § 3.4;4.3, at 101-02.
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required translation of the documents into Spanish.374 A few
consent agreements required translation into any language in which
the transaction was "principally conducted" (a Language of the
Bargain approach). 7  Often, the consent agreements looked
beyond the oral sales presentation to require translations of bargains
initiated by advertisements in Spanish (a Language of the Solicitation
approach).376 Finally, a few of the agreements seemed to employ
the broad Language of the Consumer Standard, although just for the
Spanish-Only Consumer.3" In addition to these consent agree-
ments, language minorities can point to the FTC door-to-door and
used car rules, and to state UDAPs and regulations thereunder, which
declare the failure to provide translations in certain situations an
unfair or deceptive practice.378  Together with the consent agree-
374. SeeIn re Grand Spaulding Dodge, Inc., 90 F.T.C. 406,408-10 (1977) (ordering car dealer
to cease from failing to translate loan documents and disclosures into Spanish following
negotiations in Spanish; this approach uses both Language of the Bargain and Fixed Language
Standards); In reJ. Kurtz & Sons, Inc., 87 F.T.C. 1300, 1312-34 (1976) (requiring appliance
retailer to provide English/Spanish disclosures of customers' rights); In reWeil & Co., 87 F.T.C.
406, 407-10 (1976) (requiring furniture retailer to furnish buyers with Spanish language
translations of contracts); In re Almacenes Hernandez Corp., 87 F.T.C. 400, 402-05 (1976)
(requiring furniture distributor to cease failing to provide buyers with Spanish language
translations); In reBusch'sJewelry Co., 87 F.T.C. 394,396-99 (1976) (requiringjewelry merchant
to provide Spanish-speaking customers with Spanish translations of sales documentation); In re
Daby's Furniture Corp., 87 F.T.C. 389, 391-93 (1976) (requiring furniture seller to furnish
Spanish translations of sales documents to Spanish-speaking customers and to display in store
notices of customers' right to receive same); In reJ &J Furniture Corp., 87 F.T.C. 383, 385-88
(1976) (requiring furniture distributor to display notices in store of customers' rights regarding
Spanish translations); In rejoseph's Furniture Co., 84 F.T.C. 1310, 1316-27 (1974) (requiring
furniture dealer to furnish buyers with Spanish and English contracts and disclosures following
sales presentations in Spanish).
375. SeeIn reKelocor Corp., 93 F.T.C. 9,15-22 (1979) (requiring finance company to provide
translation of Truth in Lending credit insurance disclosures); In reCrown Trading Co., 86 F.T.C.
77, 81-85 (1975) (requiring television dealer to disclose Truth in Lending information to
customers in language of sales presentation).
376. E.g., Grand SpauldingDodge, 90 F.T.C. at 408-10 (requiring automobile dealer to furnish
bilingual disclosures and documents).
377. See In re Lafayette United Corp., 88 F.T.C. 683, 704 (1976) ("[R]espondents shall not
contract for the sale of any course ofistruction... to any Spanish-speaking person who cannot
read and write English proficiently, unless the sales contract or other agreement is itself set forth
in the Spanish language."); In reMichaelYaccarino, 82 F.T.C. 279,283-87 (1973) (requiring New
Jersey automobile dealer to provide customers with contracts and credit disclosures printed in
Spanish).
378. Sep, e.g., 16 C.F.R. § 429.1 (1995) (declaring it "unfair or deceptive act or practice" to
fail to translate contract into same language as used principally in oral sales presentation);
CONN. AGENCIES REGs. § 42-110b-21 (1975) (designating failure to include disclosures in same
language as non-English advertising as unfair or deceptive practice); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r.
2-9.005 (1995) (making illegal failure to provide translations in certain consumer transactions);
ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 815, para. 505/2N (Smith-Hurd 1993) (declaring it "unlawful practice" to
fail to provide translation when conducting retail transaction in language other than English);
MASs. REGS. CODE tit. 940, § 8.05 (1995) (treating mortgage broker's or lender's failure to
interpret or translate material terms of loan transaction into language borrower understands as
unfair or deceptive practice); cf. 49 Fed. Reg. 7740, 7778 n.79 (1984) (explaining that lenders
should give cosigner disclosure required by 16 C.F.R. § 444.3 (1994) in same language as
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ments, these rules and regulations can be urged as guides to construe
a UDAP "catch-all" that outlaws unfair or deceptive practices
generally.
Despite these opportunities in existing UDAP laws, many inadequa-
cies and uncertainties compel the exploration of other solutions.
Reform of the UDAP laws might address some of the problems
detailed below. These shortcomings include the lack of any private
action under the federal and a few state UDAPs,"' together with the
broad exclusions from coverage in many UDAPs that may exempt
such mainstream transactions as loans of money,"8 ' insurance,3
81
and residential leases. 8 2 When compared to the few freestanding
translation statutes that now exist, UDAPs sometimes add criteria for
recovery that frustrate consumers. For example, some UDAPs require
that private litigants prove they suffered an ascertainable loss. 83
Sometimes, language minorities must urge the favorable construction
of their UDAP unfair or deceptive "catch-all" to encompass a
merchant's language practices.' Further, some state UDAPs have
no "catch-alls" and the language minority must look for an applicable
enumerated unfair or deceptive practice.' Finally, the FTC
underlying loan contract or they will commit unfair or deceptive practice).
379. See Bender, supra note 94, at 640-41 (explaining that most states expressly or implicitly
authorize private enforcement of their UDAP laws, but that there is no private right under
Federal Trade Commission Act).
380. See, eg., Barber v. National Bank, 815 P.2d 857, 861 (Alaska 1991) (holding that loan
is not good or service covered by state UDAP); Lamm v. Amfac Mortgage Corp., 605 P.2d 730,
731 (Or. Ct. App. 1980) (finding that Unfair Trade Practices Act does not apply to loans or
extensions of credit); see also SHELDON & CARTER, supra note 97, § 2.2.1.2, at 43-46 (discussing
shortcomings of exemptions for credit and banking activities).
381. See PRIDGEN, supra note 368, § 8.05[2], at 8-19 (noting that Congress exempted
insurance industry from federal UDAP).
382. See SHELDON & CARTER, supra note 97, § 2.2.6, at 52-54 (discussing UDAPs with regard
to personalty related to real estate, residential leases, and landlord/tenant relations).
383. SeePRIDGEN, supra note 368, § 5.04[ 1], at 5-21 (noting in addition that some courts have
implied this requirement). The loss condition could pose problems to victims of both Unfair
and Unintended Bargains. Some unfair provisions may not result in an ascertainable loss of
money until exercised. Cf. Orlando v. Finance One of West Virginia, Inc., 369 S.E.2d 882, 888
(W. Va. 1988) (holding that claimant failed to demonstrate ascertainable loss because lender
had not yet attempted to enforce unfair waiver of homestead exemption). Undisclosed
provisions that are fair, but unintended, might not result in the requisite loss even when
enforced. Id.
384. For discussion of the degree of deference to federal standards of unfairness and
deception in interpreting state UDAPs, see SHELDON & CARTER, supra note 97, § 3.4.4, at 99-102;
Bender, supra note 94, at 648-49. Cf. Ayres, supra note 184, at 865 (commenting that using
UDAPs to reach discrimination against women and minorities in automobile purchases will
require reconceptualization of what is considered unfair and deceptive).
385. See Bender supra note 94, at 645-50 (explaining Oregon law that conditions use of its
.catch-all" on prior administrative rulemaking). In those states that proscribe "deceptive"
practices generally but not "unfair" practices, the FTC translation consent agreements are
instructive in their assumption that the failure to provide the translations is both unfair and
deceptive. E.g., In re Grand Spaulding Dodge, Inc., 90 F.T.C. 406, 408-10 (1977) (holding that
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consent agreements preceded the FTC's adoption of new federal
standards of unfairness and deception in 1980 and 1983 respective-
ly."8 "Unfairness" now asks whether the particular practice causes
"substantial injury to consumers that is not reasonably avoidable by
consumers themselves and not outweighed by countervailing benefits
to consumers or to competition." 7  One commentator does
conclude that failing to provide translations "falls nicely" into this new
standard:
A non-English speaking consumer cannot reasonably avoid the fact
that he or she cannot understand English disclosures. The
confusion can lead to substantial injury. And in a situation where
a seller has a large number of non-English speaking customers, it
would not be costly to add disclosures in a second language.'
D. Language Fraud and the English-Only Marketplace as Fraudulent
Conduct
1. Overview of common law remedies
After considering whether drug manufacturers must warn language
minorities of product dangers, California's Supreme Court recently
decided to defer to the legislature as the proper institution to impose
such a duty."s9 Because neither the legislature nor any administra-
tive agency had done so, the court refused to establish ajudicial duty
to translate product warnings." Although this Article urges legisla-
tures to enact standards that entitle language minorities to transla-
tions in consumer transactions, justice for language minorities
depends on the concurrent evolution of common law fraud and
unconscionability. Courts should also liberally interpret the existing
codification of each of these doctrines so as to encompass translation
rights.
automobile dealer's practice of failing to provide Spanish-speaking customers with relevant
bilingual disclosures is "unfair, misleading and deceptive").
386. See SHELDON & CARTER, supra note 97, § 4.2.2.0, at 127-29 (discussing deception); id.
§ 4.3.2, at 129-30 (discussing unfairness in context of FTC). Congress codified the 1980 FIC
standard of unfairness in its 1994 reauthorization of the FTC. See Federal Trade Commission
Act Amendments of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-312, § 9, 108 Stat. 1691, 1695 (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 45(n)).
387. 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (1994).
388. SHELDON & CARTER, supra note 97, § 5.2.1, at 187.
389. Ramirez v. Plough, Inc., 863 P.2d 167, 167 (Cal. 1993).
390. 1& at 176.
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2. Fraud bargains as common law and UDAP fraud
Businesses that misrepresent the terms of a written bargain to
language minorities might claim that the consumer's reliance on the
misrepresentation is unreasonable. They would refer to courts that
have held that someone who fails to read a contract has not acted
reasonably to protect herself and cannot protest the other party's
misrepresentation."' Courts must reject this argument and punish
intentional fraud without regard to whether the victim relied
reasonably on the misrepresentation; to recognize negligence as a
defense to an intentional tort is bad social policy.
392
In transactions that they govern, state UDAPs have effectively
displaced the common law as a remedy for fraud in part because
UDAPs often eliminate some elements of proof that the common law
requires. Because some UDAPs abandon the need to establish
reasonable reliance, language minorities should plead their claims for
relief from the Fraud Bargain under a UDAP whenever possible
3 93
3. Unfair and unintended bargains as common law and UDAP fraud
Courts usually hold illiterate parties to the terms of their unread
contract unless the other party has misrepresented the writing to
them.394 This fraud exception to the so-called duty to read has not
been extended to nondisclosure of unfair or otherwise material terms.
In tort and contract law generally, however, the action for nondisclo-
sure is gaining momentum. Silence is considered the equivalent of
misrepresentation only when there is some legally recognized duty to
391. See supra Part I.C.2 (discussing fraud exception to duty to read); cf Rivergate Corp. v.
McIntosh, 421 S.E.2d 737, 739 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992) (rejecting claim of lessee that it was too dark
to determine that he was not signing purchase agreement as he was led to believe because party
cannot rely on misrepresentations when he can read and no fraud prevents him from reading
contract). The merchant may be particularly inclined to raise this argument when its bilingual
salesperson negotiates the oral bargain but has not been asked to translate the English written
bargain. In the event that the salesperson assumes to translate the written bargain, courts must
hold the merchant liable in fraud for a false translation.
392. See KEETON ET Ai-, supra note 53, § 108, at 750 (rejecting contributory negligence as
defense to intentional deceit).
393. See Duran v. Leslie Oldsmobile, Inc., 594 N.E.2d 1355, 1361 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992)
(reviewing how Illinois UDAP eliminates common law fraud element that requires plaintiff to
ascertain diligently accuracy of misstatements); Robertson v. Boyd, 363 S.E.2d 672, 676-77 (N.C.
Ct. App. 1988) (holding that trial court properly dismissed common law fraud claim against
seller because buyer did not make diligent inquiries and inspect for termite damage, but finding
that claimant did state fraud claim under UDAP). But see Massey v. Thomaston Ford Mercury,
395 S.E.2d 663, 664-65 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990) (stating that claimant under Georgia UDAP cannot
recover if she had "'equal and ample opportunity to ascertain the truth'" but did not do so
diligently (quoting Delta Chevrolet v. Wells, 377 S.E.2d 250, 251 (1988))).
394. See supra Part II.C.3(1)-(2).
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speak. 95 The courts, however, have established several grounds for
such a duty."6 Once limited to a few narrow exceptions such as the
existence of a fiduciary relationship between the parties, erosion of
the right to remain silent is now "so broad that a resourceful judge
can almost always find a way to fit the facts of a case within the
confines of one of the exceptions."
397
Although the doctrine of unconscionability may also address the
nondisclosure of unfair terms, 98 its remedial limitations make that
doctrine less than ideal.399 In contrast to the tepid remedies of
unconscionability, fraudulent nondisclosure unleashes a more potent
arsenal that might include punitive damages.4 °° Language minori-
ties, therefore, should actively seek the judicial recognition of a duty
to disclose (translate) certain bargains.
One emerging exception to the right to remain silent should be of
particular use to victims of an Unfair Bargain. The leading torts
treatise describes this exception as "a rather amorphous tendency on
the part of most courts in recent years to find a duty of disclosure
when the circumstances are such that the failure to disclose some-
thing would violate a standard requiring conformity to what the
ordinary ethical person would have disclosed.""° Using this excep-
tion, most courts now require sellers of realty or personalty to disclose
material, latent defects." 2  For language minorities, unfair terms
395. See Nicola W. Palmieri, Good Faith Disclosures Required During Precontractual Negotiations,
24 SETON HALL L. REv. 70, 124 (1993) (discussing exceptions to rule that party may remain
silent).
396. Id. at 125.
397. Id.
398. See infra Part III.E (discussing unconscionability and recommending that legislatures
reform UDAP laws to include provisions protecting against unconscionable conduct).
399. See id. (noting limit on remedies under unconscionability doctrine and urging legislation
to expand those remedies).
400. See, e.g., Godrey v. Steinpress, 180 Cal. Rptr. 95, 109-11 (Ct. App. 1982) (holding that
fraudulent nondisclosure of termites in real estate transaction is grounds for awarding punitive
damages).
401. KEETON ET AL, supra note 53, § 106, at 739. The Restatement (Second) of Torts articulates
this exception as a duty to disclose facts basic to the transaction when one party to the bargain
knows "that the other is about to enter into it under a mistake as to them, and that the other,
because of the relationship between them, the customs of the trade or other objective
circumstances, would reasonably expect a disclosure of those facts." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 551(2) (e) (1977). Similarly, The Restatement (Second) of Contracts requires disclosure of
facts necessary to correct "a mistake of the other party as to a basic assumption on which that
party is making the contract and if non-disclosure of the facts amounts to a failure to act in
good faith and in accordance with reasonable standards of fair dealing." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 161(b) (1979).
402. See, e.g., Cohen v. Vivian, 349 P.2d 366, 367 (Colo. 1960) (holding that latent defect
"known to the seller of a house" creates duty of disclosure); Johnson v. Davis, 480 So. 2d 625,
627 (Fla. 1985) (holding that nondisclosure is equivalent to willful misrepresentation); Foust v.
Valleybrook Realty Co., 446 N.E.2d 1122, 1125 (Ohio App. 1981) (same). See generally Serena
Kafker, Sell and Telg" The Fall and Revival of the Role on Nondisclosure in Sales of Used Real Propery,
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written in English are the equivalent of latent defects. Just as courts
have begun to protect the buyer of a house with latent termite
damage, even if she failed to inspect the home, courts should protect
language minorities0. against the nondisclosure of unfair terms,
even though they did not seek a translation."'
Courts could construe other exceptions to the general right to
remain silent to protect language minorities. For example, nondisclo-
sure constitutes fraud when the silent party takes some positive action
to conceal the truth. 5 Language minorities should argue that a
merchant's decision to strike the written bargain in English is positive
action to conceal unfair terms from a consumer unable to read
English. °6
The so-called half-truth exception requires full disclosure when
necessary to prevent a partial statement of facts from being mislead-
ing.4°7 For example, when the merchant undertakes to translate the
written bargain orally, but leaves out certain unfair terms, the
omission should constitute fraud. Similarly, if a party conducts oral
negotiations, wholly or in part, in a language other than English, the
language minority should argue that any unfair term in the written
bargain must also be translated. °"
12 U. DAYrON L REv. 57 (1986) (noting that modem trend is to require disclosure rather than
old doctrine of caveat emptor). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 161 cmt. d
(1979) ("A seller of real or personal property is ... ordinarily expected to disclose a known
latent defect of quality or title that is of such a character as would probably prevent the buyer
from buying at the contract price."). In the analogous area of products liability, courts require
manufacturers to warn of certain product dangers. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388
(1965) (stating that suppliers of chattels known to be dangerous are liable for physical harm that
results). The First Circuit has held that ajury could consider whether a manufacturer must use
symbols to warn of insecticide dangers, even if the government only required a written warning,
when it should have foreseen that illiterate farmworkers would use its product. Hubbard-Hall
Chem. Co. v. Silverman, 340 F.2d 402, 405 (1st Cir. 1965).
403. This duty to disclose should also extend to protect English-speaking consumers whom
the merchant knows are unable to read English.
404. Arguably, courts should extend the duty to disclose to victims of Unintended Bargains
when the business knows that the consumer does not intend a particular bargain. For example,
a salesperson fluent in Spanish might overhear a conversation between two customers that they
intend to purchase a car, not to lease one. In such a scenario, the merchant should disclose in
Spanish that the bargain to be struck is a lease.
405. Cf Smith v. First Family Fin. Servs., Inc., 626 So. 2d 1266, 1273 (Ala. 1993) (holding
that lender must disclose all finance charges to borrower). See generally CALAMARI & PERILLO,
supra note 56, at 367 (stating that actions "designed to hide the truth" may result in liability).
406. Cf Heuter v. Coastal Air Lines, 79 A.2d 880, 883 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1951)
(holding thatjury should decide whether airline intended to deceive Puerto Rican crash victim
when he signed release written in English, in which he was not literate, despite absence of any
affirmative misstatement).
407. SeeRESrTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2) (b) (1976) (stating that "[olne party...
[has] duty ... to prevent his partial or ambiguous statement of the facts from being
misleading").
408. Supporting this result are the FTC consent agreements that declared bargains to be
deceptive when the seller struck the oral bargain in Spanish, but the written contract and
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Some courts extend the duty to disclose in all fiduciary or confiden-
tial relationships to bargains where one party justifiably believes the
other is looking out for her interests." Dealing with language
minorities might give rise to one of these special relationships that
imposes a duty to disclose unfair terms, 410 especially if the business
targets language minorities with assurances, express or implied, that
it will treat them fairly. For example, Spanish-Only Consumers might
justifiably perceive a "Se Habla Espafiol" sign as the merchant's
assurance that it will translate any unfair or otherwise material terms
of the bargain.' Arguably, the merchant creates the same expecta-
tion when it provides a bilingual salesperson to negotiate the oral
bargain. 2
Finally, language minorities might establish a duty to disclose under
applicable UDAP laws. Several UDAPs expressly require the disclo-
sure of material facts in the transactions they govern.413 Unfair
terms in the English-language contract are material facts that should
be disclosed (translated). These laws may also protect the victim of
the Unintended Bargain, at least when the seller is aware of the
buyer's misunderstanding, by treating the mistaken terms in the
English-Only bargain as material facts to be translated. Most UDAPs
also generally prohibit unfair or deceptive practices. 4  Failing to
disclosures were in English. See supra notes 372-77 and accompanying text (discussing cases in
which precedent was established that prohibits sellers from choosing one language for oral
negotiations and another language for written agreement).
409. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 56, § 9-20, at 369-70.
410. Cf Boonstra v. Stevens-Norton, Inc., 393 P.2d 287, 290 (Wash. 1964) (declaring that
parties in fraud action had at least quasi-fiduciary relationship when one had limited knowledge
of real estate transactions and of English, although court only implied that language was factor
in decision).
411. Representations that the merchant is "serving the Latino/a community" may create the
same expectation. See Lisa Leff, The Art of the Deal-in Spanish; Car Dealerships Using Hispanic
Salespeople to Pull in Customers, WASH. POST, Feb. 5, 1994, at BI (describing advertising boasts of
Maryland car dealer that it has been "serving the Latino community for 53 years").
412. Cf Robert A. Hillman, Debunking Some Myths About Unconscionability: A New Framework
for UC.C. Section 2-302,67 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 12 (1981) (arguing thatwhen two parties bargain
in Spanish, law should require seller to translate written bargain because buyer has relied on
superior knowledge of seller).
413. E.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1522(A) (1994); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-88-108 (Mitchie
1991); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2513(a) (1993); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 815, para. 505/2 (Smith-
Hurd 1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-626 (1994); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 13-301 (1990);
MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. §§ 445.903(s) & (bb) (West 1989 & Supp. 1995); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 598.0923(2) (Michie 1994); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-2 (West 1989); OR. REV. STAT. § 646.608
(1993); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 37-24-6(1) (1994); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 17.46(b) (23) (West 1987 & Supp. 1995).
414. See supra Part III.C (noting basic contours of UDAP laws and their applicability in
language minority context).
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disclose or translate unfair terms, therefore, might be actionable by
language minorities under these UDAP "catch alls."415
E. Language Fraud and the English-Only Marketplace as Unconscionable
Conduct
Although the unconscionability doctrine should encompass the
Unfair Bargain, its insistence on substantive unfairness may exclude
victims of the Unintended Bargain.4"' Moreover, the unconsciona-
bility doctrine's inadequate remedies fail to deter unconscionable
conduct.4 17 Codifications of the doctrine have begun to address
both concerns, but additional reform is needed.
In contrast to the inadequate remedies under the common law and
the first generation codification of the doctrine in UCC Section 2-302,
some second generation codifications authorize more potent reme-
dies. By invoking UDAPs that proscribe unconscionable practices,
418
language minorities can access the range of UDAP remedies that
might include restitution, attorneys' fees, minimum damages, double
or treble damages, and even punitive damages.419 Another second
generation statute, Article 2A of the UCC, authorizes courts to grant
"appropriate relief" and attorneys' fees to victims of unconscionable
consumer leases.420  To continue the development of adequate
remedies, state legislatures should reform their UDAPs to (1)
explicitly encompass unconscionable conduct, (2) extend to consumer
transactions generaly,421 and (3) provide remedies sufficient to
deter unlawful practices.422 Current revision of UCC Article 2 must
address the need for remedies sufficient to deter unconscionable conduct.4
415. Cf Milbourne v. Mid-Penn Consumer Discount Co. (In reMilbourne), 108 B.R. 522,533-
38 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989) (discussing "catch all" provision of Pennsylvania's UDAP law and
concluding that lender's failure to disclose to borrowers disadvantages of its refinancing bargain,
as compared to its new loan bargain, is unfair practice under "catch all").
416. See supra Part I.C.3 (discussing protection that unconscionability doctrine may afford
language minorities).
417. See supra Part I.C.3.
418. See SHELDON & CARTER, supra note 97, § 4.4.1, at 136 (counting 12 such UDAPs).
Unconscionable conduct might also fil within a UDAP "catch-all" for unfair or deceptive
practices. See id. at 136-37.
419. See SHELDON & CARTER, supra note 97, ch. 8, at 415-62.
420. U.C.C. § 2A-108 (1990); see alsoNehf, supra note 240, at 812 (noting that unlike § 2-302,
Article 2A "leaves room" for courts to award affirmative damages).
421. See supra notes 380-82 and accompanying text (discussing areas not covered by some
UDAP laws including banking and insurance services).
422. See Bender, supra note 94, at 666-81 (detailing inadequacies of private remedy in
Oregon's UDAP and proposing methods to improve protection of consumers).
423. See Gail Hillebrand, The Redrafling of UCCArtides 2 and 9: Model Codes orModelDinosaurs?,
28 Loy. LA L. REV. 191, 193 (1994) (urging that reformers of Article 2 (and also Article 9 for
secured transactions) adopt unconscionability provision in Article 2A).
1100
CONSUMER PROTECTION FOR LATINOS
Legislatures should also address the failure of the common law and
the first generation statutes to explicitly authorize judges to strike
down bargains as unconscionable based on procedural unfairness
alone.424 Some second generation statutes have begun to expand
the reach of the doctrine. For example, the 1974 Uniform Consumer
Credit Code (UCCC) specifically addresses the abuse of language
minorities. The UCCC's unconscionability standard asks whether the
seller, lessor, or lender "has knowingly taken advantage of the inability
of the consumer or debtor reasonably to Protect his interest by reason
of... illiteracy, inability to understand the language of the agree-
ment, or similar factors."4' Similar language provisions are found
in the 1968 UCCC,426 the Uniform Consumer Sales Practices
Act,427 and in the various state consumer laws that codify or are
influenced by these uniform laws.4 "2  The Official Comments to the
1974 UCCC suggest that its language provision contemplates a
substantively unfair bargain:
[A consumer is entitled to relief from] a sale of goods on terms
known by the seller to be disadvantageous to the consumer where
the written agreement is in English, the consumer is literate only
in Spanish, the transaction was negotiated orally in Spanish by the
seller's sales[person], and the written agreement was neither
translated nor explained to the consumer, but the mere fact a
consumer has little education and cannot read or write and must
sign with an "x" is not itself determinative of unconscionability.4 9
If so construed, victims of Unfair Bargains are protected. These
second generation statutes, however, may not extend to the Unintend-
424. See A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 186 Cal. Rptr. 114, 121-22 (Ct. App. 1982)
(declaring that unconscionability has both procedural and substantive elements and that under
California's general unconscionability statute modeled after UCC § 2-302 "the mere fact that a
contract term is not read or understood... will not authorize a court to refuse to enforce the
contract [because] ... commercial practicalities dictate that unbargained for terms only be
denied enforcement where they are also substantively unreasonable").
425. UNIF. CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 5.108(4)(e), 7A U.L.A. 168 (1974).
426. UNIF. CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 6.111(3)(e), 7 U.L.A. 838, 839 (1968) (making
reference to "inability to understand the language" as factor in finding of unconscionability).
427. UNIF. CONSUMER SALES PRAGICFS AcT § 4(c), 7A U.LA 241 (1971) (asking whether
merchant "knew or had reason to know" that he took advantage of consumer's illiteracy or
inability to understand language).
428. E.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-88-107 (Michie 1991 & Supp. 1993); COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-6-
111 (1992); IDAHO CODE § 28-46-111 (Michie 1995); IDAHO CODE § 48-603C (Michie Supp.
1995); IND. CODE § 24-4.5-6-111 (1991 & Supp. 1994); IOWA CODEANN. § 537.5108 (West 1987);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 16a-6-111 (1988); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-627 (1994); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit.
9-A, § 6-111 (West 1980); MICH. COMP. LAWs ANN. § 445.903 (West Supp. 1995); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 1345.03 (Anderson 1993); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 14A, § 6-111 (West 1983); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 761.1 (West Supp. 1995); OR. REV. STAT. § 646.605 (1993); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 37-5-108 (Law. Co-op. 1989); W. VA. CODE § 46A-7-109 (1995); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 425.107
(West 1988); WvO. STAT. § 40-14-611 (1993).
429. UNIF. CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 5.108 cmt. 4, 7A U.LA 167, 170-71 (1974).
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ed Bargain, unless perhaps the merchant is aware of the consumer's
mistake and takes knowing advantage by failing to translate.4 10 Even
when the merchant is unaware of the consumer's mistaken under-
standing of the bargain, courts should exercise their wide discretion
under these laws and protect the language minority if the merchant
knew of the language barrier.431  Alternatively, the victim of an
Unintended Bargain can urge relief under those second generation
statutes that expressly proscribe unconscionable "conduct" without
reference to unfair terms. For example, Article 2A-108 of the UCC
outlaws lease contracts "induced by unconscionable conduct. 43
, 2
430. These circumstances could entitle the consumer to relief under the doctrine of
unilateral mistake. Under the Restatement (Second) ofContracts, a mistake as to a basic assumption
that has a material adverse effect on the bargain will support rescission if the mistaken party
does not bear the risk of the mistake and, among other alternatives, "the other party had reason
to know of the mistake." § 153(b) (1979). By allocating the risk of the mistake wherever
reasonable, § 154 of the Restatement gives courts substantial discretion to decide which party bore
that risk. Id. § 154(c). Thus far, courts have had few occasions to consider claims of unilateral
mistake resulting from a language barrier. CompareTeran v. Citicorp Person-to-Person Fin. Ctr.,
706 P.2d 582, 388 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985) (stating that if Spanish-Only Consumers failed to
understand that their home was collateral for loan, their mistake "was unilateral only, and
cannot afford ground for relief") with Oh v. Wilson, No. 26122, 1996 WL 38213, at *3 (Nev.Jan.
31, 1996) (ruling that trial court erred in awarding summaryjudgment to holders of release of
claims when material fact existed as to whether insurer knew that limited English claimant failed
to understand release).
The Restatement's rule for standardized contracts also grants relief from a term that the other
party has reason to know is unintended. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211(3)
(1979) ("Where the other party has reason to believe that the party manifesting such assent
would not do so if he knew that the writing contained a particular term, the term is not part of
the agreement.").
431. Although the 1974 UCC refers to "knowingly" taking advantage of a language barrier,
the Uniform Consumer Sales Practices Act asks whether the other party "knew or had reason
to know" that it was taking advantage of the language barrier. UNIFORM CONSUMER SALES
PRACrIcES Acr § 4(c), 7A U.LA. 241 (1971). In articulating a standard for when to refuse to
enforce bargains marked by transactional incapacity, Professor Eisenberg preferred a standard
that looked to what the other party had reason to know:
It might be appropriate to restrict the doctrine of transactional incapacity to cases in
which the fully competent party had actual knowledge of the transactional incapacity;
however, a promisee with reason to know has at least some culpability, and more
important, a standard requiring actual knowledge might be too difficult to administer.
When the evidence demonstrates a lack of actual knowledge, the lesser culpability
might be taken into account in fixing the remedy.
Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle and Its Limits, 95 HARV. L. REV. 741, 766 n.67
(1982). Professor Schwartz criticized the "reason to know" standard because he feared that
merchants would avoid the cost of individualized investigation and refuse to deal with members
of groups, such as "poor blacks and Chicanos," likely to be judged in some way incompetent to
bargain. See Schwartz, supra note 62, at 1081-82 & n.64. It is unlikely, however, that the burden
of providing translations to often predictable language minority groups will chase merchants out
of this growing market. Moreover, civil rights laws will override their decision to oust Latinos/as
from the marketplace. See supra Part III.B.1 (discussing application of federal civil rights acts
to consumer transactions).
432. U.C.C. § 2A-108(2) (1990). See generally Michael J. Herbert, Unconscionability Under
Article 2A, 21 U. TOL. L. REv. 715, 723-28 (1990) (noting distinction between procedural and
substantive unconscionability and questioning whether Article 2A goes beyond the existing
doctrines of duress and fraud). Article 2A's reference to unconscionable inducement applies
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Finally, even the common law and first generation standard might
extend to Unintended Bargains if the court agrees that subjectively
undesirable terms are always substantively unfair. 3
Admittedly, extending the unconscionability doctrine to Unintend-
ed Bargain victims may have significant impact on transactions with
language minorities. Because a merchant may not know when a
language minority has mistaken expectations about the written
bargain, cautious merchants will translate every bargain to protect
their transactions against later attack. As a result, the unconscionabili-
ty doctrine might serve as an equivalent to the Language of the
Consumer model of positive law.4'
1 Multi-Institutional Strategies to Protect Language Minority Consumers
1. Consumer education programs for language minorities
Consumer advocates often urge consumer education to comple-
ment the disclosure paradigm of consumer protection regulation.'
Apart from the need for adequate funding that generally plagues
only to consumer leases. When confronted with an unconscionability challenge to an
untranslated commercial bargain one court rejected the claim. See Gaskin v. Stumm Handel
GmbH, 390 F. Supp. 361, 363 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (enforcing forum selection clause in German
language contract and stating that parties have duty to secure translation of language they do
not understand). Courts should grant relief in appropriate circumstances, however, such as
when the commercial party has been misled as to the contents of the untranslated bargain. See,
e.g., D & W Cent. Station Alarm Co. v. Yep, 480 N.Y.S.2d 1015, 1017-18 (Civ. Ct. 1984) (relieving
shopkeeper from rental agreement for burglar alarm system on grounds of unconscionability
because she was led to believe that agreement terminated on her relocation of business and
although agreement provided otherwise, clause was in fine print and shopkeeper could not read
English).
433. A danger in extending the unconscionability standard to untranslated bargains that are
objectively fair is that consumers might manipulate this standard to seek rescission of bargains
whenever "buyer's remorse" sets in. For example, a language minority dissatisfied with an
automobile purchase for reasons unrelated to the language barrier might invoke the
unconscionability doctrine to urge falsely that she misunderstood some material term of the
English bargain. On balance, however, this risk does not justify denying relief to victims of
Unintended Bargains. Rather, before granting relief, courts should discern whether the
consumer's dissatisfaction is truly language-based (what could be called "subjective substantive
unfairness") or results from buyer's remorse. The thorny issue of buyer's remorse can be
avoided when legislatures or agencies establish positive rights to translations in consumer
transactions that carry sanctions, such as rescission, that do not depend on a showing of some
objective loss of money.
434. See supra notes 198-209 and accompanying text (discussing Language of Consumer
Standard as legislative model protecting any consumer whom merchant knows or has reason to
know is unable to understand English).
435. See DAVID CAPLOVrrZ, THE POOR PAY MORE 192 (1967) (arguing that consumer
education is one of few solutions short of eradicating poverty); Whitford, supra note 246, at 452
(maintaining that both government and media should contribute more to consumer awareness
and education).
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these programs,436 an effective consumer education program for
language minorities must address issues specific to these consumers.
Any program of consumer education must address issues of content.
For language minorities, education should include concepts and
devices of the American marketplace with which they are unfamiliar.
These concepts may include "as is" sales of used cars, credit insurance,
extended product warranties, variable interest rates, rent-to-own
transactions, and home loan escrow accounts. Because language
barriers present opportunities for abuse, adult English instruction
plays a role in the consumer education model for language minori-
ties. Unfortunately, these language programs are often overbooked
and underfunded.437
In designing consumer education programs for language minorities,
it is crucial that planners consult representatives of the particular
language group to help determine appropriate content. Moreover,
language minorities are often suspicious of government activities.4m
This is particularly true for the Latino/a community in the wake of
California's Proposition 187. Programs that originate in federal,
state, or local government agencies, such as a state Attorney General's
office, therefore, are best presented through private community-based
organizations with established linkages of trust and support in the
particular language minority community. National consumer
organizations (such as the National Consumer Law Center) and
groups that advocate for language minorities (such as the Mexican
American Legal Defense and Educational Fund and the National
Council of La Raza) might develop materials (videotapes, pamphlets,
etc.) for use in these programs.
2. Role of consumer protection enforcement agencies
In many states, officials charged with public enforcement of state
UDAPs (typically the state's Attorney General office) must serve a
growing number of language minority constituents. More than half
the states authorize their enforcement agency to promulgate
436. See Bender, supra note 94, at 643-44 (describing declining enforcement resources for
consumer protection efforts at federal level and in Oregon).
437. See CRA roRD, supra note 109, at 17 (reporting that when California's English language
initiative passed in 1986, more than 40,000 adults were on waiting list for English-as-a-second-
language classes in Los Angeles alone); BarbaraYost, Immigrants on WaitingList forEnglish Classes;
U.S. Newcomers on Track to Crack Language Barrier, ARiz. REP., Oct. 29, 1995, at G9 (reporting six-
month waiting list for some English language dasses in Phoenix area).
438. Susan Girardo Roy, Note, Restoring Hope or ToleratingAbuse? Responses to Domestic Violence
Against Immigrant Women, 9 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 263, 271 (1995).
439. See supra text accompanying note 208 (opining on possible impact of Proposition 187
on merchant-consumer relations).
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regulations under the state UDAP.44 Too few state agencies have
exercised their authority on behalf of language minorities." 1  It is
crucial that UDAP enforcement agencies with rulemaking power
initiate that process to establish positive rights to translations in
consumer transactions.
State UDAP enforcement agencies usually have great discretion in
deciding how to deploy their enforcement resources. By aggressive
pursuit of the more egregious schemes that target language minori-
ties, 2 these agencies can deliver the message that consumers
deserve equal protection and market justice regardless of their race,
English language ability, and immigration status. Because businesses
individually and through their trade associations keep close watch on
UDAP enforcement practices, a single high profile case might alter
industry practice. Moreover, UDAP enforcement agencies often
communicate with these trade associations through forums and
correspondence. Mutually acceptable business practices protecting
language minorities could be pursued through these less formal
means.
To serve adequately their language minority constituents, state
UDAP agencies need to overcome the mistrust of government
embedded in the culture of some language groups. Language
minority communities must be assured that the law protects them
from market abuses regardless of their immigration status, and that
state agencies will not report any suspicion of undocumented status
to federal immigration authorities." 3  State UDAP agencies can
440. See SHELDON & CARTER, supra note 97, § 3.4.3, at 97-99 (counting 29 states).
441. Attorneys general should follow the examples from Connecticut, Florida, and
Massachusetts discussed supra note 378. See generaly Peter S. Canellos, AG Now Requires Lenders
to Offer Bilingual Service, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 3, 1992, at 16 (Metro) (explaining origins of
ruIemaking by Massachusetts' Attorney General to protect immigrant borrowers).
442. Translation laws must be enforced or compliance will lapse. Recent incidents indicate
that some California merchants appear to have ignored that state's translation law. SeePenelope
McMillan, Two Car Dealers Fined $215,000 in Fraud Cases, LA. TIMES, Apr. 23, 1993, at B3
(discussing case of California car dealers who routinely negotiated sales in Spanish, but provided
English contracts and were convicted of fraud and fined $215,000 for practice) ;Jennifer Warren,
Suit Links Satellite-Dish Seller, Lender to Fraud, LA. TIMs, Apr. 1, 1989, at B1 (reporting same
practice by satellite-dish vendor). In order to determine compliance with translation duties,
enforcement agencies should employ undercover operations similar to those used under
antidiscrimination laws.
443. See generally Robert L. Bach, Building Community Among Diversity: Legal Services for
ImpoverishedImmgrants 27 U. MICH.J.L. REF. 639, 649-56 & n.48 (1994) (demonstrating, through
use of statistics, that legal status of immigrants affects types of legal assistance they seek, detailing
narrow sources of legal assistance used by undocumented immigrants for their consumer and
other legal problems and further noting undocumented immigrants are ineligible for Legal
Services Corporation-funded assistance). Even if California's Proposition 187 survives
constitutional challenge (see discussion supra note 43), its denial of public services to
undocumented immigrants does not appear to extend to public consumer protection
enforcement activities. See CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 48215, 66010.8 (West Supp. 1995); CAL. GOV'T
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establish communication and trust with language minorities by efforts
to (1) establish partnerships with private community-based organiza-
tions that deliver services to or advocate for language minorities, (2)
publish informational articles on consumer issues in non-English
newspapers and other media, (3) reprint consumer brochures in any
non-English languages common in the state,4' (4) staff information
and consumer fraud "hotlines" with bilingual operators, and (5) hire
bilingual enforcement officers to conduct consumer education
programs and to better communicate with language minority victims
of market practices that prompt public enforcement efforts.
3. Self-regulation in the marketplace
Whether to increase their market share, to avoid potential liability
under the common law, UDAPs, civil rights laws, or other law, or to
promote fair business practices, businesses that want to accommodate
language minorities should consider the following model. Based on
its past experience, a business should identify any language minority
group(s) that frequents it. For any group that frequents the business
often (accounting for more than one percent of its transactions). 5
the merchant should (1) translate its advertising, together with any
required disclosures, for inclusion in non-English media, (2) hire
sufficient numbers of bilingual salespersons able to conduct oral
negotiations in the language of these customers,446 (3) have avail-
able translations of every written document to be signed by or
CODE § 53069.65 (West Supp. 1995) (lacking any provisions that would curtail enforcement of
public consumer protection efforts); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 130 (West Supp. 1995);
CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 113, 114, 834b (West Supp. 1995); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 10001.5
(West Supp. 1995).
444. For example, the FTC offers several Spanish language publications on various unfair or
deceptive practices. The U.S. General Services Administration publishes a comprehensive "Lista
de publicaciones federales en espafiol para el consumidor" (list offederal consumer publications
in Spanish).
Some state English language laws, however, may purport to prevent any government entities
from producing publications or otherwise communicating in languages other than English. See
TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-1-404 (1991) ("All communications and publications, including ballots,
produced by government entities in Tennessee shall be in English ... ." ); see also supra Part IIA
(discussing validity of these laws and their potential effect on consumer protection reforms).
445. The merchant's size may bear on its ability to adopt the proposed self-regulation model.
For example, it may be unfeasible for a one-person small business to hire a bilingual salesperson
no matter the frequency of its transactions with a particular language minority group. On the
other hand, it may not be unreasonable to have available translations in these circumstances.
446. If possible, the employees should be members of the particular language group. Cf
Policy Statement, supra note 355, at 18,271 (pointing out that while fair-lending laws are not
employment laws, lenders who employ few members of protected classes contribute to climate
in which discrimination can occur, and suggesting strategies to facilitate hire of employees of
protected classes).
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provided to the customer in connection with the transaction,47 and
(4) post a prominent notice of the customer's ability to obtain a
bilingual salesperson and translations of the written bargain should
she so request.44s
For less common languages, in which the merchant does not make
available oral and written translations, the merchant should (1) orally
explain as much of the written bargain as possible in simple terms in
the language used to strike the oral bargain, (2) encourage the
consumer to obtain a translation of the written bargain, and (3) avoid
any puffery about the need for exigency that might deter the
consumer from delaying the final bargain to seek out a translation.
At least two obstacles prevent the self-regulation model from wholly
displacing the need for government intervention to aid language
minority consumers. First, unscrupulous merchants will ignore a
voluntary model. Second, merchants inclined to abandon less
egregious, but still unsound, English-Only business practices might
face backlash that discourages voluntary reform. For example,
proponents of the English language movement often target compa-
nies that voluntarily adopt bilingual advertising policies. They charge
that these policies encourage immigrants to refuse to learn Eng-
lish-the same criticism these proponents level against the provision
of government services in languages other than English. 9 Balanc-
ing the threat of backlash is the tremendous purchasing power that
language minority groups bring to the marketplace, as well as the
potential that organizations advocating for their rights might launch
boycotts of merchants that do not reasonably accommodate language
barriers.
447. For those documents provided to a merchant by a manufacturer, such as an owner's
manual, the merchant can notify the maker of the need for translation. Alternatively, the
merchant could orally translate any product hazards that are beyond the scope of the
consumer's normal expectations.
448. Representing 2600 members in the real estate finance business, the Mortgage Bankers
Association has developed a self-regulation strategy to promote home ownership among
minorities and immigrants that incorporates similar goals. See Mary Sit, Simplijying Home Buying
forImmigrants, BOSTON GLOBE,July 2, 1995, atA39 (describing strategy that includes promoting
minority recruitment and distributing Spanish-language brochures on mortgage lending); see also
Spanish Loan Apps Offered by Fannie, 5 MORTGAGE MARKETPLACE, Jan. 30, 1995, available on 1995
WL 7328863 (reporting publication by Fannie Mae of Spanish mortgage forms and glossary of
real estate and mortgage lending terms).
449. See Lee May, Battle over Bilingualism-Opposition Intensifies to Ads Using Spanish, LA. TIMES,
Sept. 8, 1986, at 21 (noting widespread debate and controversy concerning use ofadvertisements
in languages other than English and quoting U.S. English director as saying that advertising in
Spanish "'makes it much more difficult to learn English'"); see also Cordero, supra note 172, at
51 (noting that English language movement advocates have used many techniques to oppose
use of languages other than English in America, including initiating lawsuits, lobbying public
officials, and protesting against companies such as Philip Morris, Pacific Bell, and McDonald's
for providing directories, billboards, and menus in languages other than English).
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4. Impact of translation technology
While not yet capable of perfect translations from one language to
another, computer software can produce quick and cheap rough
drafts of translations into several common world languages including
Spanish.45° Eventually, technology may solve many or most of the
problems faced by language minorities in the marketplace.45 For
purposes of striking the oral bargain, consider the application to the
marketplace of Professor Piatt's workplace vision of computerized
headphones that orally translate dialogue instantaneously.452 Should
this sound far-fetched, consider further that in 1992 an American
telephone company previewed a built-in computer voice translator
system that, in real time, turns spoken English into Spanish at the
recipient's end of the call.4 5' A sobering thought is that, at best,
these technological aspirations, if realized, only level the consumers'
side of a marketplace playing field that still tilts too often in favor of
merchants.
CONCLUSION
In 1962, PresidentJohn F. Kennedy addressed Congress on behalf
of consumers, defining them as "us all."4 Kennedy articulated four
basic consumer rights: the right to safety, the right to choose, the
450. See Michael Desmond, Windows Software for the GlobalEconomy, PC WORLD, Mar. 1994, at
88 (describing advent of computer software programs designed to either translate language or
help user learn and understand language); New Translation Service Now Available on CompuServ
M2 PRE&SWiRE, Oct. 3, 1995, available on 1995 WL 10484904 (announcing on-line translation
service offering unedited machine translation within minutes, or including human post-editing
service for greater accuracy, at cost of $.03 per word and $10 per word respectively).
451. Until recently, translation software did not address the problem of language minorities
who are not literate in their native language. New "disk-to-voice" translation technology holds
promise in these circumstances. See "Sound Text" Read-Aloud Peripheral Under $100, NEWSIyrEs
NEWS NETWOm NEWSBYrES, Sept. 9, 1994, available on 1994 WL 2414657 (describing new real-
time translator that can turn typed English into vocalized Spanish).
452. SeePiATr, supra note 334, at 27 (offering scenario of workers, managers, and customers
of any language communicating through computer headphones that translate speaker's language
into listener's language of choice). Technology advances might also undercut the efficien-
cy/cost arguments of the English language movement urged to justify the conduct of
government business in the single language of English. I hope to explore this area further in
a subsequent article.
453. SeeStephen Advokat, BilingualAT&T, DET. FREE PRMs,June 10,1992, at 1C (describing
AT&T's Voice English/Spanish Translator system demonstrated at exposition in Seville, Spain,
that recognizes and translates 450 words). Subsequently, the AT&T speech synthesizer
technology has been used in a portable laptop real-time voice-to-voice translation system
designed for use by police departments and hospitals. See AF Speech Translator Nears Market,
TECH. TRANSFER WK.,Jan. 16, 1996, available on 1996 WL 8159972 (noting that system does not
yet have large vocabulary).
454. John F. Kennedy, Special Message on Protecting the Consumer Interest, 1962 Cong. Q.
458.
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right to be heard, and the right to be informed. 5 To promote the
fuller realization of these rights, Kennedy proposed the strengthening
of existing government programs and, in certain areas, that Congress
enact new legislation. 6 In articulating consumers' right to be
heard, Kennedy recognized that, although the consumers' voice is not
always heard as loudly or as often as those of smaller, better-organized
interests, government has a special obligation to be alert to their
needs and to advance their interests. v To secure consumers' right
to make informed choices, Kennedy urged comprehensive disclosure
legislation that Congress ultimately enacted in 1968 as the Truth in
Lending Act.451 Changing demographics compel the additional
reforms proposed in this Article to guarantee all persons the equal
opportunity to strike informed bargains even if they do not under-
stand English.459 While no more intrusive on fair bargains than




457. Id at 458, 461.
458. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1677 (1994).
459. Kennedy's articulation of a right to safety is echoed by those commentators who have
urged multilingual hazardous product warnings for language minorities. See Lee, supra note 19,
at 1136-41 (noting increase in Americans whose primary language is one other than English and
concluding that sellers who avail themselves of this segment of U.S. population have duty to
warn in all relevant languages).
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